

JAPAN AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

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INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 1968¹ the United States signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), climaxing years of effort to reach an agreement which might halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The Treaty became officially effective in March, 1970, and now has been ratified by over sixty nations.² President Johnson hailed it as the "most significant step we had yet taken to reduce the possibility of nuclear war,"³ and Soviet leaders were similarly optimistic. This general euphoria, however, was not felt in all world capitals. In particular, the NPT ignited a debate in Tokyo which could have profound implications for Asian and world security. Although Japan signed the agreement on February 3, 1970, her government officially indicated ratification would be contingent on several future developments,⁴ while private sources doubted if the Treaty would ever be ratified.⁵

¹Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 898.

²See Appendix I for a list of those countries which have ratified and those nations which have only signed the NPT. Since the Treaty only becomes binding after ratification, a states' signature alone means little more than support for the spirit of the Treaty. The most important non-signators are the People's Republic of China, France, India, Indonesia and Israel.

³Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 462.

⁴Information Bulletin (Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Information Bureau), Vol. XVII, No. 3, 1970, p. 26.

⁵David K. Willis, "Will Japan Join A-ban?", Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 7, 1970, p. 1. Commenting on Tokyo's signing of the NPT, Willis states that Japan is expected to postpone Diet ratification for at least two years and speculates that she may not sign at all. He cites "inside sources" which predict that chances of ratification are not better than 50-50.

This paper will examine Japanese attitudes on nuclear weapons using the NPT as a point of departure. The essay will be divided into eight sections. First, some general aspects of proliferation theory will be discussed. Second, the Treaty's evolution will be traced and its impact on Japan and the world will be described. Third, Japan's technical capacity to produce atomic weapons will be ascertained. Fourth, postwar Japanese defense policy will be outlined, emphasizing its current threat posture and illustrating its role in relations with neighboring Asia. Fifth, Sino-Japanese interactions will be analyzed with particular attention to China's emerging nuclear capability. Sixth, the peculiar nature of Japanese-American relations will be explained. Seventh, key elements of Japan's domestic scene which affect her foreign policy will be identified. Finally, some general conclusions will be drawn concerning the future role of nuclear weapons in Japanese foreign policy.

CHAPTER I

PROLIFERATION: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The irony of nuclear proliferation is that the "Nth country"⁶ tends to think the problem begins with $N + 1$. Each nation-state is fearful of weapon spread to its neighbors but invariably has perfectly unique and legitimate reasons for acquiring atomic arms itself. Although individual nuclear decisions point to a variety of imperatives, incentives for such armaments fall into two basic categories: prestige and security.

Prestige is the less tangible but possibly more powerful of the two motives. It refers to the political benefits associated with special weapons which include either a yearning for absolute sovereignty or greater freedom of action within an existing alliance system. The sheer publicity given new members of the 'nuclear club,' such as China in 1964, has helped perpetuate the prestige myth. This elusive concept appeals to the desire of all states for more independence in the world of power politics. It holds special inducements for countries like Japan which feel their current political influence is far from commensurate with their actual position in the global order. Prestige value accrues to nuclear arms because they not only indicate a nation's high technological level, economic power and military might but because they also symbolize the firm resolve of their possessor to pursue its national interests in the arena of world politics. Yet supposed prestige gains often obscure the real usefulness of atomic arsenals since such a capability may alienate nearby non-nuclear countries. This qualification is especially applicable to a nuclear Japan whose Asian

⁶ Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the $N + 1$ country," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39 (April, 1961), 357. This article popularized references to future nuclear powers as "Nth Countries."

neighbors remember only too well the era of the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere."

A second motive for procuring the bomb is security. This concern does not stem strictly from the military dimension of the international milieu; more generally, it originates from the phenomenon that as a nation becomes more involved in world affairs, its stake in a stable global order increases. As the world shifts from a bipolar to a multipolar posture, nations such as Japan find that past economic and political activities have rendered them increasingly vulnerable to the play of external forces. This realization often causes these countries to question whether previously valid security assurances are sufficient to cover their expanded national interests. While this atmosphere of uncertainty grows, atomic devices become gradually more attractive as an alternative to existing security arrangements.

The problem is that security guarantees are not simple undertakings for the protector to act in a particular way. They are commitments which are believed both by the possible aggressor and by the country fearing attack. Of necessity, such commitments are as much a feeling of mutual confidence as an overt treaty declaration. Their possible erosion is the product of today's multipolar environment plus the failure of any nation to make a predicable and exact science of deterrence. In the early Cold War years, Japan and other states backed certain allies largely because they had no other alternative. But today such countries are materially stronger and face a world where the opportunities to wield their new influence are considerably greater.

If the diffusion of world power enhances the appeal of nuclear weapons, their horizontal propagation is likewise a function of the superpowers own

vertical arms race. For instance, a further Soviet-American buildup pressures China to construct more bombs to achieve a credible second strike capability. Growth of the Chinese threat, in turn, further destabilizes the international atmosphere in which an Nth country must operate. One indirect method of providing security guarantees to potential nuclear powers is genuine progress at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) or similar superpower agreements.

A final inducement for atomic arsenals can be found in the ambivalent nature of a strong bipolar alliance. In one sense, assurances under such a system contain the best of two worlds: the greatest security before nuclear development and some promise of support even after starting construction.

This de facto support would be especially important in the new nation's first years of weapon manufacture. During the period of initial production, considerable incentives would exist for the intended enemy to preempt his adversary's capability before his adversary attained a deterrent posture. The tacit support, at least, of the Nth country's old protector might be necessary to reduce such a possibility.

Even with outside assistance, the strategic vulnerability of any system often reduces its effectiveness. Some prominent Japanese have described nuclear arms as a "beautiful dream"⁷ for precisely this reason while others have contended that, against a country lacking sophisticated air defense, even B-52's suffice as an adequate delivery mechanism. An

⁷ John K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen and Power. The Japanese Dilemma (New York: Dunellen Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), p. 355. The quote is from a 1970 statement by Kaihara Osamu, chief of the secretariat of the National Defense Council.

effective means of retaliation must also meet the changing demands placed upon it by the aggressor. Missiles which the emerging power learns about after a time lag, and develops after a further time lag, are not likely to be relevant to their initial purpose. The possibility of this continual development gap poses two additional problems. First, the Nth country will be faced with spiraling costs for weapons the benefits of which are not necessarily apparent to its citizenry. Next, the potential atomic power will be unable to achieve quickly a position of mutual deterrence vis-à-vis its probable opponent, simply prolonging the new state's initial period of extreme vulnerability to political or military preemptive action by its rival.

Despite the above considerations, the essence of Japan's nuclear dilemma appears to reside in her current Security Treaty with the United States. By this agreement, Washington extended the American nuclear umbrella over Tokyo, and the credibility of this deterrent must be the focus for any discussion of Japanese rearmament. The credibility question hinges on the assumption that a nation's adversaries and allies believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it has both the will and the physical capacity to use its atomic arsenal. The United States must appear willing to do the very thing it wants most to avoid or its guarantees are essentially meaningless.

American guarantees, as viewed by many long-time allies, have been progressively diluted during the postwar years. From Dulles' massive retaliation to MacNamara's flexible response to the Nixon Doctrine, the United States has gradually altered its strategic posture according to its perceptions of global realities. To a powerful America, such action means a more flexible foreign policy but, to an apprehensive Japan, these changes

may imply a loss of will to defend what were previously regarded as common interests in Asia. Japan has yet to question openly the basic integrity of the United States' nuclear deterrent because doing so might destroy the entire fabric of her present security structure. Nevertheless, doubts concerning the long-term prospects of a one-way American security guarantee to Japan clearly underlie official Japanese statements regarding the defense alliance.

The Nixon Doctrine thus has profound implications for Japan since reducing the United States' presence in Asia makes the entire credibility issue painfully immediate. Withdrawal from Vietnam, the return of a nuclear-free Okinawa to Japan, and force reductions throughout the Far East are substantive actions reflecting American intentions which have heightened Japanese anxiety over their country's future. Although Washington has acknowledged that some relationship exists between its forces in Japan and the validity of the United States' deterrent,⁸ absolute troop levels frequently lose their significance in light of a continued trend toward their eventual pullout. American defense strategy for the 1970's merely confirms this tendency. In the words of Secretary Laird:

⁸U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Okinawa, Hearings, testimony of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, p. 1262. Sec. Johnson, a former ambassador to Japan, stated that the United States' presence in Japan gave visible evidence of the American commitment and therefore inhibited Japanese desires to acquire nuclear weapons. During the same testimony, he also said that reduction of American bases in Japan was a product of the Nixon Doctrine under which individual countries were to assume more of their own defense burdens.

The strategy of Realistic Deterrence is new. Those who would dismiss it as a mere continuation of past policies in new packaging would be quite mistaken...we have said, and I would repeat, that we do not intend to be the policeman of the world. Many of our allies are already prosperous; others are rapidly becoming so. Therefore, it is realistic and more effective that the burden of protecting peace and freedom should be shared more fully by our allies and friends.⁹

The disquieting fact about burden-sharing in Asia are its inferences as the People's Republic of China (PRC) expands her nuclear might. Should the Chinese achieve a second strike capability against the United States, what would be the consequences for Japan? In strategic parlance, would Seattle, San Francisco or Los Angeles make better hostage cities than Tokyo or Osaka? On the surface, it would appear that a Chinese capability to strike the American heartland would greatly diminish current security assurances to Japan. Although Peking's ability to administer an unacceptable level of damage would not completely neutralize the United States' deterrent,¹⁰ it would likely lessen Washington's support for Tokyo in the event of a political or even military confrontation with the PRC. The defense of Japan itself is not the point in question. Because of her economic strength, industrial capacity and geographic location, Japan is sufficiently important to insure that the American deterrent would continue to counter any direct Chinese threat to the home islands. But in other areas in the Far East, where Japan's economic, political and prestige investments transcend those of the United States, American willingness to

⁹ Melvin R. Laird, Toward a Strategy of Realistic Deterrence (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 1.

¹⁰ A contrary argument is presented by Walter B. Wentz in Nuclear Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968), p. 72.

risk even a single population center would become at best doubtful. While such developments have not been lost on the Japanese,¹¹ even the most outspoken advocates of an independent nuclear force must weigh the probability that the United States' deterrent will not be used against the assured use of their own arsenal but its doubtful effectiveness.

Besides these strategic considerations, various economic factors also influence the diffusion of atomic devices. The tremendous investments of money and manpower required for any nuclear program serve as passive constraints on those countries desiring a weapon capacity. Yet an important development over the last decade has been the gradual lowering of technological barriers, at least to acquisition of a token force, for a variety of reasons. First, the spread of technical information about atomic energy has greatly increased. Through the United Nations' conferences on the peaceful uses of atomic power and numerous scientific contacts among all

¹¹See, for example, Yonosuke Nagai, "Security and Independence as National Goals," Chuo Koron (July, 1966) in Summaries of Selected Japanese Magazines (hereafter Summaries), U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, September 19, 1966, p. 21. Although somewhat exaggerated, Nagai's article expresses the legitimate fears of many Japanese statesmen and intellectuals by complaining:

So long as China's nuclear fighting power is negligible, the United States can choose to protect the countries around China. In the stage where China's nuclear fighting power raises a threat to the United States itself, however, Asian peace and security solely depend on China's moves and intent. This is tantamount to allowing Chinese diplomacy to hold the power of life and death. Japanese peace and security will be left to the mercy of China.

nations, the world's general knowledge of nuclear techniques has steadily improved. Next, atomic power appears to be the wave of the future for industrial areas with high population densities. The continuing reduction of organic fuel reserves, the growing danger of air pollution from combustion of such fuels, the low transportation costs of nuclear energy and its potential use for desalinization are all strong incentives for commercial nuclear programs. Finally, largely as a result of the previous two developments, actual costs of arms procurement are decreasing. In their 1967 report to Secretary-General U Thant, a group of United Nations consultant experts predicted a "modest" nuclear program would cost only \$1.7 billion.¹² Even this figure was expected to drop as technology spread and large-scale power projects would reduce capital investments and operating costs in the atomic field. The report estimated that "by 1980 there would be in the world more than 3×10^5 megawatts (Mwe) of nuclear power production. This would involve the production of plutonium sufficient for thousands of bombs each year."¹³ As will be shown later, a generous portion of this anticipated generating capacity will belong to Japan.

Intertwined with these economic issues is the problem of distinguishing between the peaceful and military applications of atomic power. Countries

¹²U.S., Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 501-502. The entire report dealt with the blast effects, economic implications and security implications of nuclear weapons. In this context, "modest" represented a force of "thirty to fifty bomber aircraft, together with fifty medium-range missiles of the 3,000 kilometer range in soft emplacements and 100 plutonium warheads." The total cost of \$1.7 billion was figured as being spread over ten years, with an annual procurement cost of \$170 million.

¹³Ibid., p. 506.

with large civilian power programs are already well down the road to weapon acquisition as it appears impossible to identify that point where clear evidence of military intent exists. The ambiguous nature of this process simply aids potential nuclear powers. Japan, for example, justifies her accelerated construction of power reactors as mandatory to meet future energy requirements, knowing full well that such action also increases her latent capability for weapon manufacture. So long as present atomic arsenals form part of their political environment and, therefore, their calculations, Japan and other near-nuclear governments will be unlikely to abandon technical options they currently possess.

A factor which further obscures the peaceful-military dividing line is the traditional web of secrecy surrounding weapon activity. Any public discussion of an impending nuclear decision is usually suppressed for two reasons: First, the subject's extreme sensitivity would arouse considerable domestic turmoil; second, such a debate would probably have divisive effects on neighboring governments. The result is often that a handful of administrators, politicians and technocrats are able to steer a nuclear program ever closer to weapon production. When the time arrives for a definite decision, project momentum is sufficiently established that it would require a very determined government to halt manufacture. An additional advantage of this strategy is in presenting possible opponents--foreign and domestic--with a virtual fait accompli.

Despite these somewhat gloomy prospects, there have been some past successes in arms control. The NPT, Limited Test Ban Treaty¹⁴ and the

¹⁴ Although not originally so conceived, the Test Ban Treaty may be the world's most significant non-proliferation measure to date. The experience of the five nuclear powers has shown that any nation trying to develop

treaty banning nuclear weapons from outer space are the prime examples of limited super-power cooperation to keep a measure of control over the global pattern of events. Yet a characteristic common to all the arrangements was the failure of two nuclear nations, France and China, to adhere to them.

Future directions of proliferation contain a wide variety of options. At one end of the spectrum, a comprehensive test ban, a freeze on delivery systems, a cut-off of fissile material production and nuclear-free zones are the most frequently discussed measures in the United Nations. In contrast, selective proliferation proposals similar to the defunct Multilateral Force (MLF) concept for Western Europe also have some attractive features. Proponents of this latter view see a MLF or some type of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system as the only means of retaining American deterrent credibility in particular countries.¹⁵ Such a sharing arrangement for Japan would theoretically buttress current guarantees but in practice might prove to be counterproductive. It would generate instability both in her internal politics and in her relations with Asia while remaining geographically vulnerable to the very threat it was designed to counter.

In one sense, the future of proliferation depends on the implementation of an existing agreement--the NPT. This Treaty was the most recent step toward arms control. Although widely hailed by both Americans and

atomic arms will find it extremely difficult, both technically and financially, to start testing fission devices anywhere but in the atmosphere. Given their current state of the art, all but the most advanced countries would have difficulty even exploding a crude weapon underground much less producing the detailed blast and yield data necessary for military purposes.

¹⁵See, for example, Wentz, Proliferation, passim.

Soviets, it was embraced with considerably less enthusiasm by potential nuclear nations. The Treaty's central assumption is that the possibility of nuclear war is reduced by stopping weapon propagation. Implicit in this rationale is the idea that proliferation is a determinant of the international environment rather than a reflection of the distrust and hostility already present in that environment and that weapons themselves are the source, instead of mere agents, of world discord. Such inverse logic gives the NPT little chance for success; it is an artificial means to deal with the political and technical complexities of weapon spread. A successful international treaty reflects reality but does not produce reality. Basically a superpower attempt to legislate the future of Nth countries, the NPT will be hard pressed to produce a lasting consensus on many points where even initial common interests between nuclear and non-nuclear signators were lacking.

CHAPTER II
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY:
EVOLUTION AND PROSPECT

After four years of negotiation, the NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968, and subsequently entered into force on March 5, 1970.¹⁶ Its functional articles can be summarized as follows:

Article I - Nuclear states pledge not to transfer atomic weapons to non-nuclear nations or to encourage those nations to acquire special weapons.

Article II - Non-nuclear countries undertake reciprocal obligations neither to receive nor to acquire atomic arms.

Article III - Procedures are established for each nation to negotiate safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The object of such safeguards is to prevent the diversion of fissionable material from peaceful uses to weapons manufacture.

Article IV - Nothing in the Treaty will hinder non-nuclear states from full development of peaceful atomic energy.

Article V - Each nuclear power will insure that any benefits from the peaceful application of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear powers.

Article VI - Each nuclear power will pursue "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date."¹⁷

Article VIII - Amendments can only be passed by a majority of all Parties to the Treaty which must include the approval of all nuclear states and all current members of the IAEA Board of Governors. There will be a review conference every five years to consider possible revisions.

¹⁶For the full text of the NPT, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 461-465.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 463.

Article X - Any Party will "have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country."¹⁸ Such notice must be given three months in advance. Also, the Treaty will have an initial twenty-five year life span.

Although any analysis must necessarily focus on the Treaty's substance, it is still helpful to compare this result with previously proposed drafts. Several articles in the final Treaty were included only at the vehement behest of non-nuclear nations. Guarantees for unimpaired civilian atomic programs, assurances about the "spinoff" benefits¹⁹ of nuclear explosive devices, five year review conferences and the twenty-five year Treaty duration were all superpower concessions to Nth country demands. Additionally, the nuclear power pledge to further arms control progress (i.e. SALT) was incorporated as Article VI from its initial position in the Treaty preamble. The content of these changes may not be earthshaking, but the pattern they represent is unmistakable. With the exception of

¹⁸Ibid., p. 465.

¹⁹For Japan's attitude, see Ryukichi Imai, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Japan," Survival, XI (September, 1969), 283. An atomic energy consultant to the Foreign Ministry, Imai contends that the immediate spinoff benefits from weapon-oriented research and development (R & D) are exaggerated but that the long-term problem is valid: Military R & D is unfortunately the best and often the only means for national investment in nuclear R & D activities. Unless there is a military purpose for conducting such research, the large initial investment and slowly realized returns will likely prohibit profit-seeking private capital from undertaking necessary research projects. Imai cites several examples to prove his point: Gas graphite reactors are an outgrowth of plutonium production facilities; light water reactors (LWR) are offsprings of submarine propulsion studies; the development of uranium enrichment for commercial use came only after the five nuclear powers spent billions in perfecting this process for bomb manufacture.

Soviet-American disagreements over safeguards and the MLF,²⁰ Treaty negotiating history, was characterized by a nuclear state versus non-nuclear state alignment on issues.

To alleviate this have-have not dichotomy, the United States made two specific offers. First, on December 2, 1967, President Johnson announced that the United States would not ask any country to accept safeguards which Washington itself was unwilling to accept. When safeguards have been applied under the Treaty, America would permit the IAEA "to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States--excluding only those with direct national security significance."²¹ This initiative was coupled with a similar British offer²² in an effort to dispel Nth country reservations that Treaty safeguards would impinge on their sovereignty and that submission to safeguards risked revelation of commercial nuclear secrets.

The second American step was a joint declaration of security assurances, undertaken in concert with Moscow and London, to support non-nuclear powers threatened by atomic attack.²³ It pledged the three nations, through the

²⁰This controversy alone stalled NPT negotiations during much of the mid-1960's. The American position held that MLF would not violate the Treaty since control of any force weapons would still reside with the United States. The Soviets maintained that physical transfer of nuclear arms, regardless of who had the trigger, was unacceptable. The conflict quietly subsided when the United States abandoned the MLF concept in 1966.

²¹Documents on Disarmament, 1967, p. 615. The United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has subsequently stated that the Johnson pledge could involve about 200 facilities of six different types (research reactors, power reactors, etc.).

²²Ibid., p. 616.

²³Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 439-440. See Appendix II for text. Ambassador Goldberg read the American declaration to the Security Council on June 17, 1968. The U.K. and Soviet representatives presented substantially identical resolutions on the same date.

U.N. Security Council, to counter effectively any nuclear actions taken or threatened against a Treaty signator. Given the Security Council's past peacekeeping record, such assurances appear questionable to endangered Nth countries. Their shortcoming is common to all United Nations' efforts at collective security among the major international competitors; there are virtually no shared interests requiring the use of force that can be relied upon to prevail over individual national interests.

In view of the above background, why did the United States work so vigorously for Treaty acceptance? The acknowledged answers varied according to the audience addressed. For domestic political consumption, both at home and abroad, Washington emphasized two points: First, that the Treaty would save potential nuclear powers the tremendous opportunity and absolute costs of atomic arsenals and prevent subsequent economic dislocation; second, that the NPT would halt a kind of geometric progression from the growth of plutonium production to weapon spread to the increased risks of local nuclear conflicts and their inevitable escalation into world war.²⁴ This latter argument, although not based on any rigorous calculation of weapons use probabilities, is quite plausible to American, Japanese and world public opinion. Most citizens, appalled by the prospect that nuclear weapons might ever be used, share a powerful intuition that with fewer possessors of atomic arms the chances of nuclear war will be significantly less. Although unable to be proved or disproved, this reasoning seems

²⁴An excellent example of this explanation of the NPT is found in an August, 1966, interview of Secretary McNamara in a Japanese magazine. See Department of State Bulletin, Vol. IV, August 29, 1966, pp. 304-305 ff.

sound and was no doubt shared by most government leaders. Despite its compelling logic, however, this explanation was not Washington's primary motive for promoting the NPT.

In addressing the Congress, Dean Rusk hinted at a justification more in line with an unemotional assessment of American national interests. The Treaty was beneficial because it reduced the number of potential nuclear customers among Nth countries, and it prevented potential atomic powers from ever acquiring special weapons despite a future capability to do so.²⁵

Rusk's explanation underlies the basic reason for Soviet-American co-operation on the NPT: Such an agreement would prevent the diffusion of atomic bombs to potential opponents without conceding either power's nuclear superiority. Each superpower presently enjoys a fiscal and industrial base which is almost beyond challenge by non-nuclear states. These material assets have been readily translated into political and military power unequaled in the modern world. As indicated by the label "superpower," Moscow and Washington dwarf their nearest competitors in the game of world politics and consequently possess considerable freedom of action in dealing with lesser nations. When a country becomes a nuclear power, however, this situation is fundamentally changed.²⁶ In a sense, fission weapons are the great equalizers; they may not close the development gap, but they sharply circumscribe American or Soviet power. Even without a sophisticated delivery system, nuclear arms abruptly alter the previous relationship

²⁵U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Hearings, testimony of Secretary of State Dean Rusk before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on the NPT, 90th Cong. 2nd sess., 1968, p. 32. Hereafter cited as Hearings, 90th Cong.

²⁶For a contrary view, see W. C. Foster in "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," Foreign Affairs Vol. 43 (July, 1965), 587-601.

between the United States or the Soviet Union and their new possessor. In short, they will probably upset the old status quo which was mutually beneficial to both superpowers.

The NPT was primarily an effort to institutionalize a status quo based on the simple bipolarism of the early 1960's. If the present situation is threatening to a state's security or national interest, that nation is not likely to sanction the status quo by international treaty; in the multipolar world of the 1970's most countries are especially reluctant to make such a commitment. Instead, many nations, particularly those states with substantial material assets, will take a wait-and-see attitude. They will maintain this deliberately ambiguous posture in order to build up their strength quietly, challenging the status quo only when they are capable or when the perceived threat reaches an intolerable level.

Although Nth countries perceived varying threat levels, all felt they were victims of nuclear power discrimination. The NPT was widely criticized as a treaty to limit the spread of atomic powers rather than an agreement to stop the proliferation of atomic weapons.²⁷ Its signing was assailed as being little more than a pious great power pledge to refrain from doing what neither power would have done in any event. Particularly irksome was American hypocrisy in evoking the sake of all mankind as a reason for denying to others that which the United States considered vital to its own security.

²⁷Elizabeth Young, The Control of Proliferation: The 1968 Treaty in Hindsight and Forecast, Adelphi Paper No. 56 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969), pp. 11-12. Somewhat more colorful was French Defense Minister M. Messmeis' remark that the NPT was designed merely to "castrate the impotent."

These general feelings were reflected by specific strategic and technical objections to the Treaty. The strategic complaints focused on security guarantees and superpower arms control progress. In the former case, the American joint Resolution was branded as a mere statement of intent instead of a declaration of assured action. Since it simply reiterated the peace-keeping function of the Security Council,²⁸ the Resolution offered little incentive for non-nuclear powers to sign the NPT, perpetuating their conviction that the Treaty entailed sacrifices of their security not balanced by concessions made or obligations undertaken by the nuclear nations. For Japan,²⁹ such reservations are sustained by Peking's recent admission to the United Nations and seat on the Security Council. With Tokyo's principal Asian competitor exercising a veto over all motions before the Council, the American joint Resolution is a dead letter.

Aside from security considerations, apprehension over the superpowers' own arms race characterized Nth country comments. India, Japan and others

²⁸See Testimony of Secretary Rusk, Hearings, 90th Cong., p. 16. Rusk confirmed non-nuclear powers' beliefs by testifying that the joint security Resolution did not commit the United States to any obligation beyond those already assumed under the U.N. Charter.

²⁹For reaction to the joint Resolution by all Japan's political parties; see Mainichi Shimbun, March 9, 1968, Daily Summary of the Japanese Press (hereafter Daily), U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, March 9-11, 1968, pp. 22-23. Comment ranged from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) lukewarm endorsement (that the measure was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for guaranteeing Nth country security), to the Japanese Communist Party's (JCP) outright rejection of the initiative. More importantly, both the LDP and all Opposition statements mentioned the Chinese threat, implying that the resolution was not adequate to cope with possible mainland actions. These announcements also came three years before Peking's admission to the United Nations further degraded the Resolution's security value.

criticized Washington and the Kremlin for pushing the NPT as a substitute for genuine progress in disarmament negotiations. They charged that Treaty limits on horizontal spread without complementary checks on vertical dispersion constituted a type of indirect discrimination. The United States replied that this dichotomy was absolutely necessary lest the NPT be hopelessly confused by issues unique to the American-Soviet situation.

A third reservation also underlay statements on the NPT by potential atomic powers. Although its purely military nature prevented open comment, Treaty prohibition of "defensive" nuclear arms severely circumscribed Nth country opportunities for self-defense.³⁰ By adhering to the Treaty such nations would deny themselves the future option of acquiring ABM's and consequently forfeit ultimate control over their destiny. Particularly for a nation technically capable of eventual ABM manufacture, foreclosing the option by participation in the NPT is an alarming thought.

Non-nuclear state uneasiness was also mirrored in technical objections to the Treaty. Already mentioned were Articles IV and V, included specifically to ensure equal distribution of atomic energy's peaceful benefits. Yet safeguard issues surrounding Article III were by far the most troublesome. The amount of technical information required by the IAEA must be detailed if control is to be realistic, but methods of obtaining such intimate knowledge are characteristically intrusive. Amid fears of industrial

³⁰For a most persuasive argument of this point, see the testimony of Dr. Edward Teller, Hearings, 90th Cong., pp. 185-186. Teller criticized the NPT for denying Nth countries the inviolable right of self defense. He also maintained that it was possible, or would be possible in the near future, to design purely defensive nuclear weapons using electronic safeguards and war-head time locks to prevent offensive employment.

espionage and preferential application of safeguards,³¹ Article III was born, giving all non-nuclear signators a two-year period in which to negotiate individual safeguard agreements with the IAEA.³² This organization established a Safeguard Committee in April, 1970, which produced a set of model guidelines³³ for all countries to follow in subsequent negotiations

³¹This charge was leveled against the European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM) by India, Japan and others. The dispute involved EURATOM's contention that its existing intercountry inspection system obviated the need to submit to IAEA inspections. Individual states subject to IAEA safeguards protested that the in-house nature of EURATOM checks meant its controls would likely be less stringent.

³²The two year negotiating period began when the Treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970. The Treaty is unclear as to what happens to those Nth countries failing to conclude safeguard arrangements by March 5, 1972.

³³Ryukichi Imai, et al. "Safeguards: Five Views," International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1971), 2-13. In its final report of April, 1971, the Committee recommended the following basic guidelines:

- 1) The IAEA should count on independent verification and authentication (i.e. spot checks) of data recorded by national accountability systems.
- 2) IAEA inspectors would use a "strategic points" concept, confining their activities to pre-selected portions of nuclear plants where the amounts of fissionable material could be most easily measured.
- 3) For inspection purposes, atomic facilities would be divided into three classes, specifying the maximum quantity of effort, (expressed in man-days or man-years of inspection time) for each type of plant. This system would mean modest facilities such as research reactors would only require a single, annual inspection while highly strategic plants (i.e. commercial reprocessing or fuel fabrication plants) would be subject to nearly continuous surveillance.
- 4) IAEA inspectors would avoid compromising commercial secrets and would refrain from unnecessary interference in plant operations.

with the Agency. Although these recommendations were readily adopted by several nations,³⁴ Japan, West Germany and other non-nuclear countries remained apprehensive about the final form of Article III safeguards.³⁵

In one sense Article III shows the dilemma of the entire NPT: Any successful disarmament treaty must be formulated in terms which are more than mere rehetorical gestures or promises for further negotiations but which are flexible enough to accommodate a broad spectrum of national attitudes and interests. Since these considerations are the product of each country's external security interests and internal domestic factors, matching this heterogeneous mixture is nearly impossible. The vague compromises which result satisfy few countries, especially nations with advanced industrial economies. These powers must be convinced their security and other national interests are enhanced before they will sign the NPT. In essence, they must perceive a more efficient threat reduction, without serious economic disadvantages, through Treaty membership than

³⁴U.S., Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eleventh Annual Report to Congress, (January 1, 1971-December 31, 1971) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 16. During 1971, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Hungary, Poland and Uruguay all concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Negotiations are currently underway with EURATOM, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and others.

³⁵See, for instance, Ryukichi Imai, "Japan and the World of Salt," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, XXVII(December, 1971), 16. As Japan's negotiator on the Safeguards Committee, Imai acknowledges some progress toward implementing Article III in a manner compatible with the needs of peaceful nuclear industry. Yet he laments the Committee's 'excessive concern with purely military uses of atomic energy, fearing that some measures to guard against the diversion of fissionable material were adopted at the expense of steps to improve nuclear technology. In Imai's words, "It is something like an attempt to prohibit the use of the plough because it may be transformed into a sword."

than through other options open to them; the NPT must offer improved security at less cost, in terms of manpower, money and national prestige, than independent actions such as nuclear rearmament programs. The myriad of Nth country criticisms, both strategic and technical, indicates substantial doubt concerning Treaty ability to fulfill the above requirements, and nowhere are these reservations better demonstrated than in official Japanese comments during the Treaty's evolution.

In a speech to the Japanese Diet on March 14, 1967,³⁶ and in an address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 22, 1967³⁷ Foreign Minister Miki stressed the same points. Japan favored the "spirit" of the NPT, but the Treaty needed improvement: Stronger security guarantees by nuclear to non-nuclear states were essential; the superpowers should take genuine steps toward disarmament; treaty provisions should not obstruct the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

Subsequent Japanese statements at the United Nations put forth more specific proposals to achieve some of these ends and repeated Japan's anxiety about others. Ambassador Tsuruoka's speech of May 10, 1968, hailed the joint U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R. security resolution as "a step in the right direction" but warned that it would not "altogether eliminate the fears of non-nuclear-weapon states regarding their security problems."³⁸ This declaration also suggested a comprehensive test ban to boost disarmament progress, simple and uniform safeguards to avoid hampering civilian fission activities and a five-year review conference to adjust the Treaty in accordance with current scientific developments. The Japanese government

³⁶Documents on Disarmament, 1967, p. 153.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 413-415.

³⁸Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 309-314.

expressed similar reservations at home, but there it additionally emphasized every signator's right, under Article X, to withdraw from the Treaty if that nation's "supreme interests" were jeopardized. Just what actions might endanger Japan's interests were left purposefully vague, but one was generally acknowledged to be unilateral American abrogation of the Security Treaty.³⁹

These complaints by Japan illustrate the main flaw of the NPT: It fails to provide adequate security guarantees for threshold⁴⁰ nuclear powers. Botswana, Nepal and the Maldives will sign the Treaty because they do not currently possess, nor entertain hopes of ever possessing, the technical capacity to sustain a nuclear weapons program. Although Canada and Sweden have the physical requisites, their special security positions likewise enable them to adhere. For India, Japan and Israel, however, NPT participation entails few gains and many potential risks. These countries have the capability for weapon manufacture while being simultaneously confronted by hostile neighbors. They are understandably reluctant to renounce their technical option for a Treaty which treats the symptoms of international instability--armaments--instead of its causes--distrust, territorial/political ambitions and perceptions of threat. So long as their environment remains unfriendly, these nations will not commit themselves to a permanent non-nuclear status. The NPT will fail to restrain those very powers for whom it was primarily intended.

³⁹Tokyo Shimbun, February 4, 1970 in Daily, February 5, 1970, p. 3.

⁴⁰"Threshold" powers as used here identifies those countries which presently have the technical capacity to manufacture atomic arms. This group is generally thought to include Canada, West Germany, Japan, India, Israel, Sweden and Switzerland.

Despite being those of a leading threshold nation, Japan's criticisms of the NPT are similar in content and tone to those of lesser Nth countries. They outwardly reflect nothing unique about Japan's concern for equal treatment or for adequate security assurances under the Treaty. Yet Tokyo's situation is most definitely without parallel among the near-nuclear powers. Her industrial capacity, her position in Asia and her domestic scene contain elements which interact in peculiar and potentially unpredictable ways. The irony of Asia in the 1970's is that the NPT may become the catalytic factor in Japan's nuclear equation. The product of this equation hinges upon how its dependent variables--industry, security and domestic politics--ultimately relate to the Treaty. In this regard, it is first necessary to examine each variable separately.

CHAPTER III

JAPAN'S NUCLEAR CAPACITY

Any potential nuclear power must surmount two technical obstacles before it can possess a useful weapon capability: The first is to acquire atomic warheads which are light enough, small enough and sufficiently reliable to accomplish their mission; the second is to procure an effective means of delivering them against desired targets. Critical to both these problems is a large bureaucratic apparatus capable of managing the intricate components associated with a nuclear development effort and a high level of research and development (R&D) investment in atomic energy.⁴¹

The first problem is usually the more difficult, and always the more misunderstood, of the two. A nuclear explosion involves bringing together swiftly critical masses of one of two fissionable isotopes; naturally occurring uranium, U - 235, or Pu-239. U-235 exists in concentrations of about 0.7 per cent in the usual isotope of uranium, U-238. Before uranium can be used as a weapon, this proportion must be increased to over 90 percent of U-235 in a specialized enrichment plant. The two methods for producing U-235 of this quality are gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge. Both are based on the same technique for transforming uranium into a gaseous form (uranium hexafluoride - UF_6) and then separating lighter molecules from heavier ones. By repeating this process thousands of times, it is possible gradually to concentrate the U-235. Gaseous diffusion accomplishes this separation by diffusing the UF_6 gas through a series of membranes which

⁴¹Arnold Kramish, "The Emergent Genie," in The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons. Strategy and Politics, ed. by R. N. Rosecrance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 265. Kramish estimates that to achieve the "technological maturity level" necessary to support a nuclear capability requires an annual research and development investment of 0.5 per cent of a country's GNP for several years.

transmit the lighter molecules, rich in U-235, more readily than the heavier molecules, rich in U-238. Because of the number of membrane stages necessary for significant enrichment⁴² and because of the quantity of ancillary equipment they require, gaseous diffusion plants are extremely large, consume enormous amounts of electric power and must operate at a very high level of capacity to remain economical. For these reasons, they are beyond the capability of all but the most industrialized societies.

In a gas centrifuge, separation is accomplished by rotating UF_6 at a high speed so the heavier atoms tend to concentrate around the periphery. Although difficulties with centrifuge technology⁴³ have precluded its industrial use, this process holds significant future possibilities.⁴⁴ Its cost is independent of plant size at low capacities;⁴⁵ it uses smaller amounts of electricity, and it requires a lower manning level than a gaseous diffusion plant. These advantages would be especially attractive to potential nuclear

⁴²C. F. Barnaby, ed., Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London: Pugwash Monograph I. Souvenir Press, 1969), p. 5. The average gaseous diffusion plant requires between 2000-4000 screens, each situated in a leak-proof chamber under very high pressure.

⁴³The main difficulty lies in regulating the behavior of UF_6 inside the centrifuge at high speeds.

⁴⁴Barnaby, Nuclear Weapons, p. 254. In the opinion of Dr. Barnaby, head of the British Pugwash Group, "The possible development of gas centrifuges is, in fact, one of the factors most likely to lead to proliferation at the present time, particularly because the technology of centrifuges is probably capable of significant improvement whereas there is probably no large factor of improvement to be expected from gas diffusion methods."

⁴⁵J. Beckman. "Gas Centrifuges for Cheaper Isotope Separation," in Nuclear Weapons, ed. by Barnaby p. 97. The crossover point where gas centrifuges would have operating costs equal to gaseous diffusion plants occurs at a production level of 200 kg. of U-235 per year. A capital cost reduction of five times or better can be attained with gas centrifuges whose output is 100 kg of U-235 per year or less.

powers wishing to conduct a more economical, possibly clandestine, weapons program than is feasible with large-scale gaseous diffusion operations.⁴⁶

The second kind of bomb production involves the separation of Pu-239 produced as a byproduct during atomic power generation. The fission of enriched uranium fuel⁴⁷ releases an excess of neutrons which are captured by the otherwise unusable U-238, transforming it into Pu-239 at the rate of one kilogram per megawatt of energy per year.⁴⁸ Before it can be used for any purpose, Pu-239 must be extracted, in a specialized fuel reprocessing plant, from the fuel elements which have been irradiated in a reactor. Once Pu-239 is in a nation's inventory, the only additional steps necessary are machining it to an explosive configuration and designing a triggering mechanism.⁴⁹

The advantages of the plutonium route to nuclear weapons are the availability of information and economies of scale. An alternate and more

⁴⁶ Japan has been conducting a vigorous gas centrifuge program for several years. After its initial success in 1969, Japan's Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) plans to start test production of enriched uranium by centrifuge this year. Indigenous centrifuge facilities are presently capable of making twenty kilograms of 1.4% enriched uranium per year. Asahi Shimbun, January 21, 1972 in Daily, January 25, 1972, p. 1.

⁴⁷ U-235 used to fuel power reactors is only 2 - 4% enriched as compared with the 90% enrichment necessary to produce a U-235 weapon. For a diagram of the plutonium production process, see Appendix III.

⁴⁸ Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread? (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Ltd. 1966), p. 91.

⁴⁹ With her highly sophisticated precision instrument and electronics industries, Japan would have little difficulty in completing this final step of weapon construction. See Junnosuke Kishida, "Concerning Nuclear Armament of Japan," Kokubo, (July, 1967) in Summaries, January 29 - February 5, 1968, p. 31, and Yomuri Shimbun, February 14, 1968 in Daily, February 27, 1968, p. 36.

efficient method of plutonium production is to construct a so-called breeder reactor which produces plutonium at a rate of 3 kg/mwe/yr.⁵⁰ Since the breeder produces about four times the plutonium it consumes⁵¹ and decreases the amount of non-fissionable plutonium isotopes in reactor byproducts, it promises to generate electricity cheaply enough to compete commercially with coal and oil. Although prototype breeders are just beginning to operate, plans for their future development can justify current construction of plutonium separation plants. Nth countries can use their reprocessing plants to stockpile weapon grade plutonium ostensibly for fueling a future generation of breeders, thus further blurring any distinction between military and civilian uses of atomic energy. With a mere seven kg. of Pu-239 comprising a critical mass,⁵² this development alone would constitute a major step toward a weapons capability.

In view of the above requisites, what is Japan's potential for manufacturing atomic devices? After a slow start, Japanese research and development programs in all fields are now accelerating rapidly. The original lag was due to extensive technological "borrowing," via licensing arrangements,⁵³

⁵⁰Victor Gilinsky and Paul Langer, The Japanese Civilian Nuclear Program Rand Memorandum RM-5366-PR (Santa Monica, Calif: The RAND Corporation 1967), p. 31.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Statement of French atomic expert M. Bertrand Goldschmidt quoted in Beaton, Must The Bomb Spread?, p. 38. Goldschmidt also stated that the minimum critical mass for a U-235 explosion was twenty kg.

⁵³For instance, Japan signed 5840 class A (less than one year duration) technological agreements from 1965 to 1968. Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power, p. 313.

which bypassed in-house R&D while importing foreign techniques to save time in modernization. With little government activity, most of Japan's early postwar efforts were privately funded. The result was that most money went toward immediately remunerative projects, such as improvement of existing products, instead of promoting basic research. Although this pattern still persists,⁵⁴ total R&D expenditures have increased dramatically in recent years: From \$513 million in 1960 to \$3.8 billion in 1971.⁵⁵ Tokyo predicts the same R&D growth rate during this decade, meaning a total outlay of near \$10 billion by 1980. In short, the general trend is to spend money, stress independent development and check reliance on technology imports.

In the more specific realm of atomic energy, Japan has had an active, steadily growing program. The Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC), headed by the Director of the Science and Technology Agency, is the principal government organ for program direction. Its industry counterpart, the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF), is fashioned after the traditional zaibatsu; all companies join together to share the risk of reactor importation, power station construction and similar undertakings. This arrangement also facilitates government financing of projects which require large initial or continuing investments that do not promise immediate monetary returns.

This structure manages an atomic energy program designed to meet Japan's rapidly expanding electrical power needs. An increasing demand for electricity and a disproportionate dependence on imported oil means nuclear power in Japan may reduce the cost of electrical power and increase the

⁵⁴ Wall Street Journal, Feb. 9, 1972, p. 27. This article quotes a Japanese electronics official as lamenting that much of Japan's R & D is almost all "D" with little basic research.

⁵⁵ Ibid. The 1971 figure was up 27.5% over 1970 but still well below the \$27.8 billion of U.S. R & D expenditures in 1971.

security of her energy supplies. Additionally, widespread availability of cheap atomic power would greatly improve Japan's bargaining position concerning the price of foreign oil. For these reasons, the JAEC's Long Range Program of 1967 forecast a 6,000 megawatt nuclear generating capacity by 1975 and 30-40,000 mwe by 1985.⁵⁶ In the fall of 1970 JAEC revised its 1967 estimates: by 1975 Japan's reactor output would equal 8,600 mwe and by 1985 total production would reach 60,000 mwe.⁵⁷ Shortly thereafter, Japan's Overall Energy Survey Council announced that the country's electrical power needs in 1985 would be four times her requirements of 1970. Oil's share of the total energy supply was to remain roughly constant, coal and water were to drop in importance and nuclear energy was to increase from zero to twenty-six per cent.⁵⁸

The pattern is one of atomic power pushing forward at top speed to keep pace with spiraling energy demands. Although nuclear energy will generate only ten per cent of Japan's electricity in 1980, it will have a large absolute base and will be expanding exponentially. Oil increases will function primarily to hold the line until 1980, the take-off year for Japan's rapidly maturing atomic industry. From then to 1985, nuclear power's share of the energy market will rise by another fifteen percent.

⁵⁶ Gilinsky and Langer, Civilian Nuclear Program, p. 1. The U.S. AEC predicted a nuclear electrical generating capacity of 120-170,000 Mwe for the United States by 1980. By comparison, the Japanese forecast, 10-15% of the American figures, did not seem excessive since the relative electrical generating capacities of both countries are roughly in the same ratio.

⁵⁷ Asahi Shimbun, February 25, 1972 in Daily, February 26-28, 1972, p. 4 and Mainichi Shimbun, March 4, 1972 in Daily, March 7, 1972.

⁵⁸ Interim Report (Draft) of Overall Energy Resource Council, Japan, Atomic Energy Department, May 31, 1971 in Summaries, June, 1971, p. 62 and Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power, p. 326. See Appendix IV for a complete breakdown of Japan's past and future energy needs and her forecasted power generating capacity.

In short, Japan is undergoing something of a boom in the use of nuclear power. To cope with this boom, the JAEC plans to obtain its first generation of reactors from abroad while investing their limited resources in fast breeder technology. This "leap frog"⁵⁹ strategy could catapult Japan into the front ranks in nuclear expertise after a decade of heavy dependence on foreign technology. Reactors installed up to 1980 will be of the U.S. light water variety. From 1980 to about 1985 Japan will depend on an interim group of heavy water advanced thermal reactors (ATR) and in the late 1980's she will complete a switch to fast breeder reactors (FBR). When finished, the transition to FBR's will virtually eliminate Tokyo's dependence on overseas uranium.

Despite its rosy future prospects, atomic power in Japan faces several current obstacles. First, indigenous uranium resources only total 7700 tons of low grade ore;⁶⁰ Japan circumvents this problem by taking her own capital, personnel and technology to countries with reserves to prospect and to operate new mines in cooperation with the host nation.⁶¹ In addition, Tokyo makes direct purchases of natural ore from uranium-rich countries such as Canada, France and the United States. Secondly, Japan has no domestic capacity for uranium enrichment, relying instead on the United States as her sole supplier. The JAEC is presently functioning under a thirty year agreement, signed originally in 1968 and renegotiated in February, 1972, which

⁵⁹ Gilinsky and Langer, Civilian Nuclear Program, p. vi.

⁶⁰ Emerson, Arms, Yen & Power, p. 330. Japan's projected requirements are 100,000 tons of uranium by 1985.

⁶¹ For example, Japan and Canada are now conducting joint prospecting in British Columbia and Colorado. See Nuclear Engineering International, January/February, 1971, p. 12. In addition, Japan has done exploratory surveys in Indonesia and is engaged in a joint venture with France in Niger. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, February 19, 1970 in Daily, February 19, 1970, p. 1.

provides 335 tons of enriched uranium to Japanese reactors.⁶² In view of Japan's ever rising energy requirements, this amount of enriched uranium may prove inadequate. Buying only from the United States also generates fears of too much reliance on a single source. The result has been increased pressure, external⁶³ and internal, for alternate enrichment methods, plus an increased emphasis on local gas centrifuge/diffusion research.⁶⁴ Japan's Defense Agency head, Yasuhiro Nakasone, created a mild sensation in Tokyo by proposing a joint Japanese-American enrichment venture, for peaceful purposes, during his 1970 visit to Washington.⁶⁵ More recently, JAIF has recommended that enrichment be undertaken as a national project with an accelerated R&D program and a production target of 5,000 tons/year by 1985.⁶⁶

⁶²Wall Street Journal, Feb. 28, 1972, p. 24. The original agreement called for 161 tons of enriched uranium. The 335 tons of enriched uranium to be furnished under the new contract is more than the total tonnage supplied to all the thirty other metal buyers who have similar accords with Washington.

⁶³See, for example, the statements of Australian Minister of National Development Reginal Swartz in Nuclear Engineering, August, 1971, p. 616. On an official visit to Japan, Swartz expressed hope that Japan would aid Australia in extracting uranium ore and constructing enrichment plants to exploit the vast uranium reserves of the Northern Territories.

⁶⁴Sankei Shimbun, August 29, 1969 in Daily, August 30-September 2, 1969, p. 12. In August, 1969, the JAEC appropriated 5700 yen for simultaneous development of gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion techniques to enrich uranium. Prototypes of each separator were to be completed by 1972 at which time a final decision to concentrate on one method of enrichment would be made.

⁶⁵New York Times, Sept. 11, 1970, p. 4. Nakasone was also reported to have told Sec. Laird that Japan was considering beginning construction of a gaseous diffusion plant in 1971. Just why Nakasone, in his Washington visit, was talking to the American Secretary of Defense about enrichment was not clear. His remarks were categorically repudiated by Prime Minister Sato of Japan.

⁶⁶Nuclear Engineering, January/February, 1971, p. 11. JAIF also recommended an immediate feasibility study and a decision by 1975 on construction of local pilot plants.

Other portions of Japan's fuel cycle, reactors themselves and fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants, are small but growing steadily. The JAEC presently has five power reactors with a 1,200 mwe output in operation, five more producing 3,000 mwe under construction and an additional dozen major reactors in various design stages.⁶⁷ As the result of a joint effort with General Electric, Toshiba recently fabricated the first nuclear fuel core in Japan;⁶⁸ it is only one of several Japanese companies engaged in joint fabrication projects with American firms. Japan is also constructing a fuel reprocessing (i.e. plutonium separation) facility at Tokai Mura which will be completed in 1974 and will process 210 tons of of irradiated uranium per year.⁶⁹

It is readily apparent that all sectors of Japan's nuclear industry are booming. From 1954 to 1967 total government expenditures for atomic energy amounted to \$191 million;⁷⁰ the fiscal year 1972 budget alone is \$170

⁶⁷ For a full breakdown of Japanese power reactors, installed, building or planned, as of January, 1972, see Appendix V. Japan also possesses 21 research reactors which produce negligible plutonium but serve as valuable training facilities for nuclear engineers.

⁶⁸ Nuclear News, September, 1971, p. 40. Toshiba is now manufacturing the core for Japan's Fukushima #2 power station. According to General Electric, this single fabrication plant is the third largest privately-owned operation of its kind in existence and largest outside the United States. For further details, see Nuclear Industry, August, 1971, p. 50.

⁶⁹ Nuclear Engineering, January/February, 1971, p. 12 and Interim Report, p. 72. Despite this new capacity, Japan's reprocessing demand, (estimated at 530 tons/year by 1980 and 1150 tons/year by 1985), is expected to render it inadequate by 1977/78. As a result, a second reprocessing facility with an output of "three to five tons per day" is being planned for completion by 1980.

⁷⁰ Wentz, Nuclear Proliferation, p. 33.

million.⁷¹ This absolute investment increase is being maximized in characteristic Japanese fashion; adapting imported foreign techniques to suit local conditions while training ever larger numbers of indigenous atomic experts.

This pattern is being simulated, in a belated fashion, by Japan's space program. Until 1967, Japanese rocketry was a series of ad hoc efforts dependent exclusively on private funds. Four unsuccessful satellite launches from 1966 to 1969 prompted strenuous government attempts to coordinate and stimulate rocket development. In 1968, the entire program was put under the Space Activities Commission; Tokyo University, leader of prior non-governmental space endeavors, was given responsibility for basic propulsion research while governments laboratories concentrated on application of satellites and on developing the next generation of rocket boosters. After orbiting its first satellite in February, 1970,⁷² the Space Activities Commission moved further away from an independent, private approach to development, calling for imports of foreign technology sufficient to build a medium liquid fuel rocket.⁷³

⁷¹Nuclear Engineering, November, 1971, p. 899. The approximate budget breakdown: \$84 million for FBR development, \$73 million for ATR development, \$5 million for the Tokai Mura reprocessing plant, \$4.1 million for centrifuge R & D, \$1.6 million for gaseous diffusion R & D and \$4.2 million for reactor safety.

⁷²New York Times, Feb. 11, 1970, p. 9.

⁷³Emmerson, Arms Yen and Power, p. 321-322. The Space Activities Commission report of October 21, 1970, stated:

The need for importing foreign technology was openly expressed:...we must strive to eliminate the technological gap with foreign countries. For this purpose, technology introduced by other means should be utilized to push space development efficiency until Japan's technology reaches a certain level....it is necessary for Japan to acquire as soon as possible the technology related to the medium liquid rocket engine, which could be further improved to increase its performance,

Although the opposition parties have viewed this buildup suspiciously, the lure of scientific prestige has quelled most complaints so long as the program has no overt military implications.

Despite its open conduct and proclaimed peaceful nature, Japanese rocketry today has undeniable military potential. This fact was underscored by the launch of Japan's second satellite in February, 1971, using a Mu rocket.⁷⁴ Developed in cooperation with the United States, this solid fuel missile has a 4,000 - 5,000 mile range and is roughly equivalent to the early American Minuteman. It lacks only an inertial guidance system and appropriate warhead to make it a lethal weapon. Although guidance systems are presently Japan's weakest area in space technology, her highly sophisticated electronics industry seems capable of solving most space navigation problems. A major effort is currently being made to construct a liquid fuel, all-weather rocket similar to the American Thor variety of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM).⁷⁵ Scheduled for completion in 1975, this project

in preparation for the launching of large stationary satellites in the future.

Japan has already signed (1969) an agreement with the United States to import certain categories of technology and equipment, including launch-vehicle technology up to the level of the Thor-Delta rocket. (See footnote 75).

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 317. The Mu is a four-stage solid fuel rocket with a potential altitude ceiling of 11,200 miles. Used principally for high altitude sounding, it could be equipped with a nuclear warhead and appropriate guidance mechanism. Its 7000 km range would cover most targets in China and Soviet Siberia. It was constructed through a joint development contract between Aerojet General Corp. and Deicel Co. Ltd. of Tokyo.

⁷⁵Kaoru Murakami, "Conditions Surrounding Japan's Nuclearization," Tembo (April, 1971) in Summaries, May, 1971, p. 46. Designing was started in 1971 by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, using technology imported from Douglas Aircraft Company. In referring to its future implications, Murakami predicts, "It may be no exaggeration to say that by 1975 there will be an ample possibility that our country will become capable of developing and manufacturing nuclear warheads and rockets as a means of delivering them."

shows that, after a slow start, Tokyo's space plans are now in high gear. They aim for the immediate goals of television and communication satellites, but they likewise offer inherent strategic options.

The technical and strategic limitations to a Japanese nuclear capability appear fairly easy to overcome. With a mushrooming reactor program, Japan is currently producing enough plutonium, approximately 1200 kg/year,⁷⁶ to support a substantial weapons program. When the Tokai Mura reprocessing plant is completed in 1974, Tokyo will need only uranium ore resources and enrichment facilities to be self-sufficient in nuclear development. Meanwhile, her present arrangements with Canada for ore and with the United States for enriched uranium are adequate to keep Japan supplied until ATR's and FBR's take over. While the government explores gas centrifuge/diffusion as means of domestic uranium enrichment, present circumstances merely seem to increase such cooperative trends: Japan has ore mining and prospecting contracts with all the world's uranium-rich nations; she is engaged in joint reactor construction programs with both American and French companies; she has received from Washington a guaranteed supply of enriched uranium and assured access to high-level space technology through specific agreements⁷⁷ while obtaining

⁷⁶ Japan's five operational power reactors produce 1200 Mwe/yr and 1 Mwe/yr. of energy produces 1 kg of Pu-239/yr. Hence, 1200 kg. of Pu-239 are produced each year.

⁷⁷ For details on US-Japan uranium enrichment agreement and space technology imports, see footnotes 62 and 73, respectively.

general assurances that this policy will continue in the future.⁷⁸ Finally, adaptation of existing rockets and some improvement in guidance mechanisms could give Japan a reasonably reliable delivery system.

The only remaining conceptual obstacles to a nuclear Japan are cost and strategic vulnerability. Since Japan's 1975 GNP is conservatively estimated at \$400 billion,⁷⁹ an allocation of five percent to defense would yield \$20 billion. Holding the growth rate of Japan's conventional forces constant at the current 0.8 percent of GNP,⁸⁰ would make 4.2 percent or \$16.8 billion available for the research, development and deployment of strategic systems. Simultaneously, real spending on conventional forces would expand with the economy at the rate of ten to fifteen percent a year. Five percent of Japan's GNP would not dislocate her economy and \$16.8 billion is far in excess of the United Nation's cost estimate for a "modest" nuclear capacity. Cost, therefore, does little to inhibit Japan's weapon potential.

The major theoretical barrier to an atomic Japan is probably the feasibility of any strategic arsenal. First, as a signator of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Tokyo cannot conduct atmospheric testing⁸¹ and would be hard

⁷⁸ The Japan Times, Jan. 9, 1972, p. 12. The statement issued after President Nixon's San Clemente meeting with Prime Minister Sato reads, in part, "They agreed that the two Governments would expand cooperation in the field of environment, of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. They further agreed that experts of the two countries would examine concrete steps in this regard."

⁷⁹ Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970, p. 165.

⁸⁰ The Military Balance 1970-1971 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies 1970), p. 72.

⁸¹ The Test Ban Treaty does, however, have a three month "escape clause" identical to Article X of the NPT.

pressed to find suitable underground test sites. Secondly, the very density of Japan's population and concentration of industrial centers not only raise the probability of massive damage from nuclear attack but preclude the dispersal of weapons necessary for a credible deterrent. Both these difficulties, however, are not insurmountable. Some of the uninhabited Ryukyu Islands or possibly even the northernmost portions of Hokkaido could be used for testing. Such testing, moreover, would not be an absolute military necessity for crude, first strike weapons. Japan could obviate the vulnerability problem by deploying all her delivery systems afloat at remote ocean locations far from the home islands. Despite increased cost, this deployment scheme would have some distinct strategic advantages since the launch platforms would become impregnable to attack by ballistic delivery vehicles and warheads directed against the missiles would not create domestic civilian casualties. With the world's most modern and efficient shipbuilding industry, Japan could likely place long range delivery systems on either surface or subsurface vessels without great difficulty.

One striking reality, therefore, is that Japan faces no major technical obstacle to nuclear armament. The principal constraints in 1972, no local ore supplies and absence of domestic enrichment facilities, are presently bypassed through various bilateral agreements and are undergoing long-term erosion as Japan advances toward the FBR. This dependence on foreign suppliers is itself an important constraint on weapon production. Yet Japan's major ore supplier and sole source of enriched uranium, the United States, would be unlikely to suspend these shipments, at the risk of permanently alienating a major ally, if faced with an irrevocable Japanese decision for

nuclear weapons.⁸² Moreover, Japan's gradual movement toward an indigeneous enrichment capability promises to eliminate this dependence by 1980 while increasing Japanese diplomatic leverage in the interim.⁸³

Tokyo's space and nuclear programs are peaceful in intent but not in capability. They serve, by improving the level of nuclear technology and promoting missile development, to raise Japan's latent capacity to acquire atomic arms. Industrial competition and Japan's quest for international scientific prestige have made her the leading Nth country in both nuclear and space know-how and, in many aspects of these technologies, she trails only the superpowers. In an absolute sense, Japan's policy of keeping her options open has pushed her nearer to a bomb capability; it has also served to narrow the relative time lag between a political decision and weapon acquisition. With completion of the chemical separation plant in 1974,

⁸²The United States would certainly offer substantial resistance to initial Japanese moves in this direction. Once Tokyo made a final nuclear decision, however, Washington would no doubt acquiesce reluctantly rather than launch Japan on a completely independent international course. This action would be especially likely if Tokyo's decision were a crash program in response to some imminent danger with which Washington desired to avoid a direct confrontation (such as the People's Republic of China).

⁸³For references to enrichment and Japan's increased international bargaining power, see Asahi Shimbun, March 31, 1969 in Daily, April 3, 1969, p. 44 and especially Mainichi Shimbun, September 16, 1969 in Daily October 8, 1969, p. 32. In this latter article, Yasuhiro Nakasone, soon to become head of the Japanese Defense Agency, called domestic enrichment "absolutely necessary," in global diplomacy. Then Vice Chairman of the LDP Foreign Affairs Research Council, Nakasone no doubt reflected the sentiments of many of his ruling party by saying, "Even though we do not have any special intention of having atomic bombs, to have other nations know that we have 'that' (i.e. domestic enrichment facilities), we are in a setup where we can divert it to other use at any time; it will be, in a sense, a charm which will keep other nations from interfering."

Japan will possibly be able to bridge this gap in a single year.⁸⁴

Given this technical ability for weapon manufacture, disincentives for a national nuclear armament program must be founded on grounds other than prohibitive cost, lack of capacity or poor prospects for effectiveness of strategic systems once developed. The serious impediments to a nuclear Japan must be political and will thus depend on her government's perception of security threats in Asia and on her own internal affairs.

⁸⁴This prediction is based on a general estimate in Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London: Chatto and Windus for the Institute for Strategic Studies 1962), p. 26. With a reactor already producing plutonium and separation facilities available, nuclear weapons could likely be manufactured in less than a year. The only constraints in that situation would be the design and construction of the warhead and associated triggering mechanism. Even without a reprocessing plant (Japan's current situation), Beaton and Maddox state that atomic arms can be produced within two years. For a combined political-technical viewpoint, see Major H. E. McCracken, "Japan's View of Korea," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 98 (February, 1972), 47. On the basis of his personal observations while being stationed in Japan, McCracken states that, given her technological foundation, "it is acknowledged that Japan could (presently) produce a arsenal of nuclear weapons with a delivery system within one year after the political decision is made." Parentheses added.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY

The most notable characteristic of Japan's postwar defense policy has been the tremendous influence of the United States. Immediate postwar circumstances made this relationship almost inevitable. From 1945 to 1952, Japan was under the American Occupation and in 1950 war erupted in neighboring South Korea. These events convinced Prime Minister Yoshida to cast Japan's lot in the Cold War with the United States, resulting in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the associated American-Japanese Security Treaty in 1951. Thus aligned, Japan proceeded to reestablish her international status as a law-abiding and self-respecting state. Reparations payments in 1952, United Nations admission in 1956 and normalization of relations with Moscow in 1956 were all examples of Japanese efforts to regain world credibility.

The 1951 Security Treaty itself was a product of bipolar alignments during the Cold War. It was typical of a period in which national interests of individual states in each camp were characteristically subordinated to the collective interests of their respective camps. Japan's national interests were equated with those of the Free World in general and the United States in particular. The threat to her security was viewed as identical to that facing other friends of the Free World--international communism led by the Soviet Union. Traditional Japanese security considerations resulting from her role in East Asia and individual relations with other states in that region were submerged in the welter of American-Soviet confrontation. Most importantly, the Russian threat arose not from direct Japanese-Soviet interaction but instead from the all-inclusive nature of bipolar power politics. This perception led Japan, and most other states as well, to ignore the

Chinese threat as separate and distinct until the early 1960's.

The Security Treaty and similar diplomatic moves were also coupled with internal efforts to strengthen Japan's security. At the insistence of General MacArthur, head of the Occupation, Tokyo established a National Police Reserve in 1950 to replace United States troops sent to Korea. In 1952 Yoshida expanded this organization into the National Safety Agency and two years later renamed it the Self Defense Force (SDF).⁸⁵ The SDF was divided into Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces (GSDF, MSDF and ASDF respectively) and numbered slightly over 100,000 men in 1954. Although this build-up was undertaken on a relatively modest scale, it represented an abrupt reversal of Occupation efforts to demilitarize Japan. Indeed, the very existence of the SDF violated Article 9 of Japan's new constitution which expressly prohibited the nation's maintenance of any war potential. Consequently, the legal foundation of Japan's entire military system remained very poorly defined. The process of rearming consisted of a cumulative series of faits accomplis rather than a well-planned program enjoying widespread public support.

In 1960, Washington and Tokyo concluded the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security which forms the core of current security relations between the two nations. This agreement had significant changes from the 1951 Security Treaty⁸⁶ but was still based on a mutually perceived need to contain the

⁸⁵ Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-68 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 108.

⁸⁶ Okinawa, Hearings testimony of U. Alexis Johnson, p. 1189. The 1960 Treaty changes were: The Treaty was given a ten year life span subject to automatic extension thereafter (or termination on one year's notice by either party); any references to American intervention in Japan's internal affairs were deleted; the United States formally committed herself to defend Japan against external threats; the practice of prior consultation between Tokyo and Washington on major changes in American force deployments in Japan was officially sanctioned. A later exchange of diplomatic notes certified that consultation in essence meant Japanese approval.

communist monolith. As such, the Treaty's rationale began to disappear before its ink was dry. The Sino-Soviet split of 1960, the Chinese atomic explosion of 1964 and the decade-long Vietnam War propelled nations from a bipolar into a multipolar world with attendant economic, strategic and political implications. Yet the 1960 Treaty preserved the bipolar balance, enabling Japan to exert herself politically and diplomatically with little autonomous defense capability. Tokyo thereby achieved considerable success in world politics without paying the costs of defense that usually result from increased interaction in the international system.

From a strictly economic standpoint, the 1960 Security Treaty proved a great boon to Japan. She received generous quantities of American military aid and attained a favorable position from which to increase her share of the vast United States' consumer market. Japan achieved a solid defense position without massive rearmament or overseas commitments and consequently maximized the benefits from her American alliance while effectively minimizing the risks.

Indirectly, the Treaty fostered a kind of economic myopia which has characterized all aspects of Japan's foreign policy since 1960. Reluctant to assume external military commitments, Tokyo has not hesitated to expand her influence via economic means. In 1963, she became a full member of the United Nations Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), officially entering the world trade sphere. She later joined the Development and Assistance Committee (DAC) of the United Nations, accepting its assistance goal: Foreign aid expenditure equal to one percent of national income.⁸⁷

In 1966, Japan hosted several conferences on international development and

⁸⁷ Lawrence A. Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 147.

helped found the Asian Development Bank with a contribution of \$200 million, an amount matched only by the United States. During the same year Japan established the Overseas Cooperation Volunteers, a rough equivalent of the American Peace Corps, which has been used almost exclusively in Asia.

Tokyo is presently committed to nine of the fifteen functioning regional cooperative organizations in the Far East, showing continued enthusiasm for such groups so long as they have no overt political overtones.⁸⁸ This strategy appears safe since the bodies presently abjure territorial and security issues in favor of broader economic and cultural questions where more agreement exists. If these groups survive the tensions of local power politics, however, they may become important transitional devices in the process of regularizing responsible participation in the international system. By providing an element of cohesion and sense of collective strength, they may eventually make alignments with extra-regional powers acceptable to weaker states, deepening member commitment to an active political, and ultimately military, role in Asia.

These few examples illustrate a subtle, perhaps naive, aspect of Japan's defense philosophy: the belief that she can maintain security through economic power only when her neighbors are secure and prosperous. This automatic tendency to equate prosperity with peace provides the political rationale for an aid program which gives the Japanese several advantages. Because they

⁸⁸ Kei Wakaizumi, "Japan and South East Asia in the 1970's," Current History, Vol. 60 (April, 1971), 205. The major organizations are: Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), Asian Productivity Organization (APO) and the Colombo Plan for cooperative economic development in South and Southeast Asia. Japan's desire to avoid the political implications of these groups was demonstrated by her concern over ASPAC's strong anti-communist bias in 1967.

omit military requirements, aid programs are attractive both at home and abroad. Their Asian-to-Asian nature appeals to countries afraid of losing their cultural identity to the West while Japan's proximity to these nations minimizes transportation costs. Most importantly, these initiatives foster the type of economic cooperation vital to Japan's success as a world trader. With rising labor costs at home, Japanese industrialists find such countries ideal for importation of their labor-intensive industries.

Despite these positive aspects, Japan's aid programs have encountered numerous obstacles. First, responsibility for aid administration is split among four government agencies. The resulting inter-agency competition over individual projects inhibits effective coordination of aid objectives. Second, Japan's terms for assistance are stricter than those offered by other nations.⁸⁹ Finally, Japan's low level of technical cooperative aid and the large amount of her total aid supplied by private industry⁹⁰ mean most assistance has a distinct profit motive. Even the bulk of Japan's "government" aid is subsidized export expansion designed to assist Japanese business and not the recipient. Not surprisingly, such conditions are often termed "exploitive" by the receiving country.

The long range goal of Japanese aid is to improve political stability in Asia while its short run byproducts are profit and prestige. For Westernized

⁸⁹ Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia, p. 148. Throughout the 1960's eighty percent of all DAC countries offered loans at three percent interest with twenty-five years to repay. Japan's best terms were 3.5 percent repayable after twenty years.

⁹⁰ Wakaizumi, "Japan and South East Asia," pp. 202-203. In 1969, the ratio of Japan's technical cooperative aid to total aid was 1.5 percent, lowest of all the DAC nations. In the same year, the ratio of government aid to total assistance was 34.5 percent for Japan while the DAC average was 49.7 percent.

Japan, such joint ventures are the most powerful common cause shared with her Asian counterparts. But aid programs are merely the tip of a Japanese economic iceberg which pervades the Far East and extends throughout the world.

Given her insular position and lack of certain natural resources, Japan's economic expansion relies heavily on the vicissitudes of international trade. Her present prosperity rests squarely on a cycle of import-process-export necessitating a continuous influx of raw materials transported across thousands of miles of open ocean.⁹¹ Not only does Japan get over ninety percent of her oil from the Persian Gulf, but she also imports eighty percent of all her raw materials and twenty percent of her food.⁹² To fuel

⁹¹In one sense, Japan's limited territory and meager natural resource supply have speeded her economic expansion. Since sea transportation costs are about one tenth of land rates, Tokyo can utilize economies of scale and ship more bulk over longer distances for less money. Lack of indigenous raw materials enables wholesale importation of required goods without regard for protecting local industry, while limited territorial size decrease expensive port-to-factory transport costs.

⁹²These figures are derived from complementary data in four different sources: Robert Epp, "The U.S.-Japanese Treaty Crisis," Current History, Vol. 58 (April, 1970), 207; Donald Hellmann, "The Confrontation with Realpolitik," in Balanced Defense: A Forecast of Japan's Security Policy to the Mid-1970's, ed. by James W. Morley (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 161, Strategic Survey 1969 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), p. 81; Hideo Sekino, "U.S.-Japan Military Relations at a Turning Point," Kikusai Mondai, November, 1971 in Summaries, March, 1972, p. 52. This last source cites the following percentage of key materials that Japan must import: 99.4% crude oil, 98.5% iron ore, 100% bauxite, 89.9% copper ore, 100% nickel, 80.1% wheat, 100% wool, 100% raw cotton and 100% natural rubber. Japan is also the world leader in total import tonnage, 300 million tons, and tonnage of merchant ships owned, 30 million tons. Although total imports comprise a relatively modest (7-9%) portion of Japan's GNP, these critical resource shortages make that amount extremely important.

this pipeline Japan boasts the world's largest merchant marine, but to protect it she has only the MSDF. Since this organization is designed solely for coastal defense, Japan actually depends on the United States' Seventh Fleet to preserve her status as a world trading giant by assuring her access to resources and markets in Asia and the world. One possible hitch in this cozy relationship is that Article 5 of the Security Treaty specifically says the United States is not obliged to protect Japanese merchantmen on the high seas.⁹³ In an era of uncertain American credibility, one lesson of Japan's tremendous economic expansion during the 1960's is increasingly clear: her economic survival depends on free entry to oceans she does not control and on peace and stability in regions where she has little effective influence.

To appreciate the future implications of this lesson, however, the past pattern of Japan's postwar relations with Asia must be examined. This scrutiny, in turn, is probably best achieved by first viewing four areas of considerable importance to Japan's security: South Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and the U.S.S.R.

The Korean peninsula has always been of concern to 20th century Japan. It was Japanese territory from 1910 until 1945, and it assumed renewed significance with the outbreak of hostilities in 1950. World War II animosities and colonial hatred between both nations continued relatively unabated until the fall of Syngman Rhee ten years later. This leadership change

⁹³ Hideo Sekino, "Japan and Her Maritime Defense," Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 97 (May, 1971), 119.

in South Korea facilitated a gradual easing of tensions, a trend highlighted by the Japanese-Korean Peace Treaty of 1965.⁹⁴

In pure strategic terms, South Korea provides Japan with defense in depth on her western flank by serving as an advance position for friendly ground forces and lending additional width against any air attack from the continent. Invasion of South Korea by a continental power would directly threaten southern Japan. Geographic proximity would drastically reduce such an occupant's seaborne transportation requirements for a future amphibious assault on Japan.⁹⁵ In addition, the possessor could easily establish air supremacy over the Straits of Tsushima, thereby restricting MSDF operations and facilitating the reinforcement of his original attack force while maintaining secure logistic lines. Although such a possibility is strictly hypothetical, the strategic importance Japan attaches to South Korea was revealed by disclosure of the "Three Arrows Plan" in 1965. Essentially a military contingency plan, it called for emergency mobilization of the SDF in the event of a communist invasion of South Korea.⁹⁶ Regardless of their validity, these threat perceptions are a political reality for a majority of Japanese. The LDP especially thinks that South Korea in the hands of an unfriendly power seriously jeopardizes Japan's security.

⁹⁴Under terms of the 1965 Treaty, Japan settled past Korean property claims in the form of \$300 million in outright grants, \$200 million in government loans and \$300 million in private commercial credits. In exchange, South Korea abolished the infamous Rhee Line, curtailing her seizure of Japanese fishing vessels between 50 miles (Rhee Line) and 12 miles (new territorial limit) of her coast.

⁹⁵Masataka Kosaka, "Concerning Japan's Nuclear Armaments," Kokubo, September, 1967 in Summaries, January 29 - February 5, 1968, p. 14. Kosaka estimates that it would ordinarily require over one million tons of shipping for a continental power to invade Japan. An invasion of South Korea, however, would reduce the figure for a direct assault on Japan to 100,000 tons.

⁹⁶McCracken, "Japan's View of Korea," p. 45. The plan assumed a North Korean land and air assault on South Korea assisted by Chinese air power.

Aside from these military considerations, South Korea is of substantial commercial importance to Japan. It furnishes a ready market for Japanese goods and provides a source of cheap labor to support Japanese investment. As mentioned previously, this last condition is especially important too in Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Few new additions to Japan's work force⁹⁷ coupled with rising wages have forced Japan to invest large quantities of money in these regions, utilizing their inexpensive labor pool to expand Japan's own industrial capacity.⁹⁸ A pair of additional factors will also encourage future Japanese multinational operations in East Asia. First, rising land costs and more stringent environmental restrictions at home will force firms to locate abroad to reduce physical plant expenses.⁹⁹ Second, foreign investment remains one essential means to secure key raw materials at reasonable prices for Japan's growing industries. It is, therefore, vital to Japan's security and prosperity that these areas and access to them remain free from serious political restrictions or tensions. An always unpredictable and frequently aggressive North Korea, as evidenced

⁹⁷Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Economic Clouds Gather on Japan's Horizon," New York Times, Dec. 19, 1971, III, p. 14. In 1970-71 Japan's Labor Ministry estimated the current shortage of skilled labor at 1,820,000 persons. Whereas 1,240,000 eighteen year olds entered the labor market in 1966, it is estimated that only 770,000 will do so in 1974. This phenomena is likely to push wages higher, accelerate inflation and create labor unrest, all incentives for companies to expand abroad.

⁹⁸Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, p. 96. Kahn estimates Japan can add possibly 100 million people to her blue collar work force in this manner.

⁹⁹"Japan's Moment of Truth," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 4, 1972, p. 47. This lack of suitable domestic location is especially critical since Japan's total space requirement for industry is expected to reach 300,000 hectares in 1985, triple that of 1965.

by the Pueblo and EC-121 incidents, threatens the viability of this investment in South Korea as well as the security of Japan's western coast.

Japan's relations with Taiwan spring from a colonial legacy similar to that of Korea; the island was occupied by Japan from 1895 to 1945. After a brief postwar separation, Japan was linked with Formosa in a somewhat different fashion. Largely as a quid pro quo for the American Senate's ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan signed a separate peace treaty with Taiwan in 1952.¹⁰⁰ This agreement has fostered a steady growth of trade and investment between Tokyo and Taipei and has reinforced existing historical-psychological bonds between the two nations. Formosa's importance was further increased by the discovery of oil on the Senkaku Islands, just north of Taiwan, in 1968.¹⁰¹ Although Tokyo's subsequent claim to the islands is disputed by Taipei, the Senkaku's strategic value as an alternative oil source for Japan could add a new dimension to Japan-Taiwan relations. Finally, Formosa's position astride Japan's southern sea lanes makes friendly contact vital to continued freedom of the seas for Tokyo.

¹⁰⁰For an excellent description of the American role in the 1952 Japan-Republic of China Treaty see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Signet Books 1969), pp. 770-774.

¹⁰¹ECAFE reports in 1968 and 1969 suggested that the entire East China Sea might be a rich alternative source of oil. Under the 1958 Geneva Agreement, all coastal states including China had rights in the area, which must in practice be defined by mutual agreement. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan finessed this point by dividing the area among themselves and ignoring the PRC. Peking subsequently claimed mineral rights to the area in December, 1970, adding its deposition to already conflicting claims between Tokyo and Taipei. On Japan's claim to the islands, see the Foreign Ministry statement in Asahi Shimbun, March 9, 1972 in Daily, March 10, 1972, pp. 15-16.

This same combination of commercial and strategic interests repeats itself in Japan's relations with Southeast Asia.¹⁰² During last fifteen years, Japan's trade with this region has more than doubled, amounting to 20.7 percent of all her international exchange in 1970.¹⁰³ The extent of Japanese economic penetration is further evidenced by the bilateral trade patterns between Tokyo and Southeast Asia; Japan is currently the first or second trading partner of every nation in the region.¹⁰⁴ Although the asymmetry of relations with individual nations provides Japan with some political leverage, many countries possess raw materials and agricultural products of great importance to the Japanese; Indonesian oil and Malaysian rubber are two examples. Trade ties are supplemented by Japanese investments throughout the Far East. Japan's Industrial Structure Council recently estimated that overall foreign investment, much of it in Asia, would total \$11.5 billion by 1975, a fourfold increase from 1970.¹⁰⁵ These purely

¹⁰²For purpose of this paper, Southeast Asia includes Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, North Vietnam, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and South Vietnam.

¹⁰³Japan Economic Yearbook 1971 (Tokyo: The Oriental Economist 1971), p. 69. The breakdown of two way trade for 1970 showed 25.4 percent of Japan's exports went to Southeast Asia while 16.0 percent of her total imports came from that region.

¹⁰⁴Hellmann, "The Confrontation with Realpolitik," pp. 164-167. See Appendix VI for a complete breakdown of Japan's trade with Asia.

¹⁰⁵Hiroshi Kitamura, "Japan's Economic Policy Toward Southeast Asia," Asian Affairs, Vol. 59 (February, 1972), 54-55. The Industrial Structure Council is an advisory body to Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Although few official figures are available, Kitamura estimates Japan's Asian investment to 1969 as follows: Indonesia \$200 million, Taiwan \$63 million, Thailand \$78 million, Malaysia \$40 million, South Korea \$14 million, Philippines \$46 million, Hong Kong \$12 million and Singapore \$24 million. In light of other data, his estimates for both Taiwan and South Korea seem quite conservative. See, for example, Asahi Shimbun, February 28, 1972 in Daily, March 7, 1972, p. 17.

economic concerns are also associated with persistent Japanese military worries about the Straits of Malacca through which the bulk of Japan's crude oil imports pass.

Overshadowing this expanding web of political and economic interconnections is the Vietnam War. Just as the Korean War was the catalyst for recovery in Japan after World War II, the Vietnam conflict has hastened her growth in the 1960's. Here Japan has played both sides of the fence and thus far has been quite successful. She has flooded South Vietnam with hondas, television sets and agricultural machinery while simultaneously becoming North Vietnam's leading trade partner. Although she shuns any situation that suggests even indirect military support for Saigon and keeps her political commitments to the Thieu regime purposefully ambiguous, Japan finds a ready market for her goods in an economy sustained by American aid.¹⁰⁶ Confident of a substantial United States presence, Japan has continued to expand her economic influence in Vietnam and elsewhere throughout Southeast Asia. Now that American troop withdrawals¹⁰⁷ make the area's security less certain, Japanese trade and investment are potentially exposed in ways that might make even inaction a painful decision. Tokyo's concern over Washington's

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 19, 1972, p. 30. In this article Pham Kim Ngoe, South Vietnam's minister of the economy, is quoted as saying, "Vietnam is looking to Japan as the major help in building up industry now and after the war. I urge the Japanese to do it now while the Americans are still bankrolling us. Thus, the Japanese can reap the benefits of developing our country and of getting partially paid for it by somebody else."

¹⁰⁷ New York Times, May 31, 1971, p. 5. In addition to Vietnam pullouts, Sec. of State Rogers has announced plans for withdrawal of 16,000 troops from South Korea and 12,000 from Japan itself.

policy¹⁰⁸ combined with increasing regional pressures for a more politically active Japan are troublesome variables in the Japanese security equation.

In the absence of the United States, it is quite possible that Japan's economic partners in Southeast Asia will seek stability through new regional security arrangements which would demand Japanese participation via political and ultimately military channels. Such pressures were clearly evidenced at the May, 1970, Djakarta conference on Cambodia. It marked the first time Japan had participated in an international political conference since World War II¹⁰⁹ and illustrated her inability to avoid a leading non-economic role in Asia.

In contrast to her rapid penetration of Southeast Asia, Tokyo's postwar relations with the U.S.S.R. have been characterized by slow, tortuous progress. While Cold War alignments offer a partial explanation, Japan's claim to the Southern Kurile Islands and a general public dislike for the Soviets are probably more important. Pushed by Tokyo with increasing vehemence since 1955, the Kuriles issue has now acquired a political inertia of its own within Japan. Public enmity for Moscow stems from a variety of historical factors

¹⁰⁸ See Okinawa: Hearings, testimony of U. Alexis Johnson, p. 1195. Perhaps both the depth and naivete of this anxiety were indicated by an incident which occurred during Sec. Johnson's tenure as ambassador to Tokyo. Several prominent Japanese contacted the American Embassy shortly after President Johnson's announced bombing halt on March 31, 1968, believing this action to be a pretext for an immediate United States withdrawal from Vietnam. The gist of their comments was, "The things we said (in Japan about U.S. involvement) were for local political consumption and not what we really meant."

¹⁰⁹ Lawrence W. Beer, "Japan Turning the Corner," Asian Survey, XI (January, 1971), 83.

of which the island dispute is simply the most recent example. Most frequently mentioned is the belated Russian entry into the Pacific War, a direct violation of their non-aggression pact with Japan. The result is that the U.S.S.R. usually occupies top position in any "most disliked nation" poll. Even after formal normalization of relations in 1956, Japanese-Soviet contacts showed little advance.

This situation was quickly altered, however, by the Sino-Soviet split in 1960. Russia's strategic posture shifted from its immediate postwar goal of containing Japan to a policy of encircling China, entangling the United States, and preserving Soviet freedom of action. The consequence was a marked growth in economic interchange between Tokyo and the Kremlin with trade increasing to \$821 million in 1970¹¹⁰ and both nations negotiating over numerous Siberian development contracts. Most attractive of the Siberian projects is a proposed pipeline to carry cheap, low sulfur crude oil from central Siberia to the coastal city of Nakhodka.¹¹¹ Yet the mere fact that this program has been under intensive negotiation since 1968 illustrates the difficulties involved. Moscow prefers Siberian oil, timber and natural gas as economic enticements to lessen American influence and to attract Japanese capital to Russia's Far Eastern frontier; Japan weighs her need for these raw materials against a long-standing distrust of Soviet motives and a desire to avoid excessive dependence on Soviet resources. The outcome of such ambivalent feelings is unclear, but they will definitely continue to affect the external milieu confronting Japan in the 1970's.

¹¹⁰Japan Economic Yearbook 1971, p. 69.

¹¹¹Michael Malloy, "Will Japan Lose Siberia to Nixon?", Far Eastern Economic Review, December 4, 1971, p. 35. The proposed pipeline would yield fifty million tons of oil annually to energy hungry Japan.

Despite these external changes, the posture of Japan's SDF has remained constant, undergoing little absolute growth since completing its first Defense Buildup Plan in 1960. Japan has instead preferred better mobility to increased size, pursuing this goal through modernization of equipment and elevation of technical standards in defense-related industries. The 190,000 man GSDF has thus maintained virtually the same manpower level for the last decade¹¹² while the MSDF and ASDF have shown slight size increases but have also concentrated on re-equipment.

These rather modest increases have been the product of both local and international forces. Domestically, this low fiscal priority for defense coincides with a strong pacifist sentiment in Japan but is really produced by institutional changes emanating from the Occupation. First, the SDF is administered by the Defense Agency under a civilian Director General, who, in turn, is responsible to the Prime Minister. The highest uniformed officer is two grades below the cabinet. Second, the Defense Agency's civilian hierarchy is a "mixed family,"¹¹³ composed mostly of bureaucrats on temporary

¹¹²Hiroshi Shinohara, "National Defense," Japan Quarterly, XVIII (April-June, 1971), 157. Present approximate force levels are as follows: GSDF - 190,000 men (reserves included); MSDF - 36,000 men, 39 destroyers, 10 submarines, 157 smaller combatants; ASDF - 40,000 men, 102 Nike missiles, 192 F-104E jets, 287 F-86F jets, 446 other combat aircraft.

¹¹³Mainichi Shimbun, March 11, 1972 in Daily, March 17, 1972, p. 22; Yomuri Shimbun, March 12, 1972 in Daily, March 16, 1972, p. 21. These articles focus on the lack of civilian control in the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) as supposedly illustrated by the transportation of SDF equipment to Okinawa prior to formal approval by the National Defense Council. Assailed as a "wild run of the uniformed," this purported transgression points out the more fundamental problem--internal confusion within the JDA. The picture is that of a Defense Agency whose constituent bureaus are controlled by personnel from other branches of government: The Defense Bureau is staffed by MITI personnel; the Accounting Bureau relies on Finance Ministry assistance; the Personnel and Education Bureau is dominated by the Autonomous Agency and National Personnel Agency. In Mainichi's words, "There remains such a doubt--Is it really possible for 'mixed family members' to formulate such 'a reasonable thing' as a defense policy?"

assignment from other ministries. Primarily concerned about returning to their parent organizations, these officials show little enthusiasm for implementing, much less formulating, effective strategic policy. Third, Defense Agency monetary requests are reviewed by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Finance Ministry before they are even included in the government's proposed budget. Submerged within a disorganized and institutionally subordinate agency, the armed forces have little direct access to the policy process. The Diet exercises an additional measure of control through approval of Defense budgets, manpower levels and mobilization requests.

In a more general sense, Japan's entire postwar atmosphere has inhibited the policy latitude of her military planners. Here public opposition to any form of rearmament and the high priority assigned to Japan's economic growth have set definite limits on defense spending. For example, a wartorn and economically insecure Japan of 1954 devoted 1.72 percent of her GNP to defense while Japan the economic giant of 1968 spent only 0.88 percent for military purposes.¹¹⁴

Despite these built in restrictions, the Japanese defense establishment has slowly but inexorably increased its strength. Technically, it ranks with the world's best and, with its strong material foundation, can expand rapidly. The government achieved this capability without arousing the public primarily because it kept defense spending near one percent of Japan's GNP. While this approach mollified defense critics, the SDF expanded with Japan's booming economy. The result has been a doubling of absolute military expenditures every six years since 1952.

¹¹⁴ Martin E. Weinstein, "Defense Policy and the Self Defense Forces," The Japan Interpreter, VI (Summer, 1970), 175.

Much of the impetus for this gradual build-up has come from Japan's influential industrial sector. Besides a general concern with the security of their overseas investments, these companies are interested in spinoff benefits of military R & D and desire self-sufficiency in arms production. This drive for a domestic arms capability is probably the major defense-related motivation for Japanese industry. Led by the powerful Mitsubishi combine,¹¹⁵ Japan's contractors are striving to limit foreign competition and to encourage greater technological competence among native industries. Although arms production is currently less than 0.5 percent of industrial output, this strategy is designed to utilize existing economic strength to build a solid base for future expansion. While both are small in size, the industrial segment of Tokyo's "industrial-military complex"¹¹⁶ far outweighs the military one in potential influence. A good example of its growing voice are the figures for Japan's Fourth Defense Buildup Plan (1972-1976): over ninety percent of its weapons and equipment will be procured at home.¹¹⁷ With its close ties to the ruling Liberal Democrats, the

¹¹⁵"Reality of Defense Industry in its 20th Year," Toyo Keizai, September 19, 1970 in Summaries, November, 1970, p. 22. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is easily Japan's leading defense producer, receiving over thirty percent of all domestic contracts. With the exception of the BADGE detection system, Mitsubishi has manufactured all major weapons items not imported from the United States. For a complete breakdown of all Japanese defense industries, see Appendix VII.

¹¹⁶Hanson W. Baldwin, "Japan Slowly Revives Arms Industry," New York Times, Dec. 12, 1970, p. 10. According to Baldwin, "The Industrial-Military complex does not run modern Japan, but it is part of the Establishment, and the industrial part of it--highly influential in both economies and politics--is demonstrating an increasing interest in, and capability for, the manufacture of armaments."

¹¹⁷Asahi Shimbun, April 28, 1971 in Daily, April 29-30, 1971, p. 5.

business community seems capable of becoming the catalyst, though not the driving force, in a possible Japanese rearmament.

To date, however, Japan has continued her low defense profile thanks to the American alliance. Japan's defense posture throughout the 1960's remained essentially what it was in 1954: To defend the home islands against direct and indirect aggression. With the United States policing the rest of Asia, Tokyo's only concern was securing its own shores from internal subversion or direct invasion.¹¹⁸ The SDF was capable of countering only intermediate-level external threats, thereby raising the threshold of attack for a potential aggressor. Because of SDF strength, any Soviet or Chinese thrust against Japan would be on a scale large enough to activate the Security Treaty and provoke an American response. In this manner, the SDF would sustain Washington's guarantee of protection, magnifying the credibility of its deterrent and minimizing the dangers of outside attack.

These same strategic assumptions underlie the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan and the 1970 Defense Agency White Paper, Japan's most recent security planning documents. The Fourth Plan aims to create a "system capable of effectively dealing with all armed aggression involving localized or minor warfare and the use of conventional weapons."¹¹⁹ Although "localized" is not defined, the Plan provides for material improvements consistent with the

¹¹⁸Weinstein, Postwar Defense Policy, p. 112. A good illustration of these strategic assumptions was the National Defense Council staff paper of 1966. Major threats (in order of decreasing priority) and methods of combating them were perceived to be: U.S.S.R. and PRC nuclear weapons--counter by reliance on U.S. nuclear umbrella; large scale conventional attacks on the home islands--counter by cooperation with the U.S. in accordance with the Security Treaty; massive internal disorders--suppress by use of the GSDF.

¹¹⁹Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, p. 163.

present SDF mission of conventional home island defense, an objective further supported by the Plan's stated goals: To improve the image of the SDF, to integrate various defense functions and to work for the autonomous development of military equipment.¹²⁰ Manpower levels will increase slightly while new destroyers and F-4 Phantom jets will comprise the major weapons additions in the \$16 million package.¹²¹ The only significant change over prior plans will be 100,000 tons of new construction for the MSDF, upgrading its anti-submarine warfare capability and giving Tokyo a navy capable of controlling the Sea of Japan and its straits. Even this alteration, however, is geared more to early intercept of a potential invader than to any specific notion to protect Japan's far-flung merchant fleet.

In contrast to the routine nature of the Fourth Plan, Japan's Defense White Paper was part of a broad effort to redefine her "Basic National

¹²⁰"Japanese Defense Policy," Survival, XIII (January, 1971), 3.

¹²¹Data derived from complementary figures in three different sources. See "Reality of Defense Industry" in Summaries, p. 16; New York Times, Apr. 28, 1971, p. 7; Strategic Survey 1970 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 35. The \$16 million total of the Fourth Plan will comprise an average annual expenditure equal to one percent of Japan's GNP. This amount represents a considerable absolute increase over the \$6.6 million, constituting 0.8 percent of annual GNP, during the Third Plan (1967-1971).

Upon completion of the Fourth Plan, Japan will have the world's seventh largest military force with overall force/equipment levels significantly increased: GSDF strength will use from 260,000 to 271,000 men; the MSDF will have about 200 ships totalling 247,000 tons; the ASDF will possess some 900 aircraft, including 158 F-4 interceptors. Specific equipment additions, by category, are: AIRCRAFT - 104 F-4's, 40-50 XT-2 supersonic trainers, 40 XC-1 medium transports, 30-40 PS-1 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, 300-400 GSDF helicopters, 20 airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft; NAVAL CRAFT--two 8000 ton helicopter convoy ships (DLH's), 10 submarines; MISSILES--Sparrow III air-to-air missiles (AAM's), two varieties of short range surface-to-surface missiles (SSM's) with 50-100 km and 20-50 km ranges.

Defense Policy" of 1957. The process was formally initiated in March, 1970, when Defense Agency Chief Nakasone published the "Five Principles of Autonomous Defense."¹²² Commonly referred to as jishu boei (autonomous defense), these precepts promised Japan would: (1) maintain the Constitution and defend her national territory; (2) maintain harmony between defense and diplomacy and keep a balance among national policies; (3) maintain civilian control of the military; (4) maintain the Government's three non-nuclear principles of not manufacturing, not possessing and not importing nuclear weapons; (5) supplement Japan's resources for national defense within the American-Japanese security system. The first three principles merely reaffirmed existing commitments to the Constitution, statesmanship and civilian control of the armed forces. Nakasone's fourth axiom, the "three nuclear no's" had been stated many times before by Prime Minister Sato but in a somewhat different context. Sato's declarations were always more in the spirit of an administration policy statement rather than a legally binding doctrine. Even though it only reiterated Sato's pledges, Nakasone's fourth principle was the first time an official government document had directly addressed the nuclear question. By simply broaching this divisive issue, the fourth maxim represented an important departure from Japan's past.

The fifth and most controversial principle was an attempt to boost Japan's defense capability within the boundaries of the American alliance. It was part of a general effort by Prime Minister Sato to minimize the expected crisis over revision of the Security Treaty in June, 1970.

¹²²For an analysis, see Kobun Ito, "Japan's Security in the 1970's," Asian Survey X (December, 1970), 1031-1036.

First announced the previous fall, this policy called for greater Japanese defense efforts to be supplemented by cooperation with the United States.¹²³ More a change in emphasis than one in substance, this policy sought to downplay the Security Treaty's significance by portraying it as subordinate to Japan's own capability. As part of a government policy orchestration seeking short-term political benefits, Nakasone's fifth principle did little to clarify future directions in defense policy. It implied greater expenditures than those under the Fourth Plan¹²⁴ but was never further defined by the government.

Nowhere is this pattern of ambiguity more apparent than in the White Paper of October, 1970.¹²⁵ The document emphasizes continued reliance on the United States nuclear umbrella and advocates gradual conventional force increases to handle various threats to the home islands. It is explicit, however, in limiting Tokyo's defense horizons to continental Japan.¹²⁶

¹²³ See Mainichi Shimbun, October 15, 1969 in Daily, October 18-20, 1969, p. 15 and Shigeo Omori, "June, 1970," Japan Quarterly, XVII (October-December, 1970), 392.

¹²⁴ Douglas H. Mendel, "Japanese Defense in the 1970's: The Public View," Asian Survey X (December, 1970), 1047. Nakasone fueled this speculation by telling the Tokyo Foreign Correspondent's Club in March, 1970, that the 1972-1976 defense budget would need to be twice its present level to achieve the goal of "autonomous defense." This statement implied annual defense expenditures from 1.6 to 2.0 percent of Japan's GNP instead of the 1.0 percent envisioned under the Fourth Plan.

¹²⁵ For partial text of the White Paper (preliminary draft) see Asahi Shimbun, September 17, 1969 in Daily, September 20-22, 23, 24, 25 & 26, 1969.

¹²⁶ "Japanese Defense Policy," 4. According to the Paper, "Japan's defense capabilities, which are purely for her own defense, will only be utilized in case of aggression against Japan to defend the nation's peace and independence in exercise of the nation's inherent right of self-defense and will remain strategically on the defensive."

Possession of nuclear arms, missiles or long range bombers are ruled out as contrary to Japan's "peace" constitution while "small size nuclear weapons"¹²⁷ are deemed legal under certain circumstances. To complete this confusing picture, Nakasone introduced the Paper with references to Japan's future status as a "middle class non-nuclear nation,"¹²⁸ a statement subsequently repudiated by Sato.

A more detailed analysis finds the White Paper divided into four basic categories which: (1) describe why Japan needs a security structure: (2) assess the Soviet and Chinese military capabilities; (3) explain why neutrality/nonalignment is not a viable foreign policy, and; (4) outline the SDF buildup under the Third and Fourth Plans. The Paper is primarily a description of present force levels and a justification of existing government policy. Nowhere does it discuss the potential threats posed to Japan nor does it attempt to estimate Japan's capacity to counter these challenges. It is, in essence, no more than a bland effort to raise the public's rudimentary level of defense consciousness.¹²⁹

¹²⁷New York Times, Oct. 20, 1970, p. 17. Particularly interesting is the Cabinet's reported phraseology change from the Defense Agency draft. The original Paper read that while constitutionally Japan could possess small nuclear weapons, the Government "at present" was against this move. The revised version states "It is possible to possess small nuclear weapons if their power is no more than necessary and the minimum for defense. But the Government is taking an anti-nuclear armament policy even if it is constitutionally possible."

¹²⁸Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 21, 1970.

¹²⁹Japan Times, October 24, 1970, p. 12. A Times editorial shortly after the White Paper's official release indicates the nature of Japan's domestic defense quandry:

We welcome that fact that the White Paper was prepared and published. It is indeed strange that this should be the first time that a report of this nature should be made

These statements--the Fourth Plan, jishu boei and the Defense White Paper--represent tentative Japanese endeavors to restructure their defense policy to conform with the realities to today's multipolar world. But in the topsy-turvy atmosphere of Japanese politics, such initiatives face a host of obstacles. The result is that the average politician finds it easier to abdicate responsibility than to articulate a coherent policy. Without the necessary political guidance, Defense Agency planners have little material from which to formulate strategic objectives--the core of any nation's defense strategy. This absence of planning is the heart of Japan's defense dilemma within the government. Its military consequences are to make the SDF a force without a strategy, materially powerful but strategically impotent. Its political expression is a hazy desire to keep all options open as evidenced by Diet debates, not on policy substance, but on whether policy should even exist.¹³⁰ Since the Opposition disputes the legality of Japan's armed forces, the government must resort to making artificial distinctions between offensive and defensive weapons to preserve its latitude for action. The military is understandably puzzled at these arbitrary labels,

public. It should have been done long ago. Previous attempts to publish a White Paper on defense, however, were quashed because of political considerations! This meant that the Government did not want to take a chance with public reaction on a subject which was considered taboo for a long time... there is a new realization of the need at this time to seek public support for defense efforts. It is, in a way, a public relations campaign...(129) Emphasis added.

¹³⁰ Tokyo Shimbun, February 23, 1972 in Daily, February 26-28, 1972, p. 11. This pattern and its consequences are illustrated by recent Diet debate over the Fourth Defense Plan's 1972 budget. As seen by Tokyo Shimbun:

The confusion of the defense problem can be seen in the fact that such questions as what defense should be and its proper scale were not fully probed (in considering the budget for the Fourth Plan), and that sterile arguments on such questions

believing user intention rather than weapon design determines armament classification.

Added to, and often compounded by, these domestic constraints on defense policy is a technical problem which hampers the formulation of strategic doctrine--Japan's ineffectual intelligence apparatus. First, Tokyo has no national secrets law to protect sensitive military information. Operating in a hostile political climate, any large intelligence activity is therefore extremely vulnerable. Second, due to the SDF's small size and prohibition from overseas deployment, Japan lacks the manpower abroad even to collect surveillance data. Since it is common knowledge that "the Defense Agency can scarcely obtain direct intelligence on the communist camp, including that on the Soviet Navy,"¹³¹ the government has made some cautious attempts to strengthen collection activities. Yet Japan's capability in this area remains largely embryonic. Without the ability to gather covert information abroad and faced with strong anti-military sentiment at home, most SDF intelligence activities are performed by small research and

as 'whether to strengthen defense power or to maintain defenseless neutrality' have been continued at the Diet. It is because the Government's defense policy is indefinite that doubts are caused as to 'militaristic Japan' and 'military preparation to take over the U.S. burden.' Parentheses and emphasis added.

¹³¹Yomuri Shimbun, January 27, 1970 in Daily, January 28, 1970, p. 11. Nakasone made an effort in early 1970 to increase Japan's intelligence collection capacity. He strengthened the research staffs in the JDA, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, succeeded in some equipment modernization (e.g. ASW hydrophones) and attempted to increase the number of uniformed officers stationed in Japanese embassies. This last request was specifically rejected, leaving Japan with only seventeen defense officers in twelve embassies throughout the world.

analysis staffs which operate with a vague mandate.¹³² Such a low-key approach may diffuse local opposition, but it also seriously inhibits any sophisticated evaluation of threat.

If purposeful ambiguity enhances the government's domestic freedom of action, it likewise circumscribes Japan's international maneuverability. Having maintained a low military profile throughout the postwar era, Japan has placed some unique restrictions on her future behavior in Asia. A sharp rise in Japan's armed forces would probably evoke a corresponding increase in Chinese military preparedness since Peking would regard such an increase outside the legitimate boundaries of Tokyo's own defense concerns and hence an aggressive move. Indeed, in the last two years the mainland has charged that renewed Japanese militarism is threatening all Asia,¹³³ a sentiment which has also been echoed faintly in the United States Congress.¹³⁴

¹³²Most of the information in this paragraph is based on the author's conversations with Professor Donald C. Hellmann, Institute of Comparative and Area Studies, University of Washington.

¹³³See, for example, Renmin Ribao Editorial, "Japanese Militarism Not Allowed to Take Old Road of Aggression," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 39, September 24, 1971, pp. 4-5.

¹³⁴U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of Special Study Mission to Asia by Hon. Lester L. Wolff, dated June 21, 1971, pursuant to H. Resoln. 143, 92nd Cong., 1st session, 1971, p. 4. Wolff cites the following as evidence of Japanese militarism: (1) the increases in her military budget; (2) the increased number of military personnel appearing in world capitals on non-specific missions; (3) a fundamental redefinition of Japan's defense perimeter "reported last year by the Wolff study mission and since substantiated by various media reports "from Tokyo; (4) a shift to heavy industry and basic hardware suited to military development in lieu of consumer industries; (5) pressure to assume full control of U.S. bases on Okinawa as well as on the home islands. Based on this sketchy data, Wolff rather sensationally concludes that "the spirit in Japan almost implies a desire for a fresh attempt to create a new Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

Although difficult to measure, such accusations have also caused some apprehension among Japan's trading partners in the Far East. Since they have accepted a pacifist Japan as a fact of life in postwar years, these countries might well overestimate the hypocrisy involved in Japanese rearmament. With growing Chinese influence and decreasing American presence, their fears may be more apparent than real, but non-communist Asia forms a trade network from which Japan cannot afford to be isolated.

The logical exit from this maze would seem to lie in a carefully planned series of political, and eventually military, moves to change slowly Tokyo's posture in Asia. On the surface, the Nixon-Sato Communique of November, 1969, seemed to be the first in a possible series of such actions. In exchange for the return of Okinawa, the White House endeavored to extract a positive commitment by Japan to the Nixon Doctrine. Sato obliged by calling South Korea "essential" and Taiwan "a most important factor" for Japan's security and by affirming that "the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan."¹³⁵ Although these statements revealed Japan's security priorities, they gave no hint of her intentions and were, in essence, only verbal acknowledgements that Japan was indeed an Asian nation.

The danger of this cautious approach is that Japan may eventually be forced to take action in a manner inconsistent with her national interests. Lacking any firm policy guidance from Tokyo, Japan's economic penetration

¹³⁵ For the complete text of the communique and Sato's January, 1970, speech to the Washington National Press Club, see Okinawa, Hearings, pp. 1425-1433. Sato's Press Club speech contained the same phraseology as the joint communique. It was given considerably more weight, however, by Sec. Johnson because it represented the unilateral statement of the Prime Minister, "undiluted" by the possibility of compromise inherent in a joint communique.

of Asia is proceeding in an ad hoc fashion, carrying ominous implications for the political involvement that will inevitably follow. Japan continues her economic spread¹³⁶ into neighboring states on the assumption that economic growth will automatically produce peace and harmony throughout the region. Instead, she becomes increasingly dependent on raw materials from these areas--areas where her entrepreneurs are possible scapegoats for all manner of political problems.

As the United States withdraws from Vietnam, the security screen behind which much of Japan's investment has been conducted will disappear, leaving key interests exposed to the interplay of local revolutionary forces. Japan seems to be counting on her economic weight to stabilize these volatile areas. Such a policy is highly questionable on several grounds. First, tangible benefits from economic growth are only realized over a long period, usually thirty to forty years.¹³⁷ It is doubtful that this slow-moving process would significantly affect the immediate political stability of a particular regime. Next, sharp changes in the existing growth rate may generate destabilizing forces because many people will quickly change status, a condition ripe for exploitation by extremist movements, and because rapid

¹³⁶ Jonathon Unger, "Japan: The Economic Threat," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 16, 1971, p. 50. A Japanese Government report released on October 4, 1971, projected an expansion of Japan's raw material requirements by fifteen percent per year and consequently recommended Tokyo take a more active role in developing the resources of lesser developed countries.

¹³⁷ Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966) p. 27. In the words of Kuznets: "The periods required to observe the sustained change that we identify as economic growth are long--a minimum of thirty to forty years--because no less a stretch of historical experience can reveal the variety of short-term fluctuations to which the economy is subject."

economic growth will not necessarily raise general purchasing power.¹³⁸

Finally, predicated political stability on economic growth displays a kind of reverse logic since institutional stability is a prerequisite for economic development. Dependent on the accumulation of capital, economic growth relies mainly on preserving the status quo long enough to give potential businessmen an assured return on their long-range investments, enabling them to acquire the capital, material and human, for future expansion. Yet this status quo is the very condition Asian revolutionaries are committed to change, putting Japan in direct opposition to the other major power in Asia--the People's Republic of China.

¹³⁸See, for example, Mancur Olson, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," Journal of Economic History, XXIII (March, 1963), 529-58.

CHAPTER V

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Relations with China dominate Japan's interaction with the rest of Asia.¹³⁹ Cultural, linguistic and racial similarities form traditional ties between both nations while Japanese guilt over war atrocities inspires a more recent sort of sympathy. Although these sources of attraction may be gradually diminishing, the one-third of Japan on the political left feels an intellectual, romantic admiration for Mao Tse-tung's socialist achievements. These conditions, plus China's power in Asia and her proximity to Japan, mean that developments in Peking are of extreme interest to the Japanese. They receive copious press coverage and are followed with considerable interest both in government and business circles. This fascination with China has also produced a rather bizarre twist in the attitude of Japan's public toward the PRC. Despite their general support of Japan's alignment with the West, the Japanese citizenry tends to view normalizing relations with China as a special case, separate from the government's overall foreign policy stance. Besides complicating Japanese diplomacy, this type of romanticism continues to sustain the overriding importance of Peking in Tokyo's domestic calculations.

In contrast, the Chinese are suspicious of Japan's actions to the point of paranoia. China's aging leadership remembers only too well the horrors of the Pacific War and its effect on the Middle Kingdom. To this emotional dislike is added a strong distaste for Japan as a leader of world capitalism.

¹³⁹ Noriyuki Tokuda, "Introduction: China Studies in Japan," Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan (hereafter JSPIJ), IV (December, 1966), 9. Quoting Prime Minister Sato, "The future of Japanese diplomacy depends entirely (on how Japan handles) the China problem."

Peking thus perceives the spread of Japanese economic influence as the inevitable consequence of monopoly capital's need to exploit other countries to fuel its own expansion.

With their different views of each other, it is hardly surprising that the postwar pattern of Sino-Japanese relations has been quite erratic. After some limited trade and cultural exchanges from 1952 to 1958, Peking abruptly broke off relations to protest the strong anti-communist policy of the Kishi government. Since 1960, Japan has followed the doctrine of "separating politics and economics," resulting in the steady growth of trade despite fluctuations in the PRC's political stance. From 1962 until the present, trade has been of two types: Memorandum Trade administered under annually negotiated agreements¹⁴⁰ and "friendly firm" trade conducted with individual Japanese companies not hostile to Peking. Although the vast China market is still the utopia of every Japanese businessman, total trade in 1970 was only \$826 million, about two percent of Tokyo's GNP.¹⁴¹

The major roadblock to normal Sino-Japanese contacts has been Taiwan. By virtue of her 1952 Peace Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, Japan created a permanent source of political tension which has been periodically aggravated by both sides. The most recent example was Peking's reaction to the Nixon-Sato Communique. The Prime Minister's reference to the importance of Taiwan for Japan's security ignited an outpouring of vituperation about Japanese

¹⁴⁰The initial Memorandum Trade agreement covered the period from 1962 to 1967. Since 1968 the agreement has been renegotiated annually, giving Peking a yearly political forum from which to denounce the Japanese government.

¹⁴¹Japan Economic Yearbook 1971, p. 69. The majority of this trade (\$572 million) is Japanese exports, principally chemical fertilizer, steel and various commodities. Primary Japanese imports are soybeans, raw silk, clothing and animal hair.

militarism which still has not subsided. The reason was simply that China interpreted this action as a form of unilateral Japanese intervention in the Chinese civil war. Although the Taiwan disagreement has prevented formal inter-state relations, unofficial contacts have flourished on several levels. Tokyo has a variety of China-Japan friendship associations, makes frequent cultural exchanges with Peking and maintains trade missions with quasi-diplomatic privileges on the mainland.

By far the most important development in Japan's relations with China, however, was Peking's successful atomic test in 1964. Although this explosion inspired initial violent reaction in the Japanese press,¹⁴² the disclosure that China had used a sophisticated U-235 weapon produced an immediate switch in Japan's media. The new reaction was more restrained than prior outbursts and exceedingly mild in comparison with Western commentary. Its tone of Asian admiration was typified by a subsequent Yomuri editorial:

We feel indignant at the nuclear test itself, but we are greatly surprised at the indomitable national spirit of Communist China which has finally produced nuclear weapons by enduring all hardships. It is good to leave such a country unrestrained without admitting it to the community of nations; that is, the United Nations? It is all the more necessary for Japan, a neighboring country, to consider the problem seriously.¹⁴³

¹⁴²Yomuri Shimbun, October 17, 1964; Asahi Shimbun, October 17, 1964; Tokyo Shimbun, October 18, 1964 in Daily, October 17-19, 1964. Yomuri referred to the Chinese "plot" in conducting the test while Asahi viewed the explosion as "a challenge to peace." Taking the hardest line of any paper, Tokyo Shimbun catalogued all past Chinese crimes (the Korean War, Tibet, "intervention" in Indo-China) and concluded that the test would have "a great effect on the world strategic situation."

¹⁴³Yomuri Shimbun, October 25, 1964 in Daily, October 24-26, 1964.

Press respect for Peking's atomic arms seemed to increase with each subsequent detonation. Most commentators agreed that China's rate of nuclear development had been extremely rapid and that such an occurrence would definitely exert an influence on Japan's security planning.¹⁴⁴ Even Japan's "defense realists" viewed China's new capacity as a political and psychological tool, primarily for defense against the two superpowers and for prestige among Third World countries.¹⁴⁵ Although these observers did not minimize Peking's threat potential, most public fears seemed to center, not on China's nuclear weapons themselves, but on the attractiveness of American bases in Japan as potential targets. Rather than perceiving Peking's nuclear arsenal as a direct threat, Japanese public opinion viewed it as merely increasing the urgency of a Sino-Japanese rapprochement,¹⁴⁶ a

¹⁴⁴ For reactions to the second and third Chinese tests, see Mainichi Shimbun, December 26, 1965 in Daily, December 24-27, 1965 and Yomuri Shimbun, February 21, 1966 in Daily, February 19-21, 1966, respectively.

¹⁴⁵ See, for example, Kiichi Saeki, "Collective Defense: A Realistic Guarantee of Japan's Security," JSPIJ, IV (April, 1966) 52 and Kei Wakaizumi in Mainichi Shimbun, April 14, 1966 in Daily, April 16-18, 1966, p. 23. In the latter article, Wakaizumi states:

From a basic standpoint, Communist China has nuclearized itself probably in order to establish its prestige and foothold as a great power...what is important here is that Communist China's leaders are clearly thinking of making the most effective use of its nuclearization as a political, diplomatic, psychological weapon...

¹⁴⁶ Kishida Junnotsuke, Chūkoku no Kakusenryoku (China's Nuclear Power), Vol. 3, n. 71, cited by John Welfied, Japan and Nuclear China (Canberra: Australian National University 1970), p. 24. A good sample of this feeling is found in the third work of the Asahi Shimbun's fifteen volume series on Japan's security and defense problems. It blithely assures readers that "Nuclear development does not necessarily mean there has been an increase in the threat." Instead, the sense of security resulting from possession of nuclear weapons may well modify China's attitude towards the outside world. Japan's role is made quite explicit.

One of the practical steps that Japan can take, at the present

view remarkably close to Opposition contentions that the threat to Japan did not derive from China but from international tension created by the Sino-American confrontation.¹⁴⁷ The real danger, as proclaimed by the Opposition and largely accepted by the populace, was that continued government adherence to containment would force China toward a more radical posture, thereby activating the now dormant threat of atomic weapons.

The reaction of the Japanese government to a nuclear China paralleled public sentiment by emphasizing that Chinese weapons were essentially defensive and that Peking had little interest in areas outside her immediate borders.¹⁴⁸ Tokyo likewise tried to downplay the effect of China's device in terms of any immediate military significance, stressing the difference

time, in order to see that China's nuclear development does not bring in its wake an increase in the Chinese threat is to contribute to the construction of the Chinese economy, to engage in economic cooperation, trade and technical cooperation. Increases in cultural, educational and scientific exchanges are also concrete steps that can be taken. Another step is to create an environment (i.e. have China join the U.N. and participate in disarmament talks) in which China can exercise her responsibilities as a great world power.

Since the Asahi defense series apparently enjoyed considerable popularity and was reprinted a number of times, it seems prudent not to underestimate its effect on public opinion.

¹⁴⁷ See, for example, Masashi Ishibashi, "Security in a Nuclear Age," Economist, May 24, 1966 in Summaries, June 6, 1966, pp. 1-7. Ishibashi argues that the Security Treaty will merely draw an innocent Japan into an inevitable Sino-American confrontation. Considering that one-third of Japan supports the political left and that most Japanese feel a great reservoir of sympathy for the PRC, it is not surprising that a majority of Japanese citizens might favor this view. Such a stance also possesses the innate appeal of blaming all problems with Peking on uncontrollable external circumstances, assuming that China's atomic arms must be aimed at one of the superpowers instead of peace-loving Japan.

¹⁴⁸ Welfield, Japan and Nuclear China, p. 45.

between simple bomb acquisition and possessing a viable weapons system.¹⁴⁹ On the diplomatic front, Japan declined any bold moves toward formal ties with Peking and instead endeavored to reaffirm Washington's nuclear guarantee; the Sato-Johnson joint communique of January, 1965, produced precisely this result.¹⁵⁰ Secure in the knowledge that American strategic might had negated any potential Chinese threat, Japan's political leadership put the issue on a back burner--to be kept under study but requiring no dramatic action.

After several years of observation, the China problem appears as intractable as ever to the Japanese, many of whom now see China and their country as inevitable rivals for political and territorial hegemony in Asia. Despite the initially mild popular reaction described above, the most important long-term consequence of China's atomic arms has been a gradual change in public discussion of Japan's security problems. These debates have reflected a distinct shift in the country's strategic position from deterring a conventional Soviet threat to coping with a nuclear Chinese menace,¹⁵¹ including open discourse on the once-taboo subject of Japan's nuclear option. The Japanese have slowly realized that China is now an independent variable in their security planning, posing a separate threat from that of the U.S.S.R. Traditionally European-oriented, the

¹⁴⁹Japan Times, October 18, 1964, p. 1.

¹⁵⁰For text of the joint communique, see Department of State Bulletin, LII, February 1, 1965, p. 135. The communique read, in part, that "...the President reaffirmed the United States' determination to abide by its commitment under the (U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security) Treaty to defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside." Parentheses and emphasis added.

¹⁵¹1966 was the first year the magnitude of this change revealed itself. See, for example, Chuo Koron February, 1966, and March, 1966; Jiyu, July, 1966, all issues in Summaries for appropriate months of 1966.

Soviet Union has neither the interest nor the forces-in-being to conduct extensive operations in Asia. China, on the other hand, has always been directly concerned with the Far East and now is acquiring the means to exert her will in the region. This distinction, plus the rising level of media attention to Chinese atomic weapons, yields an inescapable conclusion--Tokyo has experienced a definite increase in threat perception since 1964.

In its most general sense, this threat derives from an increased possibility of conventional aggression with China relying on her nuclear weapons to preclude or to limit any response by the country invaded. China's growing atomic arsenal will raise the threshold of nuclear conflict with the United States to the highest possible level. By judicious selection of battleground and proper use of tactics, a nuclear Peking will have maximum flexibility for conducting a level of insurgent activity well below the brink of American intervention.

In a more specific context, atomic arms enable China to pursue her objectives with fewer risks and greater potential gain. They let Peking readily exploit opportunities arising from ambiguities in American commitments in Asia, the social or political vulnerability of United States allies in that region and instability in countries near China's perimeter. In addition to facilitating Peking's support of local insurgencies, nuclear weapons provide her with qualitatively more effective political-propaganda techniques for spreading Chinese influence across the Far East. Such changes might be achieved in any of three ways. First, American allies would become increasingly wary of United States bases on their territory in the face of a nuclear China. These anxieties would generate indigenous pressure for a reappraisal of military alliances, resulting in the elimination or severe restriction of the operations at in-country military

installations. Second, by casting doubt on American policies in Asia, the PRC hopes to discourage Asian self-defense efforts and pull present American allies into a more neutral, pro-Peking orbit. Finally, by exacerbating existing frictions within a particular country, the Chinese desire to polarize domestic opinion in the belief that an eventual confrontation of native political forces will work to their benefit.

All of these tactics were visible in Peking's reaction to a Tokyo decision admitting American nuclear submarines to Japanese ports. Issued just after China's first test, this statement sought to capitalize on Japan's public fear of nuclear weapons:

The closer the Japan-U.S. collaboration, the less guaranteed is Japan's security. Today U.S. imperialism is brandishing its nuclear weapons in Asia, making active preparations for nuclear war. If it eventually starts such a war, Japan, as a U.S. nuclear base, is bound to bear the brunt and will inevitably be pushed into the abyss of nuclear calamity. The Japanese Government willingly acts as an accomplice in U.S. imperialism's nuclear war preparations--this is an extremely dangerous road by which the Japanese nation is led to a bottomless nuclear chasm.¹⁵²

This article was an excellent example of the propaganda potential of Peking's atomic arsenal. Yet all subsequent Chinese actions have been carefully measured in order to prevent fearful neighbors from taking strong countervailing security measures.¹⁵³ Especially wary of such

¹⁵²Renmin Ribao Observer, "The Sato Government Knows Which Way the Wind Blows," Peking Review, Vol. 7 No. 48, November 27, 1964, pp. 17-18. This article was the only Chinese statement that hinted, even indirectly, at the threat of force against an Nth country. For a complete analysis, see Morton Halperin, China's Nuclear Strategy: The Early Post-Detonation Period, Adelphi Paper No. 18, (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), pp. 12-13.

¹⁵³Good examples of this strategy are repeated Chinese assertions that they will never be the first to use special weapons and that they only acquired nuclear arms to break the superpower monopoly.

potential competitors as India and Japan, Peking has likewise refrained from any specific explanation of how her nuclear capability could be applied to assist national liberation movements. By not detailing the strategic utility of her weapons, China generates an amorphous sense that a great power stands behind revolutionary struggles throughout Asia. This non-specific threat exerts maximum political influence while not furnishing her potential rivals with particular pretexts to justify their own armament efforts.

Such a Chinese strategy has been relatively successful in the short-run; the emergence of a "moderate" foreign policy after the Cultural Revolution has also mitigated Japanese fears for the present. But for a regime which has not faced the succession crisis and is committed to fundamental revolutionary change, alterations in current external policy appear highly probable. Should Peking choose to employ its nuclear leverage as described earlier, an exposed Japan would face a series of agonizing decisions.

In the long-run, Japan's threat perception cannot help but increase as China's nuclear capability grows. Latest studies forecast that by 1975 China will have its first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), capable of propelling a three megaton hydrogen bomb 6,000 miles to the western United States or any point in the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁴ The PRC presently has the TU-16, a medium range jet bomber, in series production and will probably make this aircraft its principle delivery system for the

¹⁵⁴Edward K. DeLong, "Red China's Military Power Demands Respect," Seattle Post-Intelligencer Feb. 20, 1972, p. A5. This UPI report uses the official 1972 Pentagon estimates and like figures from London's Institute for Strategic Studies to calculate China's military potential. It states that by 1980 Peking's ICBM capability will be sufficient to present a real threat to both superpowers. The report also says that in the last year China has completed deployment of up to 20 MRBM's, capable of striking targets from 600 to 1,000 miles away. The next phase in her strategic buildup will probably involve deployment of several IRBM's with a 2,500 mile range.

immediate future.¹⁵⁵ Dispersed at airfields throughout China and possessing a 2,000 mile range, these aircraft are increasingly less vulnerable to a preemptive strike and are capable of reaching any target in the Far East. With the PRC's improving delivery system and her growing stockpile of fissile material,¹⁵⁶ the visibility of Washington's nuclear guarantee would need to increase accordingly to remain credible in Tokyo. This direct proportion exists because Peking's atomic arsenal is not measured against any absolute level of American forces; instead it is weighed against sensitivities of Asian states which are already sharpened to a fine point by inordinate fears of nuclear war.

From 1964 to 1967, the balance between American credibility and Chinese capability remained reasonably stable, but since 1968 the former has been in rapid decline while the latter has steadily increased. On a purely strategic level, billing the Safeguard system as an "anti-Chinese" ABM may have produced domestic advantages but it in effect portrayed Tokyo as Washington's nuclear lightning rod in the Pacific. More importantly, an entire series of unilateral American actions, capped by President Nixon's symbolic pilgrimage to Peking, severely shook Japan's confidence in the United States. The result is an abrupt change in the tenor of Sino-Japanese relations. Although it is too early to tell what direction this change will take, much of the blame for the alleged failure of Japan's China policy may

¹⁵⁵Based on American intelligence estimates cited by Charles H. Murphy, "Mainland China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, XXVIII (January 1972), 32. Peking should have around 130 TU-16's by mid-1972. The TU-16 is roughly equivalent to the obsolete B-47 strategic bomber of the United States.

¹⁵⁶Ibid., p. 29. With the combined output of her gaseous diffusion plants at Lanchou and Yumen, China currently has the potential to deploy about 300 nuclear warheads.

be placed squarely on Washington. This condition is unfortunately symptomatic of Tokyo's peculiar relationship with her principal ally and is directly related to her perception of a Chinese threat.

CHAPTER VI

JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Postwar relations between Japan and the United States have been intimate and friendly. A great deal of this feeling derived from the Occupation when General MacArthur and his staff literally remade Japan in the American image.¹⁵⁷ Since the United States became the new benchmark against which Japan's behavior was measured, it is hardly surprising that a considerable degree of rapport should develop. Yet these unique circumstances obscured the fact that one country was Occidental and the other Oriental with the associated racial, cultural and linguistic differences. Any reference to the close nature of the relationship must be viewed in that perspective.

In retrospect, the Occupation bred a kind of mass Japanese dependence on the United States. It set a precedent for non-involvement in international affairs which which was initially compatible with economic growth but which became increasingly difficult to maintain after 1960. The crux of this dependency was Japanese security. To rid herself of the Occupation, Tokyo had little choice but to sign the 1951 Security Treaty. The Treaty permitted American bases in Japan, giving Washington a vital staging area to defend Korea and later to regulate United States' activities throughout Asia. Japan obtained a visible defense guarantee for the home islands and a steady flow of American dollars.

While this exchange was highly successful in the bipolar world of the 1950's, lately a rising Japanese self-confidence, born of economic prosperity

¹⁵⁷The official Occupation goals were the demilitarization and the democratization of Japan. To achieve the latter objective, the United States wrote Japan's new Constitution, established labor unions, instituted land reform, abolished the zaibatsu and implemented countless lesser reforms.

and cultural distinctiveness, has made foreign military bases very unpopular. Although the United States has greatly reduced its military posture in Japan,¹⁵⁸ these alterations have been dictated primarily by American considerations of economics and military utility. From the purely political viewpoint of most Japanese, American bases have no useful function and are merely vestiges of the Occupation.

These differences in outlook have been a constant source of tension of which Okinawa is the most recent and dramatic example. Designed to maintain a Pacific defense structure against China, this base had outlived its strategic value by 1960. But considerations of military convenience, reinforced by the Vietnam War, prevented its early reversion to Japan despite mounting Japanese discontent. When the island finally returned to Tokyo's administrative control on May 15, 1972, the United States was not praised for its support of native sovereignty but was instead castigated for years of diplomatic intransigence. This episode indicates one point of disequilibrium in Japanese-American relations: Washington tends to see matters in strictly strategic terms while Tokyo always refracts them through the prism of its domestic politics.

A potentially more troublesome problem is the current economic strain between the two nations. After unselfishly assisting in Japan's postwar recovery, the United States is haunted by the spectre of a former pupil now more adept than the teacher. Much of Japan's economic success stemmed from her somewhat unilateral participation in the world's free trade system.

¹⁵⁸Okinawa, Hearings, testimony of U. Alexis Johnson, p. 1153. Since 1952, United States' military bases and facilities have been reduced from about 3800 to 125 (as of January, 1970).

She has been able to protect her own industry while extending her foreign trade through the free trade principle and ignoring the basic requirement of mutual gain through trade. By using quotas, charging special duties, limiting foreign investment and undervaluing their currency, the Japanese have reaped all the benefits of free trade. They have exercised economic tunnel vision, refusing to acknowledge that their one-sided trade policies would eventually be counter-productive.¹⁵⁹ When the inevitable American backlash came in 1971, Tokyo's reaction was, predictably, stunned and critical.

One reason for Japan's bitter reaction was her economic dependence on the United States. First, only ten percent of Japan's reserves are gold; the remainder are held in American dollars. Second, about thirty percent of Japan's total trade is with the United States.¹⁶⁰ This relationship breeds not only simple commercial dependence but also a distinct vulnerability to general economic trends in the United States. Most importantly, it makes Japan especially susceptible to any protectionist moves in American trade policy.

Not one, but a series of such moves occurred in 1971. President Nixon first imposed a ten percent surcharge on all imports on August 15, then concluded a "voluntary" textile agreement with Japan and several other Asian nations on October 15. He finally removed the surcharge only in exchange for a 16.88 percent revaluation of the yen and other world currencies in

¹⁵⁹ The irony of Tokyo's position has not been lost on Japanese commentators. See Kiyoshi Nasu, "Postwar Greatest Crisis in U.S.--Japan Relations," Jiyu, August, 1971 in Summaries, September, 1971, p. 18.

¹⁶⁰ Japan Economic Yearbook 1971, p. 69. In 1970, 30.7 percent of Japan's exports went to the United States and 29.5 percent of her imports came from that country.

December. Japan's reaction to the surcharge was largely psychological since she was already in the midst of a mild recession, caused principally by a sharp decline in capital spending. Nixon's actions thus had little trace-
 abel effect in an economic sense, but their impact on Japanese attitudes was significant. In the words of one observer, "The Japanese have been living in a myth; the myth of the dollar shock. It is a huge Kabuki play to attribute everything to August 15."¹⁶¹

If Japan overreacted to the import surcharge and subsequent yen re-valuation, she had more concrete grievances over the October textile agree-
 ment.¹⁶² The dispute originated in a 1968 Nixon campaign pledge to southern senators to curb overseas fabric imports. The President apparently ex-
 tracted a verbal promise during Sato's 1969 visit that the Prime Minister would arrest the textile flow from Japan. In the face of local resistance, Sato procrastinated until, after a series of clumsy moves on both sides, the United States literally bludgeoned Japan into submission. Since Japanese concessions were at least implicitly tied to Okinawa's reversion and Asian textiles only accounted for five percent of the American market, Japan felt that Nixon had purposefully traded on her goodwill for domestic political gain.

The lesson from these events is fairly basic: The United States and Japan are economic competitors today and this type of friction will in-
 evitably rise in the future. Faced with an annual \$3 to 4 billion balance-
 of-payments deficit with Japan, Washington will be increasingly inclined

¹⁶¹William D. Hartley, "Feeling the Pinch," Wall Street Journal, Dec. 22, 1971, p. 1.

¹⁶²Wall Street Journal, Oct. 18, 1971, p. 28. This agreement limited the growth of Japanese manmade fiber imports to five percent per year and re-
 stricted the growth of her woolen textile imports to one percent a year.

toward protectionist policies. This tendency will be particularly strong since production costs in American industry remain high while competitive Japan shows continued reluctance to liberalize her import restrictions.¹⁶³ The result is a politically passive but economically aggressive Japan confronting an economically sluggish but politically powerful United States.

This explosive potential in economic relations is likely to be exacerbated by several cultural phenomena. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the difference in public outlook between the two nations. All major events in the United States are likewise big news in Japan, but American press coverage of Japanese actions is cursory and casual. The informed Japanese receives ample information about American life-styles and behavior patterns while his overseas counterpart has only a mindless image of masses of smiling little people, hardworking but inscrutable, living in a picturesque country of pagodas and geisha girls. Such perceptions lead to neglect of Japan's importance in world affairs and, more seriously, produce gross misconceptions of Japanese actions and the motives which underlie them.

Japanese attitudes are also frequently misunderstood by the American government and its negotiators. Part of the difficulty lies with the nature of the Japanese language itself. Structured to avoid the direct and precise exposition of conflict, the language is intentionally vague when expressing notions of peaceful disagreement but is ideally suited to the Japanese penchant for consensual, indirect decision-making. Western frankness is,

¹⁶³Ibid., Jan. 10, 1972, p. 14. Even if Japan ostensibly relaxes a quota, other means are often substituted to protect the interest involved. For instance, when the government, with great fanfare, eliminated the import quota on live cattle in October, 1971, American sellers figured they had a ready market. They soon found duties had been added--\$244 for a calf over 600 pounds, for example--which effectively prohibited sales.

therefore, often brutally offensive to Japanese sensibilities, making negotiations an exercise in open confrontation and public pressure. The heart of the problem is a simple failure to communicate produced by cultural and linguistic differences. Each side always listens to the other's arguments but frequently neither party really hears what its counterpart has said.

Looking at the problem from the Japanese side of the negotiating table, a candid statement by Foreign Minister Ohira is revealing:

In the Oriental world, there is the expression communion of mind with mind, and if you look at the other person's countenance, you usually understand what the other side is thinking or feeling. When someone asks you to adopt something without fail and if you reply, 'Well, I think about it,' it immediately becomes clear to the other person that you will not approve it. The Japanese people live in this kind of Oriental civilization. They are able to communicate with each other unexpectedly well even with such vague expressions....Americans are people who do not show interest in general discussion. In other words, it does not constitute understanding to them unless everything is made concrete in a contract... The Japanese people often say that they held completely frank talks with Americans. However, there are many things which the other side failed to understand. It is like their being on the first floor and our being on the second floor, so to speak, and if the wrestlers are separated on the first and the second floors, you cannot grapple with each other.¹⁶⁴

Despite a variety of formal communication channels, confrontation invariably occurs when negotiations pit the American adversary system of justice against the Japanese consensus-building approach. Japanese tend to be overly concerned with short-term economic or political gains, taking rigid positions which, when finally compromised, make the resultant

¹⁶⁴ Masayoshi Ohira, "The Shaking World and Japan," Jiyu, January, 1972 in Summaries, January, 1972, p. 9. There were reported instances during the textile negotiations of Japanese remarks that, "we will think of it," being recorded as "yes" by the American side. For a further account, see Ryuji Takeuchi, "Realities and Future of U.S.--Japan Relations," Seisaku Kenkyu, January, 1972 in Summaries, January 1972, p. 36, passim.

concessions look more like extortion.¹⁶⁵ Americans do not clearly articulate their positions, fail to exploit the elements of honor and sentiment in the Japanese character, and thus alternate between a highly paternalistic attitude and blustering threats, neither of which encourage flexibility in the Japanese position. Differences in form are compounded by those in substance so that the established institutional means of resolving conflicts are seldom adequate. This combination produces an all too predictable pattern of neglect, irritation and ultimate crisis as evidenced by the Okinawa and textile issues.

Added to cultural, political and economic tensions is a growing uncertainty about the future American role in Asia. Soviet parity with the United States in strategic arms, the rise of Russian naval power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the emergence of China's once embryonic nuclear capability have clearly reduced Washington's ability to sustain a military preponderance in the Far East. No less dramatic, however, has been the decline of the general American will to maintain such a posture in the wake of an unacknowledged defeat in Vietnam. Unable to translate superior firepower into success on the battlefield and faced with mounting casualties and domestic opposition, Washington has elected to withdraw from the conflict and avoid commitments which might, at some future date, lead to a repeat of the Indochina debacle.

The now famous Nixon Doctrine was merely the first step down this new road. First put forth in July, 1969, the Doctrine was given further support

¹⁶⁵For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Japan's Global Engagement," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50 (January, 1971), 276, passim.

by the President in his "State of the World" message in February, 1970:

The United States will keep all its treaty commitments. We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole. In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when required and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.¹⁶⁶

In a similar message the following year, Nixon pointed to combat operations in Cambodia and Laos, conducted with United States military assistance but without American ground forces, as concrete illustrations of the Nixon Doctrine in action.

For Tokyo, the key question of this Doctrine will be its effect on the American-Japanese security system. As a competitor with China for political influence in Asia, Japan is rapidly adopting a pattern of regional behavior. It seems doubtful that an alliance fashioned against the backdrop of global bipolarity can continue to guarantee Japan's security in the multipolar context of East Asia. The Nixon Doctrine, an effort to mitigate American military preponderance throughout the Far East, is an implicit recognition of this fact. It entails costs for both sides: the United States will give up much of the direct control over regional activities she once enjoyed; Japan will forego the luxury of assured protection which has given her considerable freedom of action over the past two decades. Although the Washington-Tokyo alliance will remain essential in post-Vietnam Asia, it will be subjectively less satisfying and objectively less adequate to both

¹⁶⁶"U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's. A New Strategy for Peace." A Report by Richard M. Nixon to the Congress (Feb. 18, 1970), Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXII, March 9, 1970, p. 294.

governments as a medium for projecting American power or protecting Japanese interests. If the Nixon Doctrine presages the limitation of United States obligations and responsibilities entailed in all its existing commitments, the Security Treaty may eventually function more to contain Japan than to restrict China.¹⁶⁷

Seen in this light, the President's visit to Peking in February, 1972, was much more than a simple move to implement his Doctrine. From inception to execution, Nixon's China odyssey was the largest in the series of geopolitical earthquakes to hit Japan since mid-1971. First, Washington gave Tokyo only a few minutes prior notice before publicly announcing the historic event. This procedure confirmed a long-standing Japanese suspicion that, in any really important Asian diplomacy, the United States would go it alone.¹⁶⁸ Second, the psychological impact of an American President in Peking, the constant television coverage and the agreement to reduce United States military forces on Taiwan left the Japanese in a state of severe shock.¹⁶⁹ This last point was particularly troublesome for most Japanese

¹⁶⁷ For further discussion of this point, see Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968) pp. 79 and 159.

¹⁶⁸ See, for example, New York Times, July 23, 1971, p. 5. In reference to the surprise announcement of the Nixon visit, Japanese government sources are quoted as saying, "...all our suspicions of big-powerism are reawakened. It used to be the U.S. and the Soviet Union deciding the fate of the world. Now it looks as though the U.S. and China will decide the fate of Asia."

¹⁶⁹ Bob Considine, "Japanese in Severe State of Shock," Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 9, 1972, p. A8. Considine reports of Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green's trip to Japan (to mend fences after Nixon's Peking journey): "Green did a lot of good here. The most important thing he did was to quiet down the almost psychopathic fears the Japanese have that they might be left behind, left in the lurch, by the swift turn of events." For a good example of these "psychopathic" Japanese fears, see the results of a top level Foreign Ministry meeting on February 26, 1972. Yomuri Shimbun, February 27, 1972 in Daily, March 2, 1972, p. 24.

officials. They quite literally believed that the United States, in a single momentous stroke, had abandoned its commitment to Formosa,¹⁷⁰ violating Nixon's solemn promises to the contrary in his San Clemente meeting with Sato a month earlier.

Although the passage of time will probably lessen Japanese fears about Taiwan, it will likely deepen anxiety over Washington's future role in Asia. For Japan, the real importance of Nixon's China trip was not so much a concern over substantive matters, but their recognition, for the first time, that the United States is in the midst of a fundamental realignment, conventional and strategic, in the Far East. The trip was a dramatic illustration of one possible goal of the Nixon Doctrine: To square accounts with the PRC in preparation for a major American withdrawal from all Asia. The Doctrine does not presently signify this course but, given a Vietnam-weary public, it could ultimately aim for such an objective. The total "shock" Japan has received, ranging from Nixon's economic moves to his Peking

¹⁷⁰ See, for example, "Somebody Loves You," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 4, 1972, p. 3 and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 14, 1972 in Daily, March 14, 1972, p. 2. In this latter source, Japan's ambassador (to the United States) Ushiba even found Henry Kissinger's post-China briefing unsatisfactory:

The Japanese Government did not receive any convincing explanations on important points, such as the United States and Chinese policies toward the Taiwan question and toward the Soviet Union, discussed at the Sino-U.S. summit talks, even from Special Assistant Kissenger... United States' policy toward Taiwan is more advanced than the explanation which the Japanese Government has been receiving from the United States.

This article was one of many reporting Japanese fears of a "secret deal" over Taiwan between Washington and Peking.

sojourn, was the frightening spectre of a neo-isolationist, inward-turning United States--a ghost that is currently haunting all American allies.

These factors combined have produced, within the Japanese-American partnership, a diminished sense of a community of interests, a Japanese tendency to question the value of the American commitment and an American inclination to question the extent of its own present commitment. Washington's attitude is embodied in the Nixon Doctrine, but Tokyo's feelings have yet to be adequately expressed. Whether in the press, government or business, Japanese are taking a more critical look at the United States because of recent external events as well as a rising national pride produced by economic prosperity. This assertive mood is not anti-American but could easily move in that direction given the strong emotional undercurrent in relations between the two countries. Economic or security problems could provide the spark to ignite this trend; while the consequences in either sphere would be serious, it is in the defense area where the possibility of lasting damage is greatest.

Both Washington and Tokyo would probably agree that the Security Treaty should be slowly modified to take account of Japan's increased political status and augmented capacity for self-defense. But while the United States sees this alteration in terms of "burden sharing," Japan's desire is limited to the strictly political realm of more autonomy in international affairs. As Japan cautiously searches for a more independent world role, an impatient United States is quite likely to push her into an anti-American definition of that role. Washington often fails to consider that its leverage in changing Japanese-American relations is essentially limited to negative acts, such as withdrawal from present commitments or economic

protectionism, which ultimately produce a severe backlash. In the case of United States' pressures for a greater Japanese military role in Asia,¹⁷¹ this danger is particularly acute. Only a domestic awareness of political necessity--not compulsion by Washington--will induce Japan to develop a national and regional defense capability. If the American government ignores the complexities of Japan's domestic scene, it runs the grave risk of arousing deep and lasting enmity without having prevented Japanese nuclear armament.

¹⁷¹For instance, see New York Times, July 8, 1971, p. 3. In his recent visit to Tokyo, Secretary of Defense Laird reportedly urged increased Japanese defense spending after completion of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan. He told government officials that the United States could no longer bear the entire responsibility for nuclear deterrence and conventional protection against the Soviet and Chinese threats in the post-Vietnam period. To obtain the same degree of deterrence they have enjoyed in the past, American allies would have to contribute more than they have thus far. Laird's remarks were billed as the first explicit statement, although they contained no overt pressure for immediate action, of the Nixon Doctrine's implicit implications for Japan.

CHAPTER VII

THE DOMESTIC SCENE

Not surprisingly, postwar Japan's foreign policy has been influenced greatly by domestic determinants. Public opinion, party factionalism, institutional deficiencies and socio-economic problems have all constrained Japanese policy-makers, establishing both the general nature of policy objectives and the flexibility of means employed in their pursuit. Since this complicated process must ultimately arbitrate any nuclear debate, its general dynamics must be analyzed before considering specific issues.

Public opinion is the most visible system constraint on government actions, but a distinction between effective public opinion and opinions held by the public must first be made. The latter are reflected in public opinion polls while the former exert real influence on decision makers. Effective public opinion, moreover, can be divided into two forms, mass mood and articulated opinion.¹⁷²

Mass mood is the climate of opinion surrounding every policy-maker. It includes broad feelings such as national pride as well as attitudes directed towards specific nations or peoples. Seldom clearly expressed, this atmosphere shapes long-range objectives instead of short-term decisions. But for mass mood to have any impact on government actions, it needs spokesmen. Whether large organizations or private citizens, these intermediaries selectively transmit mass opinion to decision-makers; their statements constitute articulate opinion. Public demonstrations or appeals

¹⁷²These distinctions are drawn from a model of Japan's internal politics presented in Donald C. Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press 1969), pp. 8-13, passim.

to authority by prestigious individuals are its common modes of expression and, because of its focus on particular issues, such opinion exerts a more direct influence on government. Articulate opinion can affect government's behavior by defining the context within which any decision is made and by informing politicians what consequences their actions will have. Yet the responsiveness of these decision-makers, dictated as much by personalities of individual leaders and the elite political culture as by the immediate exigencies of situation, will ultimately determine the effects of public opinion.

Regretfully, their political culture suggests Japanese leaders will react only to extreme expressions of popular opinion. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party¹⁷³ has dominated Japanese politics since 1945. Composed largely of prewar bureaucrats drawn from the top universities, the conservatives have perpetuated a long history of self-conscious aloofness among government officials. Nearly one quarter of the LDP are officials who have already completed a career in the executive branch of government while fifty to seventy-five percent have had some former links to the business community.¹⁷⁴ These two categories form a series of in-groups, both before and during their tenure as politicians, where intimate connections are built around school, ministry and family ties. Because the conservatives have yet to be confronted with a serious electoral challenge, they

¹⁷³The Liberal Democratic Party has only existed by that name since 1955. It is composed of the same conservative politicians, however, who have been in power, (with the exception of a brief coalition rule in 1947-1948), since 1945.

¹⁷⁴Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 55-65.

have lacked any practical incentive to heed the public.

Drawing its main support from businessmen, farmers and self-employed workers, the LDP has been the beneficiary of Japan's postwar economic boom. In the face of this tremendous socio-economic change, the average Japanese citizen has been most concerned with domestic, practical and highly personal issues. Rising prices, traffic problems, educational opportunities and social security benefits consistently outrank foreign and defense policy as major voter concerns in public opinion polls.¹⁷⁵ With good local organization and heavy emphasis on economic growth, the conservatives have exploited these desires and forced the opposition parties to look elsewhere for votes. Unfortunately, two problems cloud this otherwise bright outlook for the LDP: First, the need to foster rapid growth or court electoral disaster; second, the steady erosion of its rural base of support. To date the conservatives have prevented an absolute drop in their power by blocking any attempt to redistrict. The result is that twenty percent of Japan's population, laborers in agriculture and other primary industries, hold sixty-two percent of the Diet seats¹⁷⁶ while the LDP's total popular strength has consistently declined since 1952.¹⁷⁷ Meanwhile, an increasing alienation among

¹⁷⁵ See, for example, Mainichi Shimbun, May 12, 1969 in Daily, May 10-12, 1969, p. 30 and Shigeki Nishihira, "Opinion Surveys on the Sato Cabinet and Territorial and Defense Problems," Jiyu, April, 1968 in Summaries, April 22-29, 1968, pp. 20-22.

¹⁷⁶ Gerald L. Curtis, "Conservative Dominance in Japanese Politics," Current History Vol. 60 (April, 1971), 208.

¹⁷⁷ U.S. - Japanese Political Relations: The Critical Issues Affecting Asia's Future (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies, 1969), p. 47. The figures for all elections since 1952 are:

disenfranchized urban voters promises trouble for the conservatives.

Although current conservative supremacy suggests considerable freedom for policy maneuver, party factionalism severely limits any prime minister's policy execution. Initially a product of prewar practice and postwar circumstance, the individual habatsu, or faction, has come to dominate all Japan's political parties. Today the diffuse manner in which political funds are raised and the peculiarities of Japanese electoral law merely reinforce these long-established tendencies toward the fragmentation of power.¹⁷⁸ Factions themselves are personality-centered organizations for the acquisition and allocation of political power. They are not formed by agreement on issues but instead through private deals and patronage considerations with the ultimate objective of propelling a particular man into a position of party leadership. Since the Prime Minister is selected by the Diet members of the majority party, the LDP is little more than an

<u>Year</u>	<u>LDP % of Vote</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>LDP% of Vote</u>
1952	66.1	1960	57.6
1953	65.7	1963	54.7
1955	63.2	1967	48.8
1958	57.8	1969	47.7

¹⁷⁸Hans H. Baerwald, "Factional Politics in Japan," Current History, Vol. 46 (April, 1964), 224-225. Under the current system of campaign financing, individual politicians receive more money from their faction leader than from the central party treasury, breeding personal rather than party allegiance. Furthermore, in each of Japan's 118 electoral districts, three, four or five candidates run for Japan's House of Representatives, yet each voter may vote for only one. The result is that LDP candidates often must run against each other within a single district, meaning that each candidates' personal organization is more important for securing victory than uncertain and limited party support.

alliance of factions bound together by political expediency. All promoting their man for Prime Minister or a suitable cabinet post, party members owe their allegiance to individual faction leaders rather than any central figure.

The locus of political power resides in the intraparty decision-making process of the conservatives since they control the Diet. But effective policy leadership is inherently limited by the coalition nature of the government. The Prime Minister cannot furnish strong policy guidance unless he risks upsetting the factional balance which keeps him in power--in effect staking his future on the outcome of a specific issue. This condition is further aggravated by the Japanese tradition of consensual authority. Before producing a decision, extensive consultation is required among party factions, and they must give at least their tacit consent before the Prime Minister can take action. But to build a consensus requires broad support which likewise implies appealing to as divergent a group as possible. The product is a policy born of ambiguity with the final decision making itself on the basis of accumulated data. In the realms of economics and domestic politics, where data is readily available and generally quantifiable, such a process has a chance for success, but in the bewildering, fast-moving world of foreign affairs, this policy paralysis can have dire consequences.

This immobilism is reinforced by the institutional framework within which the LDP formulates Japan's external policy. The most prominent institutions are the Foreign Office and the Diet. The Foreign Office is totally subordinated to the ruling party. It seldom has an active policy input but instead serves as a faithful executor of previously authorized programs. Functioning primarily as an implementor, it has of necessity

been concerned with the technical details of policy and with administration of Japan's international and regional activities. Contrary to prewar days, today's foreign minister is usually a party man with little experience in foreign affairs.¹⁷⁹ Thus, under his control, the logical institution for directly shaping foreign policy and indirectly affecting defense requirements is only a passive participant in Japanese politics.

The Diet, too, lacks a positive role in the foreign policy process. Since strict party discipline is observed within this chamber, conservative politicians are powerless to criticize openly the official party stand. Yet members of the Opposition are similarly impotent for a variety of reasons. Composed of the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Komeito, the Opposition purposefully focuses most of its energies on foreign policy. This emphasis dramatizes its differences with the government but also encourages extreme interparty and intraparty conflicts which undermine effective coordination against the LDP. Although the JSP and JCP have strong Marxist orientations, all the Opposition parties share a common motivational drive in Japanese nationalism and all agree on the importance of Japan's security; their divergence exists on the appropriate means to achieve security.¹⁸⁰ Nevertheless, the wide ideological gap between left

¹⁷⁹George R. Packard, II, Japan and the United States in Asia, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 36.

¹⁸⁰The basic defense policies of Japan's opposition parties are:
The JSP favors peaceful diplomacy based on "unarmed neutrality" guaranteed by a quadripartite nonaggression agreement among the U.S., U.S.S.R., China and Japan. This policy would also entail renunciation of the 1960 Security Treaty and a gradual reduction of the SDF.

The DSP leans toward a strict neutrality similar to Nehru's non-alignment policy. They would work for gradual modification of the Security Treaty, eventual withdrawal of American troops from Japan and cooperation

and right merely sharpens Diet debate and, since Liberal Democrats hold the majority, makes compromise both impossible and unnecessary. Under these circumstances, no place exists for the loyal opposition. Instead of providing responsible criticism, the Socialists often aim merely to obstruct and embarrass the government, making the Diet dysfunctional to the foreign policy process.

In contrast to the structural problems in its formal organizations, Japan's political culture contains several less tangible elements which might inhibit her external actions. Foremost of these conditions is the strong influence of morality in all Japanese actions. Originating from Japan's insular position and her disastrous military adventures of the past, this vague notion breeds a "peace at any price" mentality among many Japanese. Its utopian ideal is the "unarmed neutrality" of the JSP, but its more simple explanation is a desire to remain friends with all nations in a complex world. Although the intensity of this commitment may be questioned, it has served to legitimize violent political protest in Japan. With a ready pool of student manpower, the JSP has been able to stage large, disruptive demonstrations which are tolerated by an emotionally sympathetic public. The result is a permanently disaffected minority,

with the Free World through the United Nations.

The Komeito espouses a "perfect neutrality" where the SDF is absorbed into the U.N. police force. This stance would involve liquidation of the Security Treaty within ten to twenty years, expansion of economic and technical aid and refusal to enter any military alliances.

The JCP favors rewriting the Constitution to strengthen the SDF. It also advocates substituting an alliance with the Soviet bloc for the current Japanese - U.S. Security Treaty.

subject to swift radicalization, which is able to exploit any foreign affairs issue on abstract spiritual grounds. In this unique milieu, the content of protest is not as important as its style; obstructive dissent, left or right, has been institutionalized and is a continuing source of instability in postwar Japan.

Although not necessarily destabilizing, social welfare problems promise to be a strong competitor for Japan's resources in the future. Rapid urbanization has spawned greater taxes, increased juvenile delinquency, rural poverty and pollution while fueling demands for more housing, transportation, education and sanitation facilities. Such needs are presently sparking a debate on national priorities; its full impact has not yet hit Japan.¹⁸¹ Added to these material problems are social ills of a less visible, but no less profound, significance. The frustration produced by the hierarchical Japanese seniority system is a typical example of this phenomenon. It means that the transfer of power is slow and deliberate, producing tremendous pressures for youth to conform while refusing them sufficient responsibility to engender job satisfaction. The normal "generation gap," shallow bases of political parties, and breakup of the traditional family are similar ailments. Although their importance is not easy to measure, as the modern Japanese man gropes for a new identity, such conflicts should have a substantial effect on public opinion.

Japan's freedom of action in global affairs is thus circumscribed sharply by the primacy of her domestic troubles. Twenty-five years under

¹⁸¹Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, p. 132. The beginnings of this trend were evidenced by adoption of the Government's Comprehensive National Plan in 1968. This program illustrated the "basic direction of general land development" and the "allocation of social capital" through 1985. It was billed as a blueprint for promoting industrial decentralization and attacking the problems of urban congestion, inadequate communications and insufficient transportation facilities.

the American wing has reduced any need to focus on difficult security questions. Foreign policy remains the major contentious issue in Japanese politics, but quality of discussion suffers from the highly moralistic and intensely ideological character that the debate has assumed. The result is a government which literally cannot afford to make up its mind on defense matters since Japan's public attitude toward this subject is uniquely legalistic and sentimental, not strategic and realistic. Next, continued conservative dominance has produced a tyranny of the majority in many instances, causing the Opposition to reject parliamentarism as the final arbiter of political issues. Consequently, the Opposition has a vested interest in non-cooperation. With little hope of being elected, the JSP has few inducements to moderate its views or streamline its demands; it appeals to militants within its own ranks rather than the political center of the electorate and pursues policies which are ideologically satisfying but politically unrealistic.

A good example of this political standoff is the defense philosophies of Japan's two major parties. The JSP's unarmed neutrality appeals largely to a naive public who "imagine that international politics is a kindergarten playground where we can hold hands and make friends with everybody."¹⁸² This unworkable alternative basically disregards Japan's security, assuming that other nations will never use military means to resolve a clash of national interests with Tokyo.¹⁸³ In contrast, the LDP appears to have no

¹⁸²Yonosuke Nagai, "Japanese Foreign Policy Objectives in a Nuclear Milieu," JSPIJ, V (April, 1967), 29.

¹⁸³Even some JSP leaders have admitted the impracticality of this ideal. See "Japanese Socialist Party's Course Toward 1970," interview with Shichiro Matsumoto and Masashi Ishibashi, Gendai No Me, (December, 1966) in Summaries, November 21, 1966, p. 71. In this interview, Ishibashi explicitly recognized that the Security Treaty and the SDF had to be maintained until non-aggression pacts were concluded with Moscow and Peking. Implicit in this statement was the notion that if his party were unable to consummate these pacts, some alternative would be necessary to ensure Japan's security.

intention of adopting any defense policy other than a form of armed deterrence.¹⁸⁴ But the conservatives' public stance only offers the Security Treaty as an alternative security policy, discussing autonomous defense mainly in hypothetical terms. The LDP officially refuses to acknowledge that excessive reliance on Washington may soon pose as great a threat to Japan's sovereignty as socialist neutralism does to her security.

Two additional domestic factors, one economic and the other political, also limit Japan's international maneuverability. First, economic progress has yielded a large middle class which is essentially shut out of a political process controlled mostly by LDP business interests and JSP labor concerns. Although the DSP and the Komeito have gained strength from this constituency, neither has the foundation necessary to capture all the center ground. How and under what circumstances this group is mobilized will have great significance to Japanese politics. Second, factionalism within the LDP discourages bold leadership while inviting vigorous Left opposition. The frantic factional maneuvering and atmosphere of excitement surrounding this process merely obscures the lack of basic policy shifts and the minimal

¹⁸⁴See, for example, Kiichi Aichi, "Let Us Look at Reality As It Is," Asahi Journal, July 6, 1969, and "'Unarmed Neutrality Argument' is an Illusion," Bungei Shunju, May, 1969 in Summaries, July 21-28, 1969 and April 21-28, 1969, respectively; also interview of Secretary General of LDP, Tanaka, as reported in Yomuri Shimbun, October 10, 1969 in Daily, October 14, 1969, p. 23. In this last source, Tanaka stressed that Japan would either be protected by international arrangements or she would seek her own means of defense:

If there should be abrogation (of the Security Treaty), it would have to be when something to take the place of the Security Treaty appears, that is, either autonomous defense or the establishment of a collective security setup of the United Nations. WE WILL NOT ADOPT UNARMED NEUTRALITY.

Parentheses and emphasis added.

degree of mass participation. In one sense, it is the smoke-filled room image of the American political convention carried to the extreme.

The biggest problem for Japanese foreign policy may well be the closed nature of this policy-making process.¹⁸⁵ Unless new forms of communication or access can open the process, each major policy decision will become a potential crisis in which not only policy but also system viability is called into question. Any substantial departures from past policy will generate severe tensions for a status quo Japan, requiring the kind of dynamic guidance that a conservative government will find great difficulty in providing.¹⁸⁶ To preserve domestic political continuity, Japan will be forced to assume a passive role in international politics. Despite an increased potential for autonomous action, a reactive Japan will look to the external environment for stimuli, awaiting that crossroads where action or inaction will be equally painful. The nuclear weapons issue in general or the NPT in particular could precipitate such a crisis.

In discussing either issue, much importance is assigned to Japan's "nuclear allergy." Born in the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this nuclear pacifism sees atomic weapons as morally repugnant and as the cause

¹⁸⁵ For a comprehensive discussion of this point, see Hellmann, Domestic Politics, pp. 149-158.

¹⁸⁶ Michio Royama, "America's Far Eastern Strategy and Japan's Stand," panel discussion, Chuo Koron, May, 1968 in Summaries, May 20-27, 1968, p. 6. The consequences of this kind of policy immobilism have not been lost on the Japanese. As noted by Royama:

The Japanese Government is quite incapable of 'crisis management,' which is most important in present-day strategic thinking. This is why the Government is too flurried over the Enterprise (port visit) and B-52's to cope with them properly. If an incident with greater international meaning breaks out, how much more flurried the Government will be! I shudder at this idea. Neither can the Opposition Parties cope with such an incident. Parentheses added.

of most international unrest. Its advocates are numerous and vocal but the depth of their influence in 1972 is unclear. About fifty-five percent of Japan's population is thirty-three or younger, a generation to whom World War II is more history than personal experience. Conceived in an era of unprecedented prosperity and genuine security, their allergy is closer to an intellectual commitment than to an emotional conviction rooted in memories of wartime devastation. Such a feeling will likely be more vulnerable to sudden short-run changes in external threat perception while remaining susceptible to gradual long-term erosion.¹⁸⁷

This sentiment is, nevertheless, institutionalized for Japan by Article 9 of her constitution and by her Basic Atomic Energy Law of 1955. The former is, by any standards, a remarkable document. Created by enthusiastic Occupation reformers, this "no-war clause" reads:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷ Richard Halloran, "Japan is Losing Aversion to Idea of Nuclear Arms," New York Times, Dec. 26, 1971, p. 1. A veteran Far East correspondent, Halloran reports that "many Government officials and industrialists who keep their fingers on the public pulse here" think Japan's emotional antipathy "to things nuclear" has all but vanished. The explanation is simply that "time heals all wounds, even the severe and penetrating anguish caused by the holocausts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

¹⁸⁸ Emerson, Arms, Yen and Power, pp. 50-51.

By renouncing the right to maintain a war potential, Article 9 challenges the legality of the SDF. The JSP proclaims this force unconstitutional while the LDP argues such an organization is authorized since the Constitution does not specifically prohibit defense against aggression. As shown in the 1970 White Paper, the same reasoning can be theoretically extended to atomic weapons.

The significance of Article 9 is that it integrates security policy with the basic law of the land. If the government perceived a sufficient external threat to demand rearmament, the constitution would have to be revised. In so doing, Japan would undermine one of the principal pillars in its postwar political structure; one that to a great extent has been socialized into her citizenry's value system. Article 9 unquestionably inhibits general rearmament or the possession of special weapons, but it also subjects Tokyo's domestic scene to a variety of international pressures from which most countries are insulated.

The Basic Atomic Energy Law is a more specific outgrowth of Article 9 feelings. Paralleled by a similar ordinance for the space program, this law stipulates that nuclear research be conducted solely for peaceful ends, that these activities be placed under close parliamentary supervision and that they remain open for public inspection. Such provisions sound commendable but are not totally feasible in a world where distinctions between civilian and military programs are more a matter of intent than capability. As was shown above, a nation cannot develop a modest commercial nuclear industry without going to the brink of weapon production. The Basic Law must establish technical guidelines to promote the former while preventing the latter. The consequence is a piece of

legislation sanctified by the public but seriously handicapped in its actual implementation.

A renewal national self-confidence in modern Japan evidenced by many subtle trends has more tenuous implications for bomb acquisition. Rooted in the tenacious Japanese family structure, this resurgent nationalism has been nurtured by Japan's economic and technological success in the postwar period and is subject to varying interpretations. To the Left¹⁸⁹ it symbolizes independence from a pervasive American influence which imperils Japanese sovereignty. For the Right, independence is combined with prestige and power appeals since this group is more concerned with threats to Japan's security by a nuclear China. Despite different ideological slants, both positions contain a common desire for more autonomous action. All sides are growing increasingly uneasy about the nature of their American alliance. This new sentiment is less an emotional reaction against security dependence than a pragmatic assessment of Japan's expanding defense needs. Many Japanese feel it is not only internally demeaning to entrust most of their defense to a foreign power, but that it is also militarily unwise.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁹As used in this paper, the Japanese Left will include all the opposition parties: JSP, DSP, Komeito and JCP. The Right refers to most segments of the LDP.

¹⁹⁰See, for instance, New York Times, June 27, 1965. In discussing the Security Treaty, Genki Abe, former Chief of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board, commented that "to count on another country for vital national defense is nothing other than abject colonialism. The foundation of national defense is the firm will to defend one's country by oneself." As Times correspondent Robert Trumbull noted, Abe stated in print what many Japanese have been saying in private ever since China's first nuclear test. For other examples of this feeling, see Tokyo Shimbun, March 21, 1966, and Sankei Shimbun, October 29, 1966 in Daily, March 25, 1966, and October 29-31, 1966, respectively.

Furthermore, mobilizing this latent nationalism is probably the only means of building a nation-wide consensus which would transcend the factional differences of Japanese politics. Growing national pride is presently juxtaposed in a curious fashion with Japan's lingering pacifism; a dramatic change in Tokyo's perception of an outside threat could quickly upset the balance. Under such circumstances, nuclear weapons would not only enhance Japanese security but would also graphically demonstrate her emergence as a great power, independent from the United States.

If the implications of nationalism are tough to discern, the attitudes of different interest groups are more readily apparent. Aside from the formal positions of Japan's political parties, the nuclear issue is likely to be affected by pressure from three other sources--Japan's businessmen, scientists and general public. The fact that Japanese industry produces ninety percent of the SDF's equipment and the growth of vocal defense advocates among Japan's business community are often cited as meaningful rearmament indicators.¹⁹¹ As mentioned in Chapter IV, these figures are accurate, but not necessarily significant signs of a budding military-industrial complex. Of greater current importance than large increases in the defense budget are the risks a rearmament policy would entail for a Japan dependent on good-will in East Asia and the United States. Potential losses in these vast markets easily countervail any immediate business desire for bigger arms profits, making gradual increases the rule at present. In addition, Japan's entrepreneurs are wary of the domestic political hazards posed by rearmament while the omnipotent Finance Ministry

¹⁹¹ See, for example, Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, p. 165.

frowns on large expenditures in an area which will contribute little to economic growth. Finally, Japanese industrial interests lack a Pentagon or equivalent central procurement source within the government which can effectively press their demands. Although the voice of business is growing, it will only become relevant after a political decision for rearmament is made.

The opposition of Japan's scientific establishment¹⁹² to nuclear arms is well-known and qualitatively important. Mostly physicists and nuclear engineers, these men are distributed throughout Japan's entire atomic industry and possess irreplaceable technical skills in their field. A recent example of their nuclear sensitivity was the fear that government statements on the NPT were explicitly intended to preserve Japan's weapon option. Yet this same group also criticized the Treaty for security shortcomings.¹⁹³

¹⁹²Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power, p. 342. The political sensitivity of this group is shown by their frequent refusal to cooperate with the United States on certain projects because of the participation of American officers in these endeavors, even though the research was not directed to military purposes. For example, the cooperative monitoring of radioactivity proved difficult to carry out because of objections to participation by technically qualified members of the American military.

¹⁹³Yasuo Miyake, "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Scientist's Position," Mainichi Shimbun, Evening edition, February 10, 1970 in Daily, February 14-16, 1970, pp. 7-8. Speaking for Japan's scientific community, Miyake first castigates the government statement upon signing the NPT as "Japan's having declared its intention to reserve the right to arm itself with nuclear weapons." He then lists the scientists' somewhat contradictory preconditions for signing the Treaty: (1) The U.S. and U.S.S.R. must increase their efforts for disarmament; (2) Japan must make a positive declaration that it has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons; (3) the PRC and France must participate in the NPT. Miyake also estimated that 5,000 scientists and technicians would be needed for any nuclear armament program and implied that weapon production was impossible without their active cooperation.

It seems unlikely that the government could mount a special weapons program without at least the scientist's tacit consent, but they are subject to the same changes in threat perception as the Japanese public.

Public attitudes on atomic arsenals are generally measured by opinion polls. Although these surveys generally show a very low percentage of Japanese favor atomic weapons, their value is open to question for two reasons. First, citizen response quite logically depends on what question was asked which in turn reflects the interpellator's judgment on relevant issues and phraseology. Such naively phrased queries as, "Do you favor nuclear weapons?", grossly oversimplify the problem and seldom appreciate the context within which any decision would be reached. Second, opinion surveys assume a level of citizen sophistication and interest in public affairs which simply does not exist. Because of the public's ignorance of specific events, polls must necessarily be raised to a level of generality which inhibits meaningful analysis. Furthermore, tallies intimate that mass opinions are intensely held and will have a large effect on government policy. As shown above, both assertions are at best doubtful.

A closer study of opinion polls presents a considerably different picture than a unanimously anti-nuclear Japan. For instance, a 1969 Mainichi poll showed that only two percent of Japan favored immediate acquisition of nuclear weapons but forty-five percent believed their country should eventually possess atomic arms.¹⁹⁴ An earlier survey of postwar youth by a Japanese psychologist yielded similar results: Three-fourths of the sample believed that Japan would obtain nuclear devices within the next twenty

¹⁹⁴Mainichi Shimbun, May 12, 1969 in Daily, May 10-12, 1969, p. 35.

years.¹⁹⁵ These statistics, even without reference to a threatening international environment, show a Japanese public increasingly inclined to accept fission weapons as an undesirable but necessary evil for national survival. Perhaps it is neither enthusiasm nor revulsion but the sense of inevitability about this issue that suggests more accurately the limits of popular aversion to nuclear weapons and the expanding policy latitude open to Japanese leaders.

Despite their faults, the more simplistic "yes or no" nuclear surveys are often used by the Opposition to demonstrate support for their position. The avowed stand of all opposition parties, especially the JSP, involves a vociferous denunciation of arms nuclear arms which appeals to the undifferentiated pacifism of the Japanese public. Beneath this verbal veneer, however, the JSP has admitted that Japan might reluctantly rearm, even with atomic weapons, if so compelled by international events.¹⁹⁶ Such a stance implies that unarmed neutrality is the touchstone for Socialist foreign policy only in a Marxist, utopian order where all conflict has been eliminated. In today's imperfect world, the odds against this possibility appear substantial.

Similar idyllic notions have characterized government nuclear policy in the postwar era.¹⁹⁷ From 1957 to 1964, Japan worked vigorously for

¹⁹⁵ Yasumasa Tanaka, "Japanese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Arms," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXIV (Spring, 1970), 33. Tanaka's sampling of student opinion was taken in 1965-1966.

¹⁹⁶ See the statement by the then chairman of the JSP's Foreign and Defense Policy Committee, Masashi Ishibashi, "Security in a Nuclear Age," Economist, (May 24, 1966) in Summaries, June 6, 1966, pp. 5-7.

¹⁹⁷ For a discussion of Japan's early U.N. efforts to control special weapons, see Robert Van Edington, "Japan in the United Nations on the Issues of Nuclear Weapons" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1968).

absolute control of fission weapons, concentrating on test bans and eventual complete disarmament. Since Tokyo entertained neither the ambition nor the capability for nuclear arms, her efforts were directed principally at the superpowers from the high moral plateau of a nation which had experienced the horrors of atomic war. Typical of this approach was Japanese government reaction in September, 1961, when the Soviet Union announced it was breaking an unofficial superpower test moratorium. The Foreign Ministry maintained the Soviet decision "not only betrays the earnest prayer of all the people of Japan, but mercilessly tramples on the prayerful hopes for peace of all peoples who fear war and love peace."¹⁹⁸ This righteous indignation was vindicated by conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in August, 1963, an agreement to which Japan promptly adhered.

Today Japan has a definite capability plus some possible justifications for acquiring nuclear devices. Consequently, LDP policy is privately to keep options open, publicly to proclaim the "three nuclear no's" and internationally to work for measures, such as a comprehensive test ban, which will further circumscribe the primacy of the nuclear powers. The conservatives' public attitude is their most troublesome tactic. It eschews Real-politic for present political gain, failing to consider that domestic tranquility may be seriously upset when the LDP must compromise a previously proclaimed ideal.¹⁹⁹ Sato's "three nuclear no's" are merely one of his

¹⁹⁸ Japan Times, September 3, 1961, pp. 1-2.

¹⁹⁹ The government has made some statements mentioning Japan's technical capability for weapon manufacture. See, for example, Sato's remarks in Japan Times, January 12, 1965 and December 5, 1967. Officials believe that by driving home the idea that Japan has a nuclear alternative, they are laying a foundation for future acceptance of atomic devices. These statements, however, are always camouflaged by vocal disclaimers about

"four nuclear pillars."²⁰⁰ Their transient quality is indicated by the Prime Minister's refusal to freeze them into a Diet resolution. Although Sato protests that he "cannot make any pledge which would bind future cabinets,"²⁰¹ such moves are simply designed to preserve the government's freedom of action in dealing with any contingency. Regretably, these catchy slogans cast nuclear deterrence problems in all-or-nothing terms, while only a limited number of specialists discuss the technical issues which would help clarify difficulties peculiar to Japan's strategic situation. Even these theorists, however, assume that the United States will remain sufficiently engaged in Asia for Japan to continue her reliance on American nuclear prowess for the indefinite future. In sum, government nuclear policy is necessarily ambiguous and frequently contradictory. When forced to focus on specific questions, it presents a far different image from the pacifist Japan to which Asia and the rest of the world have grown accustomed: Nowhere is this pattern more apparent than in Japan's debate on the NPT.

government intent to procure special weapons. Done to quiet the Opposition, this tactic obscures the basic message. Instead of acknowledging a subtle distinction between intent and capability, the average Japanese citizen merely interprets such announcements as further government pledges to keep Japan non-nuclear.

²⁰⁰ Sankei Shimbun, February 8, 1968 in Daily, February 24-26, 1968, p. 16; Mainichi Shimbun, March 8, 1968, and Asahi Shimbun, March 6, 1968 in Daily, March 8, 1968, pp. 8 and 45, respectively. The remaining three pillars are: (1) efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament; (2) dependence on the United States' nuclear deterrent; (3) steps to promote development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

²⁰¹ Nihon Keizai Shimbun, February 10, 1968 in Daily, February 14, 1968, p. 20. In more candid moments, Sato has called the Non-Nuclear Declaration "a kind of dream" or has maintained there was "no need for it." See Yomuri Shimbun, January 31, 1968, and February 1, 1968 in Daily, February 1, 1968, and February 2, 1968, pp. 23 and 41, respectively.

From 1965 to 1968, Japan's attitude on the proposed Treaty could be described as one of cautious opposition. As discussed earlier, Tokyo consistently sided with the non-nuclear powers in demanding a variety of security and economic concessions from the superpowers.²⁰² Although a majority of these objections centered on technical issues related to commercial developments in atomic energy, they also appeared to have a distinct security rationale. Japan's proposal of a five-year Treaty review to account for technological advances in the nuclear field is a case in point. In 1968, Tokyo's civilian nuclear program was not sufficiently developed for Japan to argue strongly against controls. By the time of the first review, however, Japan would enjoy the option of pressing for a complete Treaty reappraisal on the grounds that indigenous circumstances made existing inspection requirements intolerable.

Although most of Japan's pre- 1968 commentary on the NPT was carefully measured, a pair of statements revealed the depth of government concern over Japanese security. One was the December, 1967, speech by Japan's ambassador to the United States, Takezo Shimoda;²⁰³ the other was the Foreign Ministry's Tentative Plan on Attitudes Toward the NPT, published

²⁰² See, for example, the proposals for changing the Treaty that special envoy Ohno carried to the United States in April, 1967. Sankei Shimbun, April 14, 1967 in Daily, April 15, 1967, p. 4. The suggestions included concrete nuclear power pledges for disarmament, detailed arrangements for the peaceful uses of atomic energy including explosive devices, identical inspection procedures for nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states, Treaty review every five years to compensate for technological advances and explicit security guarantees by nuclear nations to Nth countries threatened or attacked with fission weapons.

²⁰³ For full text, see Japan Times, December 3, 1967.

in early 1966.²⁰⁴ Both statements explicitly link Tokyo's participation in the Treaty to the actions of Peking. Shimoda warned that Japan's adherence to the NPT might amount to accepting Chinese suzerainty over all Asia, and he strongly advocated that Japan's nuclear option should remain open to the next generation. The Foreign Ministry Plan specifically mentioned the future threat of Communist China, arguing that Japan should not bind its hands by prematurely signing the Treaty. Additionally, the Tentative Plan reserved the right for "nuclear planning" consultations under the NPT, leaving open the possibility of a Japanese MLF at some later date. To no one's surprise, both documents inspired heavy Opposition criticism and were subsequently diluted or dismissed. They represent, however, a frank expression of Japan's major reservation about the Treaty--it would impair her ability to cope with any future menace, particularly a nuclear China.

Expressed in milder terms, security worries likewise dominated the LDP's general criticisms of the NPT:

- (1) The NPT was an unequal treaty, giving legal recognition to the inferior status of non-nuclear powers. It demonstrated this shortcoming by only applying IAEA safeguards to Nth countries and by failing to impose disarmament obligations on either superpower.
- (2) The Treaty did not provide adequate security guarantees for non-nuclear countries threatened by nuclear states.
- (3) China and France had refused to sign the Treaty, leaving two nuclear powers unfettered by its commercial or security restrictions.

²⁰⁴For complete plan, see Nihon Keizai Shimbun, April 23, 1966 in Daily, April 26, 1966, p. 3.

- (4) Stringent Treaty inspection requirements might expose some nations to the risks of industrial espionage, hinder their peaceful nuclear programs and deny them the spinoff benefits of atomic explosives.²⁰⁵

The first three reservations were directly related to Japanese security concerns while the fourth had a more subtle, but no less significant, connection with Tokyo's defense posture. Since all Japan's reactors are currently inspected by the IAEA, the intensity of her objections to NPT safeguards seems peculiar. Not only does the IAEA prohibit its inspectors from disclosing information to any non-Agency personnel but the examined state also has an absolute veto over any particular inspector. Perhaps her traditional diplomatic courtesy prevents Japan from refusing entry to an inspector merely because she suspects he might reveal industrial secrets; a more likely reason is that the NPT has substituted an entirely new inspection principle, international consensus by treaty, for the simple rationale of property rights.²⁰⁶ At present, IAEA checks are a part of bilateral Japanese agreements with the United States, Great Britain and others which operate on the assumption that the supplier has every right to examine his product and its intended use. The NPT would expand the present scope of these inspections to include both imported and domestically produced nuclear components while justifying their conduct under rigid Treaty standards instead of under the more flexible guidelines characteristic of mutually beneficial bilateral arrangements.

²⁰⁵ See the statement of Ambassador Shimoda when he signed the NPT in Washington on February 3, 1970. Department of State Bulletin LXII, March 2, 1970, pp. 228-9.

²⁰⁶ For further elaboration, see George H. Quester, "Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," Asian Survey, X (September, 1970), 770.

The desire to preserve flexibility was likewise inherent in Japanese objections to possible Treaty limitations on peaceful nuclear activities. Government officials maintained that no exchange of information should be prohibited merely on the grounds that it had military as well as peaceful applications. Uranium enrichment technology was cited as a specific example: Such knowledge made it easier to produce special weapons but should not be denied as it lowered fuel costs and made atomic power generation more economical.²⁰⁷

The complaints listed in category four thus had overt economic appeals but also contained plausible security motivations. Again, Japan resolutely denied any military ambitions but simultaneously refused to foreclose her nuclear alternative. Meanwhile, she capitalized on nationalistic reactions against the "unequal" Treaty to promote her own "peaceful" atomic energy programs, moving ever closer to a bomb capability. The government was understandably reluctant to sign the NPT on the assumption that Japan's presently stable security relationship would endure for the Treaty's twenty-five year life. Even with the Treaty's escape clause, Japan's adherence would create a moral commitment which would further complicate her local and global political problems should she withdraw. The LDP's approach to the entire nuclear issue seems to reflect the belief that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." It is displayed in a unique passion for hedging one's bets and is not limited to the NPT. For example, in a 1969 statement to the

²⁰⁷ Atsuhiko Yatabe, Chief, Science Section, Foreign Ministry, "A Note on the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons: The Japanese Point of View," Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 14 (1970), 27-28. Privately, many LDP members endorsed domestic enrichment facilities as much for their potential value as for their tangible economic benefits. See Mainichi Shimbun, September 11, 1969 in Daily, September 20-22, 1969, p. 29.

Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) of the U.N., Japan's ambassador Asakai claimed his government supported the Sea Bed Treaty in principle.

"However, as Japan is surrounded by the sea, it is difficult for us to agree to the proposal that purely defensive devices against an attack from the sea should also be prohibited by the treaty."²⁰⁸

If the NPT occasioned mild government criticism, it inspired vehement attacks by the Opposition. With exception of the DSP,²⁰⁹ all opposition parties denounced the Treaty as an international fraud and threatened drastic action should the conservatives try to push it through the Diet. The Opposition listed three major faults of the Treaty: (1) the NPT froze Japan's client relationship with the United States; (2) without superpower disarmament pledges or inspection requirements for nuclear countries, the Treaty discriminated against non-nuclear powers; (3) it failed to place restrictions either on the superpowers or on non-signator nations such as China.²¹⁰ Two

²⁰⁸ Statement of Ambassador Asakai when Japan first joined the ENDC on July 3, 1969, Documents on Disarmament, 1969, p. 312. The Sea Bed Treaty was designed to prohibit use of the ocean floor for military purposes, specifically nuclear weapons. It was opened for signature on February 11, 1971, and has since been signed and ratified by over twenty nations, including Japan.

²⁰⁹ For the DSP position, see article by then Chairman of DSP Foreign Affairs Committee, Eki Sone, "DSP's Attitude Toward Nuclear Non-Proliferation," Gaiko Jiho, (June, 1967) in Summaries, June 26 - July 3, 1967, p. 42. Although DSP objections to the Treaty roughly parallel those of other opposition parties, their recommendations are quite different. The Democratic Socialists urge that Japan join the NPT "for a period of experimental acceptance," but they specifically link withdrawal to the non-participation of France and China. These two countries are also mentioned in DSP comments on the Treaty's insufficient security guarantees. The total picture is that of an organization more concerned with pure security matters than any political party outside the right wing of the LDP. Since this party is not bound by the Liberal Democrats' pro-American stance, its strong defense orientation might provide a future impetus toward an independent Japanese military capability.

²¹⁰ For statements of all opposition parties, see Asahi Shimbun, Evening edition, February 3, 1970, pp. 17-18, and Mainichi Shimbun, September 6, 1969, p. 22, in Daily, February 6, 1970 and September 10, 1969, respectively.

facts stand out in these statements. First, they parallel the Liberal Democrat's objections, showing a keen sense of Japanese national interest regardless of their rhetorical trappings. Indeed, the Opposition generally abjured criticizing the substance of LDP policy on the NPT, attacking instead the possibility of Japanese adherence out of deference to the United States.²¹¹ Second, they furnish ample reason for an already reluctant conservative government to shelve the Treaty issue indefinitely. It would be sheer folly for the LDP to exhaust its dwindling political capital by fighting for an agreement which the party itself cannot support.

In contrast to the security slant of party protests against the NPT, business interests dwelt primarily on the Treaty's commercial disadvantages. The charge of industrial espionage was particularly acute in view of the IAEA requirement for the review of nuclear plant blueprints before construction.²¹² The competitive Japanese businessman feared such "intrusive" demands would increase the likelihood of an information leak, giving his rivals an unfair jump in the world reactor market. Realizing that Japan's atomic energy industry is still at a fairly elementary stage, commercial interests wish to avoid the remote possibility of inhibiting its future

²¹¹Mainichi Shimbun, September 6, 1969 in Daily, September 10, 1969, p. 22. The Opposition noted conservative complaints about the Treaty's unequal nature but believed they would eventually sign the accord in order to strengthen ties with Washington. The JSP and others felt that "even though one (the LDP) talks about autonomy, it is no more than the autonomy of running the opposite direction within a train."

²¹²This provision is now regarded as necessary to allow proper inspection and accounting procedures to be applied to nuclear installations after construction has been completed.

development. Even now Japanese industrialists complain about the frequency and thoroughness of IAEA inspectors,²¹³ grumbling that routine plant closures for their activities will prove economically disastrous and needlessly interrupt electricity generation. In point of fact, these concerns seem overstated, appearing more symbolic than substantive. First, the IAEA specifically cautions its inspectors against interfering with plant operations. Second, it will be several years before Japan will produce a commercially competitive reactor for export. Even then inspection requirements can be altered at the first Treaty review conference. Finally, with the rapid development of nuclear technology, secrecy on inventions will be valuable for only a short time and the risks of damage resulting from leaks will be correspondingly small. More likely in a competitive market, advertising rather than secrecy will be the normal rule for sellers. Regardless of their validity, these admonitions, at a minimum, give the industry-conscious conservatives cause for considerable procrastination.

To date such delays have been the government's watchword. Seen in this light, Japan's Treaty signature in February, 1970, was mainly a shrewd tactical move dictated by external circumstances. It was foremost a necessary reciprocal gesture for the promised American return of Okinawa. After casting her lot with the non-nuclear powers during negotiation, Japan's action was also an appropriate follow-up to the Federal Republic of Germany's signature

²¹³See, for example, a formal protest to MITI and the Foreign Ministry by the Federation of Electrical Power Companies over shutdown of Japan's Tsuruga power station. Nuclear Engineering, May 1971, p. 371. Reactor shutdown is often necessary to measure accurately plutonium output or to calculate how much uranium is in the reactor core. Such checks, however, normally coincide with normal plant closure for maintenance and refueling operations. For a sample of more general complaints about the frequency IAEA inspections, see Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 26, 1970 in Daily, January 27, 1970, p. 2.

in December, 1969.²¹⁴ Furthermore, by signing the Treaty just before it entered into force, Japan could participate in upcoming Article III negotiations, thereby pressing her safeguard demands more effectively. Finally, if Tokyo had simply let the NPT become official, she would need to "accede" at a later date. That is, the government would have to sign and ratify in one operation without the political flexibility of the February signing maneuver.

Upon signing the NPT on February 3, 1970, Japan issued a statement detailing all her previous reservations: neither China nor France were signators; the Treaty should not hamper peaceful nuclear activities; the superpowers needed to make greater disarmament progress; the implementation of security guarantees would be closely monitored; safeguards must be simple, rational and uniformly applied.²¹⁵ Two passages of the Foreign Ministry's declaration tied Japanese ratification directly to these last three points.

The Government of Japan, pending its ratification of this Treaty, will pay particular attention to developments in disarmament negotiations and progress in the implementation of the Security Council Resolution on the security of non-nuclear weapon States and continue to make a close study of other problems which require consideration for the safeguarding of her national interests.²¹⁶

²¹⁴The Japanese press consistently linked West Germany's participation with that of Japan. In May, 1969, Sato and Chancellor Kiesinger in effect sanctioned this speculation by agreeing that the "two countries will promote consultation and cooperation on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," See Asahi Shimbun, May 20, 1969, and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 20, 1969 in Daily, May 22, 1969, p. 15.

²¹⁵Documents on Disarmament, 1970, pp. 2-5; Asahi Shimbun, February 4, 1970 in Daily, February 4, 1970, p. 3; Mainichi Shimbun, February 4, 1970 in Daily, February 5, 1970, pp. 1 and 2-3, respectively.

²¹⁶Documents on Disarmament, 1970, p. 3.

The safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with Article III of the Treaty must not be such as would subject her to disadvantageous treatment as compared with the safeguards agreements which other states parties conclude with the same agency, either individually or together with other states. The Government of Japan intends to give full consideration to this matter before taking steps to ratify the Treaty.²¹⁷

With this series of qualifications,²¹⁸ it appears doubtful that Japan will ever adhere to the NPT. The real danger in this situation is that pressure from Washington or internal events may push the Treaty into the center of Japan's domestic political stage. If caught in interparty and intraparty factional struggles, the NPT will be defined, not in international terms, but under conditions relevant to Japan's peculiar domestic milieu. The Opposition will be forced to create ad hoc rationalizations for defeat of the Treaty simply to seem different from the conservatives. The LDP, in

²¹⁷Ibid., p. 4. Foreign Minister Aichi subsequently stated that Japan must receive "Euratom-Level" safeguards before she will ratify the NPT. See Asahi Shimbun, February 3, 1970 in Daily, February 13, 1970, p. 12. Japan started bilateral safeguards negotiations with the IAEA in February, 1972.

²¹⁸Tokyo Shimbun, January 27, 1970, in Daily, January 28, 1970, p. 2. As the only major Japanese paper favoring the NPT, Tokyo Shimbun was particularly leery of these non-specific government objections to the Treaty:

If the LDP proposes such questions (about NPT implications for Japan's security, for peaceful atomic energy, etc.) from its position as the ruling Party, it will have a responsibility to classify the contents of such questions concretely. This kind of question, which is like a puzzle, cannot but deepen our suspicion that those who are calling for caution toward the signing of the Treaty have an intention, in fact, to arm ourselves with nuclear weapons and that they have called for caution in order to camouflage such an intention.

turn, will likely be immersed in a factional battle in which each habatsu leader would use the Treaty as an expedient stepping stone to enhance his personal power. Since opposition from every party revolves about similar questions of Japanese security and sovereignty,²¹⁹ an exhausting fight against Treaty ratification would commit all elements to a fundamentally anti-pacifist, independent position in world affairs. If a sudden crisis should force a change in external threat perception, the pacifist Opposition would be caught with their moral momentum going in the wrong direction. In short, the NPT could become a political football in a game where touch-down means a nuclear Japan.

²¹⁹Mainichi Shimbun, September 15, 1969 in Daily, September 30, 1969, p. 30, 1969, p. 30. In the concluding paragraph of its fifteen article series on the NPT, Mainichi pinpointed this relationship between Treaty opposition and nuclear incentives:

In the final analysis, it is the Japanese people who will decide ultimately Japan's nuclear policy. In this respect, it is worth noting that in our country today, there seem hardly any views in any circles positively supporting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Can it not be said that we can see a psychological basis for the emergence of a national consensus in this fact? And, will this not become linked with a good opportunity for the formulation of an 'autonomous' nuclear policy?

For the full series of articles, see Mainichi Shimbun, September 1-15, 1969 in Daily, September 3-30, 1969.

CONCLUSIONS

Study of the balance sheet gives at least even odds that Japan will become a nuclear power in the 1970's. Incentives for weapon acquisition are strong and increasing. Nuclear arms would be potent prestige symbols, giving a status-conscious Japan political power commensurate with her economic prowess. The continued growth of China's arsenal demands a countervailing capability. Washington's withdrawal from the Far East casts the American deterrent in an uncertain light. Technological advances continually narrow the gap between peaceful and civilian nuclear efforts. A nuclear Japan would enjoy the dual security benefits of absolute control over her destiny and of new power in a previously punchless foreign policy.

The obstacles to atomic arms are equally powerful but in many cases are waning. Violent opposition to such a move from public, press, business and the scientific community promises unprecedented internal turmoil. The cost of special weapons would hinder Japan's economic growth. Legal constraints--Article 9, the Basic Atomic Energy Law and the Test Ban Treaty--are compelling moral barriers. The vulnerability of any Japanese force de frappe might render it strategically useless. A fearful Asia might react by isolating Tokyo from its vital markets. Nuclear devices would 'irrevocably establish an adversary relationship between Japan and the PRC.

The next few years will be a period of transition and preparation for Japan. She will continue rocket development and peaceful atomic programs, keeping technical options open while accumulating human and material resources to cope with future contingencies. Should the international situation require it, Japan could then develop a nuclear capability with considerable speed at a time when domestic attitudes would be more receptive.

This technological advance in itself will provide a powerful push toward special weapons development. The renunciation of atomic arms is not a difficult policy decision when no capability to produce them exists and when no serious challenge, political or military, is present. An alteration in either condition produces greater inducements for fission devices, a change in both generates an almost inescapable momentum toward nuclear development. The dynamics of this process are unmistakable: Any political decision for weapons manufacture cannot be taken unless the technical capacity exists; the existence of technology alone makes a weapons decision easier to reach; the presence of an external threat merely makes an affirmative decision more likely. Incremental technological gains are clearly moving Japan in this direction, and political factors, though less apparent, also seem to be aiding the advance. It is not without significance that a Japanese Foreign Ministry study of the merits and demerits of joining the NPT failed to note a single merit in foregoing national nuclear arsenals.²²⁰

At any time, specific world events, such as a security crisis in Korea or Taiwan, might sufficiently jeopardize Japanese interests to propel her toward a nuclear course. Certainly Japan's political system breeds a type of reactive foreign policy which makes her uniquely susceptible to these external upheavals. More likely is a steady buildup of political pressures forcing a decision in the late seventies. Japan's increased suspicion of a nuclear China, a desire for more independence from the United States and the wish for greater political influence will probably grow in the next several years, and, unless Asia experiences a dramatic transition from

²²⁰"Merits and Demerits of Participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," Asahi Shimbun, October 13, 1969 in Daily, October 10-13, 1969, p. 30.

President Nixon's 'era of confrontation to one of negotiation,' such inducements may soon become irresistible to Japan. Their compelling nature derives from the fact that all these incentives are, directly or indirectly, related to Japanese security. As illustrated by debate over the NPT, Tokyo is deeply concerned about the need for a reliable nuclear shield to insure Japan's security and to protect her national interests. Although seldom clearly addressed, one major issue for the Japanese was the credibility of Washington's deterrent as embodied in the Security Treaty. If the Security Treaty was accepted as providing adequate defense guarantees, it would have been pointless to criticize the NPT for not furnishing Japan with reliable strategic protection. Yet Tokyo opposed the Treaty on precisely these grounds.

In broader terms, the NPT debate within Japan showed her leader's growing uneasiness over the present nature of their American alliance. Even if a mutual military need exists, the maintenance of any alliance usually requires a convergence of interests that goes well beyond a common desire for security. In the past, American preponderance in Asia has mitigated the need for such a convergence. If the Security Treaty is to remain viable in the future, Japan must perceive a United States willingness to risk conventional or even nuclear war with China in defense of Japanese interests for reasons other than simple territorial integrity. The American commitment must apply to the full range of Japan's current regional endeavors and must not be subject to deterioration when China's strategic force becomes capable of striking the United States. Given present trends of the Nixon Doctrine, such a future guarantee is at best unlikely. This development implies that Tokyo's client defense relationship with Washington

must eventually change to accommodate each nation's divergent interests.

It is the timeless question of old myths and new realities:

There is nothing constant in the universe; all ebb and
flow, and every shape that is born bears in its womb
the seeds of change.

Ovid, Metamorphoses

In relations between states as in those between humans, there are few constants. The Security Treaty is a rigid clamp on a fluid situation. It reflected reality in the bipolar era of the 1950's, but, in its present form, the Treaty can no longer accommodate Japan's evolving interests.

The NPT's major shortcoming is that it forces Japan's continued reliance on the Security Treaty as a means of defense for all her interests. But the Security Treaty itself is relevant only in those instances when American and Japanese interests are identical by chance or when Japan is under direct attack. The Security Treaty and NPT security assurances provide reliable protection only for the most basic Japanese interest--survival.

The United States has exacerbated Japan's anxiety by pressuring her to adopt mutually incompatible positions: a greater military role in Asia under the Nixon Doctrine and participation in the NPT. At the very time when economic problems are widening the gap between both nations, Washington is asking Tokyo to raise its conventional military posture in the Far East while abandoning its nuclear option for exclusive reliance on American strategic might. The assumption underlying White House strategy is that Japan's response to present political problems will parallel her quick, rational adjustment to past economic difficulties. This approach ignores the dynamics of Japanese politics as well as the nature of the desired objectives. The concrete goal of maximizing profits is vastly different from the ambiguous aims of security and national sovereignty.

Since Japan's legitimate national interests extend well beyond the home islands, future Chinese actions will be her greatest worry. Yet Vietnam has demonstrated the limited utility of American military power to counter a Chinese-style war of national liberation. As one Indian observer noted:

...the naval, air, and nuclear power of the United States is by itself no answer to subversion or guerrilla warfare; no answer to an infantry push by the Chinese; no answer to a limited use of tactical nuclear weapons by the Chinese artillery; no answer to the score raids and no answer to blackmail.

...But these are precisely the contingencies which the Chinese are likely to create in the near future. They will not create contingencies in which U.S. power is a relevant deterrent.²²¹

The unavoidable conclusion is that United States' power, nuclear and to a lesser extent conventional, is not a relevant asset for dealing with conflict in East Asia. The Nixon Doctrine is in one sense a recognition of American inability to counter limited, local threats throughout the Far East.²²² Its explicit message is an increased emphasis on strategic strength; its implicit corollary is that Washington will tolerate a higher level of regional conflict in Asia. Subsequent American actions have merely reaffirmed the same theme: The United States will no longer make an automatic military response to communist insurgencies in Asia. For Japan the implications are ominous, if uncertain. They do insure, however, that her

²²¹Raj Krishna quoted in Wentz, Nuclear Proliferation, p. 45.

²²²The Japanese government has also recognized this fact. See "Japanese Defense Policy" Survival, p. 3. In the words of the Defense White Paper:

The development of strategic nuclear weapons systems and the global collective security arrangements in various parts of the world prevent the outbreak of large-scale wars. But this has not been instrumental in deterring limited wars and guerrilla wars involving the use of conventional weapons.

perception of the Chinese threat will be locked into an inverse relationship with American presence in the Far East. Not only will Japan's threat perception increase with the absolute rise of China's military potential, but it will also grow as Washington achieves a lower Asian profile.

Unless the United States discards the Nixon Doctrine and remains substantially engaged in Asia, Japan must eventually decide to "fish or cut bait" in international politics. This decision and the circumstances under which it is reached will determine Japan's possession of nuclear weapons. If she desires firm control of her destiny, Japan must participate in the drama of power politics for which strategic arms are a vital prerequisite. It seems doubtful that Japan will entrust indefinitely the military protection of her national interests to the United States or to the vicissitudes of a military balance controlled by others. It is likewise incredulous that Japan can attain the status of a great power unless she provides herself with the military might that such a status has required in the past. If Tokyo succeeds in avoiding these demands, the world may well witness the coming of a millennium in international relations. Yet Japan's present ostrich approach, by continuing to neglect great power responsibilities, could also have disastrous consequences for global peace. In any event, current security imperatives and Japan's long-term national interests seem to compel her active participation in international affairs. Japan today is a ship adrift in the turbulent waters of world politics. To steady herself and sail safely through future tempests, she may ultimately require nuclear ballast.

APPENDIX I

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, Entered Into Force March 5, 1970

*(Signature at Washington, and on July 1, 1968, unless otherwise indicated.
States which have deposited their instruments of ratification are underlined and, the first date of deposit is indicated in parentheses.)

<u>Afghanistan</u> (2/4/70)	<u>Honduras</u>
<u>Australia</u> 2/27/70	<u>Hungary</u> (5/27/68)
<u>Austria</u> (6/27/69)	<u>Iceland</u> (7/18/69)
<u>Barbados</u>	<u>Indonesia</u> 3/2/70
<u>Belgium</u> 8/20/68	<u>Iran</u> (2/2/70)
<u>Bolivia</u> (5/26/70)	<u>Iraq</u> (M)** (10/29/69) (M)**
<u>Botswana</u> (4/28/69) (L)**	<u>Ireland</u> (7/1/68)
<u>Bulgaria</u> (9/5/69)	<u>Italy</u> 1/28/69
<u>Cameroon</u> 7/17/68 (1/8/69)	<u>Ivory Coast</u>
<u>Canada</u> 7/23/68 (1/8/69)	<u>Jamaica</u> 4/14/69 (3/5/70)
<u>Central African Republic</u>	<u>Japan</u> 2/3/70
(10/25/70)+	<u>Jordan</u> 7/10/68 (2/11/70)**
<u>Ceylon</u>	<u>Kenya</u> (6/11/70) (M)**
<u>Chad</u> (M)**	<u>Korea, Republic of</u>
<u>China, Republic of</u>	<u>Kuwait</u> 8/15/68
(1/27/70)	<u>Laos</u> (2/20/70)
<u>Colombia</u>	<u>Lebanon</u> (7/15/70)
<u>Congo (Kinshasa)</u> 7/22/68	<u>Lesotho</u> 7/9/68 (5/20/70)
(8/4/70)	<u>Liberia</u> (3/5/70)
<u>Costa Rica</u> 3/3/70	<u>Libya</u> 7/19/68
<u>Cyprus</u> (2/10/70)	<u>Luxembourg</u> 8/14/68
<u>Czechoslovakia</u> (7/22/69)	<u>Malagasy Republic</u> 8/22/68
<u>Dahomey</u>	(10/8/70)
<u>Denmark</u> (1/3/69)	<u>Malaysia</u> (3/5/70)
<u>Dominican Republic</u>	<u>Maldives Islands</u> 9/11/70
<u>Ecuador</u> 7/9/68 (3/7/69)	(4/7/70)
<u>El Salvador</u>	<u>Mali</u> 7/14/69 (2/10/70)
<u>Ethiopia</u> 9/5/68 (2/5/70)	<u>Malta</u> 4/17/69 (2/6/70)
<u>Finland</u> (2/5/68)	<u>Mauritius</u> (4/8/69)
<u>Gambia</u> 9/20/68	<u>Mexico</u> 7/26/68 (1/21/69)
<u>German Democratic Republic</u>	<u>Mongolia</u> (M)** (5/14/69) (M)**
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of</u>	<u>Morocco</u> (12/16/70)
11/28/69	<u>Nepal</u> 1/5/70
<u>Ghana</u> (5/5/70)	<u>Netherlands</u> 8/20/68
<u>Greece</u> (3/11/70)	<u>New Zealand</u> (9/10/69)
<u>Guatemala</u> 7/26/68	<u>Nicaragua</u>
(9/22/70)	<u>Nigeria</u> (9/27/68)
<u>Haiti</u> (6/2/70)	
<u>Holy See</u>	

Appendix I continued

<u>Norway</u> (2/5/69)	<u>Syria</u> (M)** (9/24/69) (M)**
<u>Panama</u>	<u>Togo</u> (2/26/70)
<u>Paraguay</u> (2/4/70)	<u>Trinidad & Tobago</u> 8/20/68
<u>Peru</u> (3/3/70)	<u>Tunisia</u> (2/26/68)
<u>Philippines</u>	<u>Turkey</u> 1/28/69
<u>Poland</u> (6/12/69)	<u>United Arab Republic</u> (M-L)**
<u>Romania</u> (2/4/70)	<u>United Kingdom</u> (11/27/68)
<u>San Marino</u> (8/10/70)	<u>United States of America</u>
<u>Senegal</u> (12/17/70)	(3/5/70)
<u>Singapore</u> 2/5/70	<u>U.S.S.R.</u> (3/5/70)
<u>Somali Democratic Republic</u>	<u>Upper Volta</u> 11/25/68 (3/3/70)
(3/5/70)	<u>Uruguay</u> (8/31/70)
<u>Southern Yemen</u> 11/14/68 (M)**	<u>Venezuela</u>
<u>Sudan</u> 12/24/68 (M)**	<u>Vietnam, Republic of</u>
<u>Swaziland</u>	<u>Yemen Arab Republic</u> 9/23/68
<u>Sweden</u> 8/19/68 (1/9/70)	(M)**
<u>Switzerland</u> 11/27/69	<u>Yugoslavia</u> 7/10/68 (3/4/70)

*The United States has not accepted notification of the signature, nor of the deposit of ratification instrument, in Moscow, of the "German Democratic Republic."

**Denotes place of signature (or, if after parenthesized date, deposit) as follows:

(M) in Moscow only.
 (L) in London only.
 (ML) in Moscow and London.
 + Denotes instrument of accession.
 \$ Government not recognized by the United States

Total: 97 Signatures (88 of which were in Washington, D.C.)
 63 Deposits (57 of which were in Washington, D.C.)

Sources: U.S. Dept. of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Tenth Annual Report to Congress, (January 1, 1970--December 31, 1970) Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 41-42.

Eleventh Annual Report to Congress (January 1, 1971 - December 31, 1971) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 38-45.

APPENDIX II

United States Declaration on Security Assurances
to Non-Nuclear Nations, June 17, 1968

The Government of the United States notes with appreciation the desire expressed by a large number of States to subscribe to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We welcome the willingness of these States to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The United States also notes the concern of certain of these States that in conjunction with their adherence to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security. Any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States.

Bearing these considerations in mind, the United States declares the following:

Aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the United Nations Charter, which calls for taking "effective collective measures for the


prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." Therefore, any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.

The United States affirms its intention, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that is a victim of an aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

The United States reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

The United States vote for the draft resolution before us and this statement of the way in which the United States intends to act in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations are based upon the fact that the draft resolution is supported by other permanent members of the Security Council which are nuclear-weapon States and are also proposing to sign the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that these States have made similar statements as to the way in which they intend to act in accordance with the Charter.

APPENDIX III



- Simplified flow diagram for the nuclear fuel cycle of a power reactor using slightly enriched uranium fuel. According to one estimate the fuel cycle costs can be broken down as follows: natural uranium 0.27, conversion charge 0.05, enrichment charge 0.35, fabrication cost 0.40, reprocessing, charge 0.13, plutonium credit - 0.13, and spent uranium credit - 0.07.

Source: Gilinsky and Langer, Civilian Nuclear Program, p. 21.

APPENDIX IV

Prospect of Primary Energy Sources (in units of 10^{13} kcal)

Type of Energy	1967		1975		1980	
	Quantity	Percent	Quantity	Percent	Quantity	Percent
Water power	17.1	8.3	22.2	6.6	26.4	4.4
Nuclear power	.0		8.0	2.4	60.1	10.0
Coal	50.6	24.6	55.1	16.3	56.5	9.5
Domestic coal	(29.6)	(14.6)	(31.4)	(9.3)	(31.4)	(5.3)
Oil	132.8	64.7	246.2	72.8	446.9	74.8
Imported	(125.1)	(60.8)	(222.1)	(65.6)	(431.8)	(72.2)
Others (natural gas, charcoal, etc.)	5.0	2.4	6.9	1.9	7.8	1.3
Domestic	(4.9)	(2.3)	(5.1)	(1.4)	(4.8)	(0.8)
Totals	205.5	100.0	338.4	100.0	597.7	100.0
Domestically produced energy	52.4	25.5	59.6	17.6	63.5	10.6
Imported energy	153.1	74.5	278.8	82.4	534.2	89.4

Source: Nihon no Anzen Hosho. 1970 e no Tenbo. 1969 edition. Tokyo, 1969, p. 252. (Japan's Security. Outlook on 1970). Projections made by the Overall Energy Survey Council cited in Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power, p. 326.

Future Outlook of Japan's Power Generating Capacity (In Megawatts electric power, Mwe)

	1970	1975	1980	1985*	1990
Hydro	18,700	24,000	32,900	45,000	58,400
Fossil	37,000	75,000	91,200	121,000	105,800
Nuclear	<u>1,300</u>	<u>9,000</u>	<u>27,000</u>	<u>60,000</u>	<u>119,700</u>
Total	57,000	108,000	151,000	226,000	283,900

- Sources: 1) Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Atoms in Japan, September 1970 Supplement: United States Atomic Energy Commission, American Embassy, Tokyo, cited in Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power, p. 326.
- 2) Interim Report (Draft) of Overall Energy Dept., May 31, 1971 in Summaries, June, 1971, p. 62.

*Figures in this column are taken from source #2 as it reflects a more recent estimate than source #1. All other data are taken from source #1.

Atomic Reactors in Japan: Completed (+), Planned (#), or under Construction (\$) (As of Jan., 1972)

Name of Plant	Location	Reactor Type & Number	Output (MWE) Gross/Net	Efficiency %	Date of Pwr Oper.	Operator	Main Contractor
Tokai JPDR+	Tokai Mura	BWR1	12.5/11.2	25	8/63	JAERI	GE*
Tokai JAPCO+	Tokai Mura	Magnox 1	166/157	26.7	7/66	JAPCO	GE-SC*
Tsuruga 1+	Tsuruga	BWR1	357/341	32	3/70	JAPCO	GE*
Mihama 1+	Mihama	PWR1	340/320	33	11/70	KEPCO	West/MAPI*
Fukushima 1+	Tokyo	BWR1	/380	-	10/70	Tokyo	GE*
Mihama 2\$	Mihama	PWR1	500/470	34	6/72	KEPCO	MAPI
Fukushima 2\$	Tokyo	BWR1	780	-	73	Tokyo	GE
EFR Oarai \$	Ibaragiken	-	50	-	74	-	-
Shimane \$	Kashima	BWR1	/460	-	11/73	Chukogu	Hitachi*
Fukushima 3\$	-	-	/784	-	74	Tokyo Elect.	Toshida
Takahama 1#	Takahama	PWR1	826/781	34	8/74	KEPCO	West/MAPI
Hamoaka 1\$	Hamoaka	BWR1	540/500	25	11/74	Chubu	Toshida
Fukushima 4#	-	-	/784	-	-	-	-
Genkai 1#	-	-	/500	-	-	-	-
Hamoaka 2#	-	-	/500	-	-	-	-
Onagawa 1#	-	-	524/500	-	-	Tohoku	Toshida
Fugen ATR #	Tsuruga	-	200/165	-	75	PNC	Consortia
Takahama 2#	Takahama	PWR1	826/781	34	10/75	KEPCO	-
Oi #	Oshima	-	/1150	-	76	KEPCO	-
FRP Japan#	-	-	/300	-	-	-	-
Fukushima 5#	-	BWR1	/780	-	12/75	-	-
Tokai 3#	Tokai Mura	BWR1	/1100	-	76	-	-

Sources: Nuclear Engineering, January/February, 1971, p. 94.

Nuclear Engineering, May, 1971, p. 371.

Gilinsky and Langer, Civilian Nuclear Program, pp. 15 and 17.

Ryukichi Imai, "Japan and the Nuclear Age," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, XXVI (June, 1970), p. 38.

APPENDIX VI

Trade of East Asian Countries with Japan as a Percentage of Their Total Trade (1968) (In millions of U.S. Dollars)

Country ^a	Exports ^b		Imports ^b		Total		Rank (Total) Trade
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	
Burma	12.4	15.2	39.3	24.2	51.7	21.3	1
Cambodia	6.6	21.5	20.3	28.0	26.9	26.1	2
Communist China	224.2	16.9	325.5	29.5	549.7	22.6	1
Nationalist China	150.7	19.1	471.7	52.7	622.4	36.9	2 ^c
Indonesia	251.9	34.7	146.6	22.1	398.5	28.7	1
South Korea	101.6	22.1	602.7	46.1	704.3	36.5	1
							(identical with U.S.)
Malaysia	343.4	30.6	104.5	15.9	447.9	25.2	1
Philippines	398.0	48.3	411.1	32.1	809.1	38.5	2 ^c
Singapore	61.8	20.6	209.3	21.2	271.1	21.1	1
Thailand	147.0	34.4	365.5	35.8	512.5	35.4	1
South Vietnam	2.7	15.4	199.0	28.1	201.7	27.7	2

^aNorth Vietnam and North Korea have been omitted because trade data with Communist nations is incomplete. Laos has been omitted because it is not statistically significant.

^bAs reported by Japan.

^cPreliminary reports indicated that Japan had become the leading trading partner of both the Philippines and Nationalist China in 1970.

Sources: International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade Annual 1963-1967: Direction and Trade, June 1968, August 1968, February 1969, March 1969, April 1969, May 1969, June 1969, September 1969, November 1969, February 1970; Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook, 1969, cited in Donald C. Hellmann, "The Confrontation with Real-politik," in Balanced Defense: A Forecast of Japan's Security Policy to the Mid-1970's ed. by Janes W. Morley (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1972), p. 166.

APPENDIX VII

(1) Position of Defense Production in Industrial Production (100 million yen - %)

Year	Defense Production (a)	Industrial Production (b)	a/b
1958	1,016	92,464	1.1
1959	1,003	132,312	0.8
1960	1,158	169,068	0.7
1961	1,035	202,992	0.5
1962	1,201	203,498	0.6
1963	1,287	227,140	0.6
1964	1,610	266,379	0.6
1965	1,417	281,827	0.5
1966	1,476	326,388	0.5
1967	1,723	396,623	0.4
1968	1,708	462,845	0.4

(a) This column contains special procurement.

2)

Year	Defense Expenditures	GNP	Rate
1962	2,138	211,992	1.00
1963	2,475	244,640	1.01
1964	2,808	288,379	0.96
1965	3,054	317,869	0.96
1966	3,451	365,445	0.94
2nd Defense Plan Total	13,926	1,428,325	0.97
1967	3,870	430,963	0.89
1968	4,221	510,774	0.82
1969	4,838	599,022	0.80
1970	5,695		
1971	6,500		
(estimate)			
3rd Defense Plan Total	25,100		
(estimate)			
1972	8,500-9,000		
1973	9,500-10,000		
1974	10,500-11,000		
1975	12,000-12,050	*1,419,900	0.85
1976	13,500-14,000		
4th Defense Plant Total (estimate)	54,000-56,500		

*The prospect for 1975 under the New Economic and Social Development Plan.

(3) Overwhelming Weight of Mitsubishi (1969): 100 million yen - %

	Sum of money of contracts (a)	Rate to total of contracts	Total of sales (b)	a/b
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries	701.3	30.9	7,072.5	9.9
Kawasaki Heavy Industries	214.1	9.5	2,159.5	9.9
Ishikawajima-Harima	191.7	8.5	3,365.9	5.4
Mitsubishi Electric Machine	113.6	5.0	3,761.3	3.0
NEC	59.0	2.6	1,957.0	3.0
Toshiba	47.5	2.1	5,502.0	0.9
Hitachi, Ltd.	38.2	1.7	6,750.8	0.6
Komatsu Mfg.	36.4	1.6	2,076.4	1.8
Japan Aircraft Mfg.	28.2	1.2	-	
C. Itoh & Co.	23.8	1.1	2,564.3	0.1
Shimazu Mfg.	23.5	1.0	326.1	7.2
Daikin Industry	23.3	1.0	403.6	5.8
Fuji Heavy Industries	23.1	1.0	975.9	2.4
Maizuru Heavy Industries	22.6	1.0	-	
Sumitomo Heavy Machinery	21.8	1.0	904.8	12.4
Mitsui Shipbuilding	17.9	0.8	1,179.1	1.5
Tokyo Precision Instrument	17.9	0.8	144.7	2.4
Isuzu Motors	17.9	0.8	1,948.8	0.9
Okai Electric Industry	16.5	0.7	575.2	2.9
Fujitsu Ltd.	16.2	0.7	1,194.2	1.4

(Note) a/b is the rate of contracts to the total of sales, and not the rate of the defense production amount to the total of sales.

Source: "Reality of Defense Industry," Summaries, pp. 18 & 19.

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